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Abstract
A semantics for quantified modal logic is presented that is based on Kleene’s notion
of realizability. This semantics generalizes Flagg’s 1985 construction of a model of a
modal version of Church’s Thesis and first-order arithmetic. While the bulk of the
paper is devoted to developing the details of the semantics, to illustrate the scope of
this approach, we show that the construction produces (i) a model of a modal version
of Church’s Thesis and a variant of a modal set theory due to Goodman and Scedrov,
(ii) a model of a modal version of Troelstra’s generalized continuity principle together
with a fragment of second-order arithmetic, and (iii) a model based on Scott’s graph
model (for the untyped lambda calculus) which witnesses the failure of the stability of
non-identity.
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1 Introduction
Realizability is the method devised by Kleene [1945] to provide a semantics for intuitionistic
first-order number theory. In the course of its long history (cf. van Oosten [2002]), realizabil-
ity was subsequently generalized to fragments of second-order number theory and set theory
by Troelstra [1998], McCarty [1984, 1986], and others. The primary aim of this paper is to
present a systematic way of transforming these semantics into an associated semantics for
systems of classical modal logic, so that we obtain modal systems of first-order arithmetic,
fragments of second-order arithmetic, and set theory. The resulting systems validate not
intuitionistic logic but rather classical logic, so that while intuitionistic logic is used in the
construction of these modal systems, the logic of these modal systems is thoroughly classical.
The resulting semantics generalize the important but little-understood construction of
Flagg [1985], whose goal was to provide a consistency proof of Epistemic Church’s Thesis
together with epistemic arithmetic, a modal rendition of first-order arithmetic. Epistemic
Church’s Thesis (ECT) is the following statement:
(1.1) [(∀ n ∃ m ϕ(n,m))]⇒ [∃ e  ∀ n ∃ m ∃ q (T (e, n, q) ∧ U(q,m) ∧ϕ(n,m))]
In this, the quantifiers are understood to range over natural numbers, and T (e, n, q) is
Kleene’s T -predicate, which says that program e on input n halts and outputs a code for the
halting computation q, while U(q,m) says that the computation q has output value m. The
modal operator takes on an epistemic interpretation due to Shapiro [1985a], whereby ϕ
represents “ϕ is knowable”. ECT then expresses the computability of any number-theoretic
function which can be known to be total in the admittedly strong sense that it’s knowable
that the value of this function is knowable for each input.1
The extension of Flagg’s construction sits well with some of the original philosophi-
cal motivations for ECT and epistemic arithmetic. Shapiro’s motivation was to have an
object-language in which certain “pragmatic” properties of computable functions could be
expressed, where a property is “pragmatic” if an object has it or lacks it “in virtue of hu-
man abilities, achievements, or knowledge, often idealized” (Shapiro [1985a, p. 41], Shapiro
[1993, pp. 61-62]). Reinhardt’s interest stemmed from the observation that ECT together
with  ∀ n ( θ(n) ∨  ¬θ(n)) implies that θ(n) is recursive, thereby expressing the idea
that epistemically decidable predicates are as rare as recursive predicates [Reinhardt, 1985,
p. 185]. Given either of these motivations, one would obviously want to know what hap-
pens when the mathematical background is changed from arithmetic to other domains, and
thus it’s natural to seek to understand the extent to which Flagg’s construction may be
generalized.
Our semantics generalizes Flagg’s work by distinguishing between two roles played by
arithmetic in his original construction: on the one hand, arithmetic is used to formalize the
1There is some regrettable clash in terminology which ought to be mentioned at the outset. The modal
principle ECT as defined in (1.1) ought not be confused with the non-modal principle known as extended
Church’s Thesis sometimes abbreviated similarly. For a statement of extended Church’s Thesis, see Troelstra
and van Dalen [1988, volume 1 p. 199].
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standard notion of computation on the natural numbers, and on the other hand arithmetic
is used to provide the domain and the interpretation of the non-logical arithmetic primi-
tives. On our approach, the notion of computation is generalized to the setting of partial
combinatory algebras (cf. § 3), which roughly are algebraic structures capable of formalizing
the elementary parts of computability theory such as the s-m-n theorem, the enumeration
theorem, the recursion theorem, etc. These algebras are used to construct a space of truth-
values, and our semantics then maps modal sentences to elements of this space. Thus the
order of explanation in our work is the reverse of that found in earlier work on ECT and
epistemic arithmetic: whereas the earlier work attempted to use modal logic to explicate
the notion of computability, our work uses certain notions from computability to aid in the
explication of modality, at least in the minimal sense of providing a semantics for it.
While there are a number of different axiomatic systems for quantified modal logic, in
what follows we only need to work with a small number of them. Let’s define Q◦.K to be
the Hilbert-style deductive system for the basic modal predicate system K, as set out in
Fitting and Mendelsohn [1998, pp. 133-134] and Corsi [2002, p. 1487]. See the proof of
Theorem 6.12 below for an explicit listing of the axioms of Q◦.K. The system Q◦.K + CBF
is then simply Q◦.K plus the Converse Barcan Formula CBF:
(1.2)  ∀ x ϕ(x) ⇒ ∀ x  ϕ(x)
The system Q.K (with no ◦ superscript) results from the system Q◦.K by replacing the
Universal Instantiation Axiom
(1.3) ∀ y ((∀ x ϕ(x)) ⇒ ϕ(y))
with its free-variable variant:
(1.4) (∀ x ϕ(x))⇒ ϕ(y)
As is well known, Q◦.K does not prove CBF, but Q.K does [Hughes and Cresswell, 1996,
pp. 245-246]. Finally, if L is any set of propositional modal axioms, then let Q◦.L be the
system Q◦.K plus the L-axioms, and similarly for Q.L. In what follows, we’ll work almost
exclusively with Q◦.S4 + CBF and Q.S4, where S4 refers as usual to the T-axiom ϕ ⇒ ϕ
and the 4-axiom ϕ ⇒ ϕ. In particular, we appeal repeatedly to the common theorem
of Q◦.S4 + CBF and Q.S4 that  ∀ x ϕ(x) and  ∀ x  ϕ(x) are equivalent.
The final modal notation that we need pertains to identity, existence, and stability. We
expand the system Q◦.K (resp. Q.K) to the system Q◦eq.K (resp. Qeq.K) by adding the
following axioms, which respectively express the reflexivity of identity and the indiscernibility
of identicals, and wherein s, t range over terms in the signature:
t = t(1.5)
s = t⇒ (ϕ(t)⇒ ϕ(s))(1.6)
Further, if x is a variable, then let the existence predicate E(x) be defined by ∃ y y = x, where
y is a variable chosen distinct from x. Finally, if Γ is a class of formulas, then Γ-stability is
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the following schema, wherein ϕ is from Γ:
(1.7)  [∀ x (ϕ(x)⇒  ϕ(x))]
Most often in what follows we’ll focus on the stability of atomic formulas and their negations.
Finally, it’s perhaps worth mentioning that our notation for the systems Q◦eq.K and Qeq.K
is patterned after Corsi [2002], who additionally assumes the stability of the negation of
identity, which in general fails on our semantics. See the systems Q◦=.K and Q=.K on Corsi
[2002, p. 1498].
The systems of first-order arithmetic with which we shall work are Heyting arithmetic
HA, Peano arithmetic PA, and two versions of epistemic arithmetic which we call EA◦ and
EA. The first two are sufficiently well known from standard references such as Troelstra
and van Dalen [1988, volume 1 p. 126] and Ha´jek and Pudla´k [1998, p. 28], although it’s
perhaps useful to stipulate that in what follows the signature of both shall be taken to be
L0 = {0, S, f1, f2, . . .}, wherein 0 and S stand respectively for zero and successor and fi is an
enumeration of function symbols for the primitive recursive functions. Thus we take x < y
to be an abbreviation for f(x, y) = 0 for a suitable primitive recursive function [Troelstra
and van Dalen, 1988, volume 1 p. 124 Definition 2.7]. Then we define:
Definition 1.1. The system EA◦ is Q◦eq.S4 plus PA, and the system EA is Qeq.S4 plus PA,
where in both cases we include induction axioms for all formulas in the extended modal
language.
These definitions in place, we can now state what we take our generalization of Flagg’s
construction to establish in the setting of first-order arithmetic:
Theorem 1.2. The theory consisting of EA◦, CBF, and ECT is consistent with both the
failure of EA and the failure of the Barcan Formula BF:
(1.8) [∀ x  ϕ(x)]⇒ [ ∀ x ϕ(x)]
The proof of this theorem is presented in §8, and follows immediately from Theorem 8.3
and Theorem 8.5 and Proposition 8.7. Further, as we note in Theorem 8.3, the existence
predicate is a counterexample to (1.4). This admittedly clashes with Flagg’s own statement
of his results, as he takes himself to be working with EA instead of EA◦. We discuss this issue
more extensively immediately following Theorem 8.5. Finally, despite the centrality of the
Barcan Formula BF (1.8) to quantified modal logic, to our knowledge neither Flagg nor any
of the commentators on his results had indicated whether his model validated this formula,
and so it seems fitting to record this information in the statement of the above theorem.
However, see Shapiro [1985a, p. 20] for a discussion of the status of the Barcan Formula BF
in EA itself.
One distinctive feature of our Flagg-like construction is that it always produces the
stability of atomics (cf. Proposition 6.15 (i)). In the set-theoretic case, the membership
relation is atomic and so any set-theoretic construction a` la Flagg will induce the stability of
the membership relation. This places strong constraints on the types of set theory that can
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be shown to be consistent with ECT using these methods. For, consider any non-computable
set of natural numbers such as the halting set X = ∅′, and let Y = ω \ X be its relative
complement in the natural numbers. Then of course we have ∀ n ∈ ω (n ∈ X ∨ n ∈ Y ).
Then the stability of the membership relation implies that ∀ n ∈ ω ∃ y ∈ ω  ((n ∈ X ∧ y =
1)∨ (n ∈ Y ∧ y = 0)). But then ECT implies that X’s characteristic function is computable.
The moral of this elementary observation is that if one wants to show the consistency of
ECT with a modal set theory, and one proceeds by a construction which forces atomics to
be stable, then the modal set theory has to be something far different from just the usual
set-theoretic axioms placed on top of the quantified modal logic.
In what follows, we rather focus on a variant eZF of Goodman’s epistemic theory EZF
[Goodman, 1990, pp. 155-156]. Goodman’s theory includes a version of the axiom of choice,
and without this axiom, it is equivalent to Scedrov’s epistemic set theory ZFEC [Scedrov,
1986, p. 749-750]. This system is the successor to other versions of intensional or epistemic
set theories proposed by Myhill, Goodman, and Scedrov in their contributions to the volume
Shapiro [1985b] which also contains Flagg’s original paper. Since EZF is less familiar, let’s
begin by briefly reviewing this system. This system is built from Qeq.S4 by the addition of
the following axioms:
I. Modal Extensionality : ∀x ∀ y ((∀ z (z ∈ x⇔ z ∈ y))⇒ x = y)
II. Induction Schema: [∀ x ((∀ y ∈ x ϕ(y))⇒ ϕ(x))]⇒ [∀ x ϕ(x)]
III. Scedrov’s Modal Foundation: [ ∀ x ((∀ y ∈ x ϕ(y))⇒ ϕ(x))]⇒ [ ∀ x ϕ(x)]
IV. Pairing : ∀ x, y ∃ z  (∀ u (u ∈ z ⇔ (u = x ∨ u = y)))
V. Unions : ∀ x ∃ y  (∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔ ∃ v (v ∈ x ∧ z ∈ v)))
VI. Comprehension: ∀ x ∃ y (∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔ (z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z)))
VII. Modal Power Set : ∀ x ∃ y  ∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔  (∀ u (u ∈ z ⇒ u ∈ x)))
VIII. Infinity : ∃ u  [∃ y ∈ u  (∀ z z /∈ y)
∧(∀ y ∈ u ∃ z ∈ u  ∀ v (v ∈ z ⇔ (v ∈ y ∨ v = y)))]
IX. Modal Collection:
[ (∀ y ∈ u ∃ z ϕ(y, z))]⇒ [∃ x  ∀ y ∈ u ∃ z ((z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(y, z)))]
X. Collection: [∀ y ∈ u ∃ z ϕ(y, z)]⇒ [∃ x ∀ y ∈ u ∃ z ∈ x ϕ(y, x)]
In Goodman’s earlier paper, “A Genuinely Intensional Set Theory” [see Goodman, 1985, p.
63], the Modal Extensionality Axiom (Axiom I) is explained by noting that the objects in
the theory’s intended domain of discourse are not sets in the conventional sense, but should
be understood rather as “properties.” Accordingly, one identifies x and y not when they
have the same elements, but when they knowably have the same elements. In the schemas
II, III, VI, IX, X, the formulas can be any modal formulas in the signature of the membership
relation, which may contain free parameter variables. Further, in this enumeration of the
axioms, we’ve omitted Goodman’s version of the axiom of choice, since its statement is
complicated in the absence of full extensionality and since Scedrov’s axiomatization contains
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no similar such axiom.
The only atomic in EZF besides identity is the membership relation, and one can check
that Goodman’s construction does not in general satisfy the stability of the membership
relation. However, in this system there is the following entailment:
Proposition 1.3. EZF plus the stability of the membership relation implies the stability of
the negation of the membership relation.
Proof. Consider the following instance of the Comprehension Axiom VI of EZF:
(1.9) ∀ p ∀ x ∃ y  (∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔ (z ∈ x ∧ z /∈ p))
We may argue that this implies the following:
(1.10) ∀ p, x, z ((z ∈ x ∧ z /∈ p)⇒ (z /∈ p))
For, let p, x, z satisfy the antecedent. Let y be the witness from (1.9) with respect to this
x and p. From z ∈ x ∧ z /∈ p we can infer to z ∈ y, and from this and the stability of
the membership relation we can infer to (z ∈ y). But then from (1.9) we have (z /∈ p).
So indeed (1.10) holds. But since EZF proves ∀ z ∃ x z ∈ x (for instance by the Pairing
Axiom IV), we then have that EZF proves
(1.11) ∀ p, z ((z /∈ p)⇒ (z /∈ p))
Then by necessitation, we obtain the stability of the negation of the membership relation.
As we will see in §9, Flagg’s construction applied to the set-theoretic case satisfies the
stability of atomics but not the stability of negated atomics (cf. Proposition 9.6). Thus the
previous proposition implies that the type of set theory modeled by this construction will be
slightly different from EZF. Hence, we introduce the following modification:
Definition 1.4. The theory eZF consists of Qeq.S4 plus (i) the following axioms of EZF:
Axiom I (Modal Extensionality), Axiom III (Scedrov’s Modal Foundation), Axiom IV (Pair-
ing), Axiom V (Unions), Axiom VII (Modal Power set), Axiom VIII (Infinity), and (ii) the
following axioms:
VI. Comprehension: ∀ x ∃ y (∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔ (z ∈ x ∧  ϕ(z))))
X. Collection: [∀ y ∈ u ∃ z  ϕ(y, z)]⇒ [∃ x ∀ y ∈ u ∃ z ∈ x  ϕ(y, x)]
Hence, outside of the comprehension schema, the primary difference between the two systems
is that eZF lacks Axiom II (Induction Schema) and Axioms IX-X (Modal Collection and
Collection) of the system EZF. It compensates by including versions of comprehension and
collection for formulas which begin with a box. Our result is that when we apply Flagg’s
construction to a set-theoretic setting, we obtain the following:
Theorem 1.5. The theory consisting of eZF, ECT, and the stability of atomics is consistent
with the failure of the stability of negated atomics.
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This theorem is proven in §9 below, and in particular is an immediate consequence of Propo-
sition 9.3, Proposition 9.6, and Proposition 9.8. In Theorem 1.5, like in all set-theoretic
formalizations of Epistemic Church’s Thesis, one understands ECT to be rendered by bind-
ing all the variables to the set-theoretic surrogate for the natural numbers guaranteed by the
Infinity Axiom (Axiom VIII).
The bulk of this paper is devoted to developing the details of our realizability semantics
for quantified modal logic. In §2 we describe a general class of prealgebras, called Heyting
prealgebras, which serve as the basis for the truth-values of the many-valued structures which
we shall build in later sections. Further, in this section we emphasize a generalized double-
negation operator which in our view is critical to the overall construction. In §3 we describe
how to build Heyting prealgebras out of partial combinatory algebras. We there describe
three important examples of partial combinatory algebras: Kleene’s first model (the model
used in ordinary computation on the natural numbers), Kleene’s second model (related to
oracle computations), and Scott’s graph model (used to build models of the untyped lambda
calculus).
Then in §4 we describe how to transform Heyting prealgebras based on partial combina-
tory algebras into Boolean prealgebras with a modal operator, where the relevant distinction
is that Boolean prealgebras validate the law of the excluded middle whereas Heyting preal-
gebras do not in general. Prior to proceeding with the construction proper, in §5 we focus
on delimiting the scope of the modal propositional logic validated in these modal Boolean
prealgebras. Then, in §6, we show how to associate a modal Boolean-valued structure to
certain kinds of Heyting-valued structures. In §7 we describe two general results on this
semantics, namely the Go¨del translation and Flagg’s Change of Basis Theorem.
In §8 we apply this construction to the arithmetic case and obtain Theorem 1.2 and in
§9 we apply the construction to the set-theoretic case and establish Theorem 1.5. These two
constructions use the partial combinatory algebra associated to Kleene’s first model, namely
the model used in ordinary computation on the natural numbers. To illustrate the generality
of the semantics constructed here, in §10 we build a model of a fragment of second-order
arithmetic which employs Kleene’s second model and which validates a modal version of
Troelstra’s generalized continuity scheme. This modal version then stands to second-order
arithmetic with low levels of comprehension roughly as ECT stands to first-order arithmetic
(cf. Theorem 10.4). Finally, in §11, we employ Scott’s graph model and use it to build a
simple example wherein the stability of the negation of identity fails (cf. Proposition 11.4).
Before proceeding, it ought to be explicitly mentioned that ours is not the first attempt
to revisit Flagg’s important construction. In particular, Flagg’s advisor Goodman did so in
1986, remarking that Flagg’s original presentation was “not very perspicuous” (cf. Goodman
[1986, p. 387]). In addition to generalizing from the arithmetic to the set-theoretic realm,
one difference between our approach and that of Goodman is that he worked only over a
single partial combinatory algebra, namely that of the ordinary model of computation on the
natural numbers. Further, Goodman’s proof proceeds via a series of syntactic translations
between intuitionsitic arithmetic, epistemic arithmetic, and a modal intuitionistic system.
By contrast, our methods are entirely semantic in nature, and carry with it all the benefits
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and limitations of a semantic approach. For instance, while we get lots of information about
independence from the axioms, we get little information about the strength of the axioms.
See the concluding section §12 for some more specific questions about deductive features of
the axiom systems modeled in this paper.
2 Heyting Prealgebras and the Generalized Double-
Negation Operator
In this section, we focus on Heyting prealgebras and a certain operator 	 which is formally
analogous to double negation. A Heyting prealgebra H is given by a reflexive, transitive order
≤ on H such that there is an infimum x ∧ y and supremum x ∨ y of any two element subset
{x, y} ⊆ H, and a bottom element ⊥, a top element >, and such that there is a binary
map ⇒ satisfying x ∧ y ≤ z iff y ≤ x ⇒ z for all x, y, z ∈ H. Hence, overall, a Heyting
prealgebra is given by the signature (H,≤,∧,∨,⊥,>,⇒). Hereafter, we will use the notation
¬x to denote x ⇒ ⊥, and x ≡ y as an abbreviation for x ≤ y and y ≤ x. If t(x), s(x) are
terms in the signature of Heyting prealgebras, then atomic formulas of the form t(x) ≤ s(x)
will be called reductions or sometimes inequalities, while atomics of the form t(x) ≡ s(x)
will be called equivalences. Further, given the close connection between reductions and the
conditional, in the context t(x) ≤ s(x), the term t(x) will be called the antecedent and the
term s(x) will be called the consequent. As one can easily verify, the following are true on
any Heyting prealgebra (cf. Proposition B.1 in Appendix B):
x ∧ (x⇒ z) ≤ z(2.1)
x ≤ y implies y ⇒ z ≤ x⇒ z(2.2)
(x⇒ y) ∧ (y ⇒ z) ≤ x⇒ z(2.3)
Suppose that H is a Heyting prealgebra and d is in H. Then we define the map 	d : H→
H by 	d(x) = (x⇒ d)⇒ d. Obviously if d = ⊥, then 	d(x) = ¬¬x, and so we can think of
	d as a kind of generalization of the double-negation operator. This map 	d : H→ H then
has the following properties (cf. Proposition B.2 in Appendix B):
x ≤ y implies 	d (x) ≤ 	d(y)(2.4)
x ≤ 	d(x)(2.5)
	d (	d(x)) ≤ 	d(x)(2.6)
	d (	d(x)) ≡ 	d(x)(2.7)
	d (x ∧ y) ≡ 	d(x) ∧ 	d(y)(2.8)
	d (x⇒ y) ≤ 	d(x)⇒ 	d(y)(2.9)
	d (x ∨ y) ≥ 	d(x) ∨ 	d(y)(2.10)
	d (d) ≤ d(2.11)
d ≤ 	d(x)(2.12)
	d (>) ≡ >(2.13)
	d (x)⇒ d ≡ x⇒ d(2.14)
Notationally, we may write 	dx for 	d(x). Further, we stipulate that 	d binds tightly, so
that, e.g., writing 	dx ∨ y will refer not to 	d(x ∨ y) but to (	dx) ∨ y. The map 	d is
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denoted by d in Flagg [1985, Example 8.3 p. 133], but we avoid this terminology due to the
received use of the diamond symbol for the modal operator.
There is a strong connection between Heyting prealgebras and intuitionistic logic. Fol-
lowing the tradition in many-valued logics, let’s say that a formula ϕ of propositional logic
is valid in a Heyting prealgebra if the homophonic translation of this formula into an ele-
ment of the prealgebra is equivalent to the top element of the prealgebra. Further, let IPC
designate the intuitionistic propositional calculus [Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, Definition
2.1.9, volume 1 p. 48]. One can then show that if IPC ` ϕ, then ϕ is valid in any Heyting
prealgebra [Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, Theorem 13.5.3 volume 2 p. 705]. Intuitionistic
logic is also a natural logic to reason about Heyting prealgebras, and in Appendix B we
verify that (2.4)-(2.14) are provable in a weak intuitionsitic logic, a fact which will prove
useful in the subsequent sections (cf. in particular Proposition B.3, as well as the discussion
of uniformity in §3).
There is similarly a natural connection between Boolean prealgebras and classical logic. If
a Heyting prealgebra satisfies x∨¬x ≡ > (equivalently, x ≡ ¬¬x) for all elements x, then it
is called a Boolean prealgebra. Since the classical propositional calculus CPC simply extends
the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC by the law of the excluded middle, CPC ` ϕ
implies that ϕ is valid in any Boolean prealgebra. The purpose of the operator 	d is to map
a Heyting prealgebra H with element d to a Boolean prealgebra Hd wherein d is equivalent
to the bottom element. This is the substance of the following proposition with which we
close the section. This proposition is stated and a proof of it is sketched in Flagg [1985,
Theorem 8.4 p. 134].
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that H is a Heyting prealgebra and d ∈ H. Define the set
(2.15) Hd = {x ∈ H : 	dx ≡ x}
Then Hd has the structure of a Heyting prealgebra, where the operations are defined by
restriction from H, except in the case of join and falsum, which we define as follows:
(2.16) f ∨d g = 	d(f ∨ g), ⊥d = 	d(⊥)
Further, Hd is a Boolean prealgebra and ⊥d ≡ d and ¬d¬dx ≡ 	dx.
Proof. For the proof, let us explicitly name the components of the structure on Hd:
(2.17) (Hd,≤d,∧d,∨d,⊥d,>d,⇒d)
where these are defined by restriction of H to Hd, except in the case of join and falsum which
are defined as in equation (2.16). Since ≤d is the restriction of the preorder ≤ on H to Hd,
of course ≤d is a preorder on Hd. Since they are defined by restriction, technically we have
∧d,∨d,⇒d: Hd×Hd → H. Let us argue that the codomain of these operations is in fact Hd.
So suppose that x, y ∈ Hd. First note that x ∧d y ∈ Hd. For, it follows from equation (2.8)
that 	d(x ∧ y) ≡ 	dx ∧ 	dy ≡ x ∧ y. Second note that
(2.18) 	d (x⇒ y) ≡ 	dx⇒ 	dy
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For, one half of this follows from equation (2.9). For the other half, note that since x, y ∈ Hd,
we can appeal to equation (2.5) to obtain 	dx ⇒ 	dy ≡ x ⇒ y ≤ 	d(x ⇒ y). From
equation (2.18), it follows that x⇒d y is in Hd, since x⇒ y ≡ 	dx⇒ 	dy ≡ 	d(x⇒ y).
Third, note that x ∨d y ∈ Hd. For equation (2.7) yields the second equivalence in the
following: 	d(x ∨d y) ≡ 	d(	d(x ∨ y)) ≡ 	d(x ∨ y) ≡ x ∨d y.
Since ∧d is defined by restriction, it follows immediately that x ∧d y is the infimum of
{x, y} in Hd. To see that x ∨d y is the supremum of {x, y} in Hd, note that x ≡ 	dx ≤
	d(x ∨ y) ≡ x ∨d y and y ≡ 	dy ≤ 	d(x ∨ y) ≡ x ∨d y, where the inequality comes from
equation (2.4) applied to x ≤ x ∨ y and y ≤ x ∨ y. Suppose now that z ∈ Hd with x, y ≤ z.
Then x∨ y ≤ z. Then by applying equation (2.4), we obtain x∨d y ≡ 	d(x∨ y) ≤ 	dz ≡ z.
Hence, this is why x ∨d y is the supremum of {x, y} in Hd. Since we have that ∧d and ⇒d
are the restrictions of ∧ and ⇒ to Hd, it follows that we automatically have the axiom for
the⇒-map. Finally, since ≤d is defined by restriction and > is in Hd by equation (2.13), we
have that > is the top element of Hd. As for the bottom element of Hd, suppose that x is
an arbitrary element of Hd. Then ⊥ ≤ x, and so 	d⊥ ≤ 	dx ≡ x by equation (2.4). Thus
it follows that Hd is a Heyting prealgebra.
To see that ⊥d = 	d(⊥) ≡ d, first note that ⊥ ≤ d and so 	d⊥ ≤ 	dd ≤ d, where the
first inequality comes from (2.4) and the second from (2.11). On the other hand, one has
that d ≤ 	d(⊥) by equation (2.12). So in fact we have ⊥d ≡ 	d(⊥) ≡ d.
Now we argue that Hd is a Boolean prealgebra. In our Heyting prealgebra Hd, negation
¬d is defined by ¬dx ≡ (x ⇒ ⊥d) ≡ (x ⇒ 	d⊥) ≡ (x ⇒ d). Note that it follows from
this that ¬d¬dx ≡ 	dx. To establish that Hd is a Boolean prealgebra, we must show that if
x ∈ Hd then ¬d¬dx ≡ x, or what is the same we must show 	dx ≡ x. But this is precisely
the condition to be an element of Hd in the first place.
3 Heyting Prealgebras from Partial Combinatory Al-
gebras
The goal of this section is to recall the definition of a partial combinatory algebra and to
describe some examples which will be relevant for our subsequent work. Our treatment
relies heavily on van Oosten [2008, Chapter 1]. The only way in which this differs from
his treatment is that we need to pay attention to certain uniformity properties delivered by
the standard construction of a Heyting prealgebra from a partial combinatory algebra. So
without further ado, here is the definition of a partial combinatory algebra (cf. van Oosten
[2008, p. 3], Beeson [1985, p. 100]):
Definition 3.1. A partial combinatory algebra, or pca, is a set A with a partial binary
function (a, b) 7→ ab and distinguished elements k and s such that (i) sab↓ for all a, b from
A, and (ii) kab = a for all a, b from A, and (iii) sabc = ac(bc) for all a, b, c from A.
The convention in pca’s is that one associates to the left, so that abc = (ab)c. Further,
“downarrow” notation in condition (i) of pca’s is borrowed from computability theory, so
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that in general in a pca, ab↓ indicates that the partial binary function is defined on input
(a, b). In any pca A, there are some elements beyond k and s to which it is useful to call
attention. First, the element skk serves as an identity element, in that one has skka = a
for all a from A. Second, there is the pairing function p and the two projection functions
p0, p1 such that p0(pab) = a and p1(pab) = b. Third, there is an element k˘ such that k˘ab = b.
Sometimes we use k and k˘ to code case splits, much like we might use 0 and 1 in other
contexts. It’s worth noting that van Oosten [2008, p. 5] uses the notation k instead of k˘, but
we opt for the latter because the former potentially clashes with notation for the numerals
introduced in equation (9.7). Finally, one has the following very helpful proposition, which
is sometimes used as an alternative characterization of a pca (cf. van Oosten [2008, p. 3],
Beeson [1985] p. 101):
Proposition 3.2. Let A be a pca and let t(x1, . . . , xn) be a term. Then there is an element
f of A such that for all a1, . . . , an from A one has fa1 · · · an↓= t(a1, . . . , an).
Sometimes in what follows we’ll have occasion to treat a pca as a first-order structure, and
there arises then the question of the appropriate signature. It’s helpful then to distinguish
between a few different options. The sparse signature takes merely s, k as constants, while
the expansive signature invokes the above proposition to recursively introduce a new constant
ft for any term t. Further, sometimes we’ll work with pca’s in which the binary operation is
total. The relational signature then takes the binary operation to be rendered as a ternary
relation, while the functional signature takes the binary operation as a binary function
symbol.
The paradigmatic example of a pca is Kleene’s first model K1, which has as its underlying
set the natural numbers and its operator (e, n) 7→ {e}(n), where this denotes the output, if
any, of the e-th partial recursive function run on input n. In Kleene’s first model K1, the
element k from condition (ii) is given by a program k which on input a calls up a program
for the constant function a. For the element s from conditions (i) and (iii), choose a total
recursive function s′′ such that s′′(a, b, c) is an index for the program which first runs input c
on index a to obtain e and second runs input c on index b to obtain index n, and then runs
input n on index e. Then choose total recursive function s′ such that s′(a, b) is an index for
a function which on input c returns s′′(a, b, c); and finally choose s to be a total recursive
function such that s(a) is an index for a function which on input b returns s′(a, b). The
functions k, s′′, s′, s all come from the s-m-n Theorem and so may be chosen to be total,
thus ensuring that condition (i) holds.
Two further pcas which will be of use in §§10-11 are Kleene’s second model K2 and Scott’s
graph model, and before describing these pcas it’s perhaps worth stressing that the reader
who is uninterested in these specific sections can safely skip our treatment of these other pcas.
Kleene’s second model K2 (cf. van Oosten [2008, pp. 15 ff] §1.4.3, Beeson [1985, §VI.7.4 p.
132]) has Baire space ωω = {α : ω → ω} as its underlying set. Recall that the topology on
Baire space has the basis of clopens [σ] = {α : ∀ i < |σ| α(i) = σ(i)} wherein σ is an element
of ω<ω, namely, the set of all strings σ : [0, `) → ω where ` ≥ 0 and we define length of σ
as |σ| = `. Strings of small length are sometimes explicitly written out as, e.g., (0, 5, 3) or
(57, 3, 25, 100), and a degenerate case is length 1 strings written out as, e.g., (0) or (57). Each
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σ from ω<ω is assumed to be identified with a natural number so that all the basic operations
on strings such as length σ 7→ |σ| and concatenation (σ, τ) 7→ σ_τ are computable. Finally,
each α from Baire space and each length ` ≥ 0 naturally determines an element α  ` of ω<ω
of length ` by restriction. Likewise, the concatenation (σ, α) 7→ σ_α is naturally defined to
be the element of Baire space which begins with σ along its length and then followed by α.
Baire space is of course a basic object of descriptive set theory, but the only part of that
theory that we need to recall is that the Gδ subsets are the countable intersections of open
sets, and that the subsets of Baire space whose relative topology is completely metrizable
are precisely the Gδ sets (Kechris [1995] p. 17). This hopefully motivates the attention paid
to Gδ sets in the context of Kleene’s second model, since it is these on which the relative
topology is most similar to that of the usual topology on Baire space.
In Kleene’s second model K2, the application function is defined in terms of oracle com-
putations. The relevant notation here is: {e}γ(n) denotes the e-th Turing program run on
input n and with the graph of the function γ on the oracle tape, and α ⊕ β is the effective
union of α and β which follows α on the evens and β on the odds. Then the application
function in K2 is defined as follows:
(3.1) (αβ)(n) = {e0}α⊕β(n)
where program e0 on input n, searches for the least ` such that α(((n)
_β)  `) has non-
zero value m + 1, and return m if such is found. It is very difficult to work directly with
this characterization of the application function, and so practically one proceeds by using the
following proposition, whose proof we relegate to Appendix A since while we use it frequently
in §10, we only use it in that section:
Proposition 3.3. (I) For every continuous function G : D → ωω with Gδ domain D ⊆ (ωω)n
there is γ such that G(α1, . . . αn) = γα1 · · ·αn for all (α1, . . . , αn) in D. (II) For every γ and
each n ∈ {1, 2}, the partial map (α1, . . . , αn) 7→ γα1 · · ·αn has Gδ domain and is continuous
on this domain.
Applying the Proposition 3.3.I to the first projection allows one to satisfy condition (ii)
of a pca, and with a little further ingenuity one can likewise obtain conditions (i) and (iii) of
a pca (cf. [van Oosten, 2008, pp. 17-18]). Further, Proposition 3.3.I implies that for every
index e ≥ 0 there is αe such that (αeβ)(n) = {e}β(n). Hence, Kleene’s second model K2 can
be understood as an “oracle computation” version of Kleene’s first model.
The final pca which is used in this paper is Scott’s graph model S (cf. van Oosten [2008,
§1.4.6 pp. 20-21], Scott [1975, pp. 157-165]). The pca S has domain P (ω), namely all subsets
of natural numbers. Often the pca is itself denoted as P (ω), but we will use S instead since
the semantics we develop involves us using a good deal of powerset notation. In the context of
Scott’s graph model S, the lower case Roman letters a, b, c, x, y, z and subscripted versions
thereof are reserved for elements of S, while we reserve n,m, ` and subscripted versions
thereof for natural numbers. Further, the letters d1, d2, . . . are reserved for a standard and
fixed enumeration of finite subsets of the natural numbers. For any x ∈ S, we define
[x] = {y ∈ S : x ⊆ y}. Then the topology on S has basis [dn], and the topology on Sk is
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the product topology. When the exponent k ≥ 1 is understood from context, we abbreviate
e.g. x = (x1, . . . , xk) and y = (y1, . . . , yk) and n = (n1, . . . , nk) and dn = (dn1 , . . . , dnk) and
[dn] = [dn1 ]× · · · × [dnk ]. Finally, we say that x ⊆ y if x1 ⊆ y1, . . . , xk ⊆ yk, and we say that
a function f : Sk → S is monotonic if x ⊆ y implies f(x) ⊆ f(y).
Scott then proved the following helpful characterizations of the open and closed sets and
the continuous functions [Scott, 1975, pp. 158-159], from which it immediately follows that
all continuous functions are monotonic:
Proposition 3.4. Suppose that U , C ⊆ Sk. Then (i) U is open iff for all x ∈ Sk, one has
x ∈ U iff ∃ n (dn ⊆ x ∧ dn ∈ U). Further, (ii) C is closed iff for all x ∈ Sk, one has x ∈ C
iff ∀ n (dn ⊆ x implies dn ∈ C).
Proposition 3.5. Suppose that f : Sk → S. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) For all x ∈ Sk, one has f(x) = ⋃dn⊆x f(dn).
(ii) The function f : Sk → S is continuous.
(iii) For all x ∈ Sk, one has m ∈ f(x) iff ∃ n (dn ⊆ x ∧ m ∈ f(dn)).
(iv) For all x ∈ Sk, one has dm ⊆ f(x) iff ∃ n (dn ⊆ x ∧ dm ⊆ f(dn)).
Using these propositions, we can define the application function and show that the axioms
of a pca are satisfied. In this, we fix a computable bijection 〈·, ·〉 : ω×ω → ω, and we iterate
in the natural way, e.g. 〈n,m, `〉 = 〈〈n,m〉, `〉. Then we define the application function as
follows:
(3.2) ab = {m : ∃ n ≥ 0 (〈n,m〉 ∈ a ∧ dn ⊆ b)}
When a is recursively enumerable, the thought behind this operation is that ab = c means
that “we can effectively enumerate c whenever we are given any enumeration of b” [Odifreddi,
1999, p. 827], with the variables changed in the quotation to match (3.2), cf. also Rogers
[1987, §9.7 pp. 145 ff], Scott [1975, p. 155, p. 160]. From (3.2), an induction on k ≥ 1 shows
that for all b = (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Sk one has
(3.3) ab1 · · · bk = {m : ∃ n (〈n,m〉 ∈ a ∧ dn ⊆ b)}
Note that unlike the other paradigmatic examples of pcas, the application operation (3.2)
here is total.
Like with Proposition 3.3, it’s helpful to articulate the connection between the continuous
functions and the application operation. However, in this setting the connection is much
tighter, due to the fact that the application operation (3.2) is total. In particular, we have
the following proposition due to [Scott, 1975, p. 160].
Proposition 3.6. (I) For any continuous function f : Sk → S there is a = graph(f) =
{〈n,m〉 : m ∈ f(dn)} such that for all b = (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Sk, one has f(b) = ab1 · · · bk.
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(II) For any a ∈ S, the function fun(a) : Sk → S given by fun(a)(b) = ab1 · · · bk is contin-
uous. (III) For any continuous function f : S → S, one has fun(graph(f)) = f . (IV) The
function graph ◦ fun : S → S is continuous and for all a ∈ S one has
(3.4) 〈n,m〉 ∈ graph(fun(a)) iff ∃ ` (〈`,m〉 ∈ a ∧ d` ⊆ dn)
This proposition allows us to quickly see that S is a pca. For k, simply apply the Proposi-
tion 3.6.I to the continuous map (a, b) 7→ a. For s, the function G(a, b) = a · b is continuous
by Proposition 3.6.II. Then the map H(a, b, c) = G(G(a, c), G(b, c)) is continuous and so by
Proposition 3.6.I there is s such that sabc = (ac)(bc). Hence, S is a pca.
However, the original interest in S is related to the untyped lambda calculus, and Scott
and Meyer produced a series of axioms describing when a pca yields a model of the untyped
lambda-calculus. These are the axioms at issue in the following proposition, where in a pca
we define 1 = 11 = s(k(skk)) and 1n+1 = s(k11)(s(k1n)):
Proposition 3.7. The pca S satisfies the axioms ∀ x, y kxy = x and ∀ x, y, z sxyz =
(xz)(yz) and 12k = k and 13s = s and the Meyer-Scott axiom (∀ x ax = bx)⇒ 1a = 1b.
For a proof of this proposition and the result that this constitutes a characterization of
models of the untyped lambda calculus, see Barendregt [1981, Corollary 18.1.8 p. 473] and
Barendregt [1981, Theorem 5.6.3 p. 117]. In our context, it will be useful to have a simpler
description of the action of 1 = s(k(skk)). By Proposition 3.6.I & III, there is c such that
cx = graph(fun(x)). It can then be shown that 1x = cx [Barendregt, 1981, Proposition
18.1.9.i p. 473, Lemma 5.2.8.ii p. 95], and so on S, the consequent of the Meyer-Scott
axiom can be expressed as graph(fun(a)) = graph(fun(b)). By considering the case of a = ∅
and b = ω, one can deduce from this and (3.4) the following elementary observation, which
we shall use later in §11 to provide an example of the non-stability of negated atomics (cf.
Proposition 11.4):
Proposition 3.8. There are a, b ∈ S such that 1a 6= 1b and for all x ∈ S one has ax 6= bx.
Before turning to a discussion of how pca’s give rise to Heyting prealgebras, let’s adopt
the following abbreviation: if e is from A and X, Y ⊆ A, then we say that
(3.5) e : X  Y iff ∀ a ∈ X ea↓∈ Y
In other standard treatments of pca’s, this is sometimes described simply by saying that e
realizes X ≤ Y [van Oosten, 2008, p. 6]. But since this notion will figure heavily in the
modal semantics in §6, it is useful to have some explicit notation for it. With this in place,
we can state two variations of the well-known result that pca’s allow one to generate Heyting
algebras. In the case of A = K1, the first of these is denoted by R in Flagg’s original paper
(cf. [Flagg, 1985, Theorem 9.1 p. 135]).
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Definition 3.9. Let A be a pca. Then the Heyting prealgebra structure on the powerset
P (A) of A is given by the following:
X ≤ Y iff ∃ e ∈ A e : X  Y
X ∧ Y = {pab : a ∈ X ∧ b ∈ Y }
X ∨ Y = {pka : a ∈ X} ∪ {pk˘b : b ∈ Y }
⊥ = ∅
> = A
X ⇒ Y = {e ∈ A : e : X  Y }
In this, recall from the discussion at the outset of this section that k, k˘ code case breaks
and that p is the pairing function with inverses p0 and p1. Finally, note that for every
X ∈ P (A), one has that X ≡ ⊥ or X ≡ >. Indeed, if X is empty, then of course X = ⊥.
So suppose that X is non-empty with element a. By Proposition 3.2, choose e in A such
that ex = a for all x from A, so that e : >  X and hence > ≤ X. And of course the
identity function witnesses X ≤ >. Hence, up to equivalence, the Heyting prealgebra P (A)
is only two-valued, and if one took its quotient one would then obtain a Boolean algebra.
But the Heyting prealgebra P (A) is still interesting because in §6 we will assign formulas
ϕ(y) to elements ‖ϕ(y)‖ of this Heyting prealgebra, and we will often be looking at how
‖ϕ(y)‖ varies with y uniformly, where y comes from some domain N (cf. Definition 6.3).
And just because for all X ∈ P (A) one has that X ≡ ⊥ or X ≡ >, does not mean that for all
sequences {Xy ∈ P (A) : y ∈ N} it is the case that (∀ y ∈ N Xy ≡ ⊥) or (∀ y ∈ N Xy ≡ >).
By consulting the proof of Proposition 1.2.1 from [van Oosten, 2008, p. 6], which verifies
that P (A) is actually a Heyting prealgebra, one can see that the Heyting prealgebra structure
on P (A) is highly uniform, in that there are ek from A for 1 ≤ k ≤ 12 such that for all
X, Y, Z ⊆ A and all a, a′ from A one has
e1 : X  X ∨ Y, e2 : Y  X ∨ Y
a : X  Z ∧ a′ : Y  Z implies e3(paa′) : X ∨ Y  Z
a : Z  X ∧ a′ : Z  Y implies e4(paa′) : Z  X ∧ Y
e5 : X ∧ Y  X, e6 : X ∧ Y  Y
e7 : X  >, e8 : ⊥ X, e9 : X  X
a : X  Y ∧ a′ : Y  Z implies e10(paa′) : X  Z
a′ : X ∧ Y  Z implies e11a′ : Y  (X ⇒ Z)
a′ : Y  (X ⇒ Z) implies e12a′ : X ∧ Y  Z
Further, all of e1, . . . , e12 can be taken to be terms in the ample relational signature of pcas
(cf. immediately after Proposition 3.2) and indeed the same terms will work for any pca.
From this uniformity, we also obtain the following associated Heyting prealgebra struc-
ture. In Flagg’s original paper, this was denoted by R(X ) (cf. Flagg [1985, p. 122, Theorem
9.3 p. 136]).
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Definition 3.10. Let A be a pca and let X be a non-empty set. Let F(X ) or the Flagg
Heyting prelagebra over X be the set of functions {f : X → P (A)}. Then the Heyting
prealgebra structure on F(X ) is given by the following:
f ≤ g iff ∃ e ∈ A ∀ x ∈ X e : f(x) g(x)
(f ∧ g)(x) = f(x) ∧ g(x)
(f ∨ g)(x) = f(x) ∨ g(x)
⊥(x) = ⊥ = ∅
>(x) = > = A
(f ⇒ g)(x) = f(x)⇒ g(x)
Usually in what follows, the pca A will be clear from context, and so failing to display the
dependence of F(X ) on A will not cause any confusion. As another natural piece of notation,
we extend the notation e : X  Y where X, Y ⊆ A to e : f  g where f, g from F(X )
by stipulating that this happens iff for all x from X one has e : f(x)  g(x). With this
notation, we have f ≤ g iff there is e from A such that e : f  g.
In what follows, considerations pertaining to uniformity will play an important role in the
proofs. The equivalences and reductions (2.4)-(2.11) can all be done in weak intuitionistic
theory, and this implies that there are uniform witnesses to these equivalences and reductions
in F(X ). For example, line (2.5) not only gives us f ≤ 	gf for all f, g ∈ F(X ), but also
gives us that there is a single witness e from A such that e : f  	gf for all f, g ∈ F(X ).
For a formal justification of this, see Appendix B and in particular Proposition B.3.
In what follows, we’ll say that an equivalence or inequality in F(X ) holds uniformly
when there are such uniform witnesses. A similar locution is used when we have sequences
of elements from F(X ). For instance, suppose we know that fi ≤ g uniformly in i ∈ I, in that
there is a single witness e from A with e : fi  g for all i ∈ I. Then we likewise know by (2.4)
that there is a single witness e′ such that e′ : 	Dfi  	Dg uniformly in i ∈ I and D ∈ P (A),
and we express this more compactly by saying that 	Dfi ≤ 	Dg holds uniformly in i ∈ I
and D ∈ P (A). Finally, given a sequence of elements {fi : i ∈ I} of F(X ), we define its union
and intersection pointwise by (
⋃
i∈I fi)(x) =
⋃
i∈I fi(x) and (
⋂
i∈I fi)(x) =
⋂
i∈I fi(x). Then
uniform reductions on sequences are sufficient for reductions concerning their intersection and
union. In particular, supposing that fi ≤ h uniformly, then one has
⋂
i∈I fi ≤
⋃
i∈I fi ≤ h.
Similarly, supposing that h ≤ fi uniformly, then one has h ≤
⋂
i∈I fi ≤
⋃
i∈I fi.
We close this section with two elementary propositions on F(X ) that will prove useful in
what follows, and that illustrate these uniformity considerations:
Proposition 3.11. For any two sequences {gi ∈ F(X ) : i ∈ I} and {fi ∈ F(X ) : i ∈ I} one
has uniformly in D ∈ P (A) that 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi ∧ fi) ≡ 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi ∧ 	Dfi).
Proof. The identity function witnesses that (gi ∧ fi) ≤
⋃
i(gi ∧ fi) uniformly in i ∈ I.
Then (gi ∧	Dfi) ≤ 	D(gi ∧ fi) ≤ 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi ∧ fi) uniformly in i ∈ I,D ∈ P (A) by (2.5) in
conjunction with (2.8), and then by (2.4). Then
⋃
i∈I(gi∧	Dfi) ≤ 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi∧fi) uniformly
in D ∈ P (A). Then uniformly in D ∈ P (A) we have 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi∧	Dfi) ≤ 	D	D
⋃
i∈I(gi∧
fi) ≡ 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi ∧ fi) by (2.4) and (2.7). Conversely, uniformly in i ∈ I and D ∈ P (A) we
have (gi ∧ fi) ≤ (gi ∧ 	Dfi) by (2.5). Then
⋃
i∈I(gi ∧ fi) ≤
⋃
i∈I(gi ∧ 	Dfi) uniformly in
D ∈ P (A). Then uniformly in D ∈ P (A) we have 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi∧fi) ≤ 	D
⋃
i∈I(gi∧	Dfi).
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Proposition 3.12. For any sequence {fi ∈ F(X ) : i ∈ I}, one has
⋂
i∈I fi ≡
⋂
D∈P (A)
⋂
i∈I 	Dfi.
Proof. To see that
⋂
i∈I fi ≤
⋂
D∈P (A)
⋂
i∈I 	Dfi, simply note that we have fi(x) ≤ 	Dfi(x)
uniformly in D ∈ P (A) and x ∈ X by line (2.5). Conversely, let e be a witness to (2.11) in
P (A), so that e : 	ZZ  Z for all Z ∈ P (A). Then suppose that n is in the intersection⋂
D∈P (A)
⋂
i∈I 	Dfi(x). To see that en is in intersection
⋂
i∈I fi(x), let i ∈ I be given and
consider D = fi(x). Then since n is in	Dfi(x) = 	DD, we then have that en is in D = fi(x),
which is what we wanted to show.
4 Construction of Boolean Algebras with Modal Op-
erator
In this section, we fix a pca A and present a general construction of a series of Boolean
prealgebras associated to arbitrary non-empty sets X using Proposition 2.1. In what follows,
we adopt the convention introduced in the last section that if X is an non-empty set, then
F(X ) denotes the set of functions {f : X → P (A)}, and we suppress the dependence of F(X )
on the underlying pca A. To get a sense of the notation, note that if X ,Y are two non-empty
sets, then under our conventions F(X ×Y) denotes the set of functions {f : X ×Y → P (A)}.
Often in what follows, we will be taking Y = P (A), and so it is important to take explicit
note of the relevant conventions, since we’re proceeding by suppressing the role P (A) plays
as the codomain of all the functions in F(X ×P (A)), but we’re explicitly displaying the role
that P (A) plays as a component of the domain of the functions in F(X × P (A)).
So let X be given and let pi : X × P (A)→ P (A) be the projection map pi(x, Z) = Z, so
that pi is a member of F(X × P (A)). Then 	pi : F(X × P (A)) → F(X × P (A)) is the map
defined by 	pi(f) = (f ⇒ pi)⇒ pi. Then define as in line (2.15) the set
(4.1) B(X ) = {f ∈ F(X × P (A)) : 	pif ≡ f}
Then as a consequence of Proposition 2.1, one has that B(X ) possesses the structure of a
Boolean prealgebra. In Flagg’s original paper, this was denoted by B(X ) and presented only
in the proof but not the statement of Flagg [1985, Theorem 10.1 p. 138]. See in particular
the discussion of the projection map as the “preferred element” on the top of Flagg [1985,
p. 139].
Often in what follows we will focus on a special case of the above construction wherein
X is a singleton. Since it will be the subject of special focus, and since choosing a specific
singleton with which to work would be awkward, we present the following definition. Let
id : P (A) → P (A) be the identity map id(Z) = Z, which is an element of F(P (A)). Then
recall that 	id : F(P (A))→ F(P (A)) is the map defined by 	id(f) = (f ⇒ id)⇒ id. Then
define as in line (2.15) the set
(4.2) B = {f ∈ F(P (A)) : 	idf ≡ f}
Then B too has the structure of a Boolean prealgebra.
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Before proceeding to the construction on the modal operator, let’s briefly note two ele-
mentary propositions pertaining to closure conditions in these Boolean prealgebras:
Proposition 4.1. (Proposition on B(X ) being closed under uniform intersections). Suppose
that a sequence {gi ∈ B(X ) : i ∈ I} is in B(X ) uniformly, in that there is e from A such
that all for all i ∈ I and D ∈ P (A) and x ∈ X one has e : 	Dgi(x,D) gi(x,D). Then the
intersection
⋂
i∈I gi is also in B(X ).
Proof. Let h(x,D) =
⋂
i∈I gi(x,D). Then the identity map is a witness to h(x,D) ≤ gi(x,D)
for all i ∈ I and D ∈ P (A) and x ∈ X . Then by (2.4) there is a witness e′ such that
e′ : 	Dh(x,D)  	Dgi(x,D) for all i ∈ I and D ∈ P (A) and x ∈ X . Then composing e′
with the postulated witness e yields a uniform witness e′′ such that e′′ : 	Dh(x,D) gi(x,D)
for all i ∈ I and D ∈ P (A) and x ∈ X . Then since h(x,D) = ⋂i∈I gi(x,D), we also have
that e′′ : 	Dh(x,D) h(x,D) for all D ∈ P (A) and x ∈ X .
The following proposition provides a closure condition which we appeal to repeatedly in
what follows. The name we give to this proposition reflects the fact that it’s not assumed
that the antecedent is a member of the Boolean prealgebra:
Proposition 4.2. (Proposition on Freedom in the Antecedent) Suppose that f ∈ B(X ) and
Q : X × P (A) → P (A). Let h : X × P (A) → P (A) be defined by h(x,D) = (Q(x,D) ⇒
f(x,D)). Then h ∈ B(X ).
Proof. We must show 	Dh(x,D) ≤ h(x,D) uniformly in x and D. By (2.9) and (2.5),
(4.3) (	Dh(x,D)) ∧Q(x,D) ≤ ((	DQ(x,D))⇒ 	Df(x,D)) ∧ 	DQ(x,D) ≤ 	Df(x,D)
which is ≤ f(x,D) since f ∈ B(X ). Then we have that 	Dh(x,D) ≤ (Q(x,D) ⇒ f(x,D))
and so we are done.
Now we proceed to the construction of the  operator. This is defined in terms of the
following embedding, which we dub “µ” since it’s a helpful mnemonic in this context for
“modal” and since it’s unlikely to be confused with any of our other notation. In Flagg’s
original paper, this map was denoted by j∗X and mentioned in the proof of Theorem 10.1 on
Flagg [1985, p. 139].
Definition 4.3. Let µ : F(X )→ B(X ) be defined by (µ(f))(x,D) = 	D(f(x)).
Sometimes we also write the action of µ as f 7→ µf instead of f 7→ µ(f). Note that µ
varies with X , but since µ’s definition is uniform in the underlying set X , we don’t mark
this dependence explicitly in the notation for the map. Further, for any f ∈ F(X ), let
f ∈ F(X × P (A)) be given by f(x,D) = f(x). This allows us to present an equivalent
definition of µ as µ(f) = 	pif . The map f 7→ f also helps to keep track of the typing, as
one can see by consulting Figure 1 which records the relation between these various maps.
Finally, before proceeding, let’s note that µ does indeed have codomain B(X ). It suffices to
show that 	pi(µ(f)) ≤ µ(f). But we may calculate that
(4.4) 	pi (µ(f))(x,D) = [(µ(f))(x,D)⇒ pi(x,D)]⇒ pi(x,D) = 	D 	D f(x)
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which is ≤ (µ(f))(x,D) uniformly in D by (2.6).
The following proposition records some elementary properties of the µ map. In this,
recall that the join and falsum on the codomain B(X ) of µ are described in line (2.16) of
Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 4.4. Let f, g ∈ F(X ). Then we have:
f ≤ g iff µ(f) ≤ µ(g)(4.5)
µ(f ∧ g) ≡ µ(f) ∧ µ(g)(4.6)
µ(f ∨ g) ≡ µ(f) ∨pi µ(g)(4.7)
µ(>) ≡ >(4.8)
µ(⊥) ≡ ⊥pi ≡ pi(4.9)
Proof. For (4.5), first suppose that f ≤ g. Then uniformly in x ∈ X we have that f(x) ≤
g(x). Then by (2.4), uniformly in x ∈ X and D ∈ P (A), we have that 	Df(x) ≤ 	Dg(x),
which is just to say that µ(f) ≤ µ(g).
For the other direction, suppose µ(f) ≤ µ(g). Then uniformly for x ∈ X and D ∈ P (A),
we have 	Df(x) ≤ 	Dg(x). In particular, let D = g(x). So 	g(x)f(x) ≤ 	g(x)g(x). Hence
by line (2.5) and (2.11), we have f(x) ≤ 	g(x)f(x) ≤ 	g(x)g(x) ≤ g(x).
For conjunction, we want to show for all (x,D) ∈ X × P (A) that µ(f ∧ g)(x,D) =
µ(f)(x,D) ∧ µ(g)(x,D). But this holds because by (2.8), we have that µ(f ∧ g)(x,D) =
	D((f ∧ g)(x)) = 	D(f(x) ∧ g(x)) ≡ 	Df(x) ∧ 	Dg(x).
For disjunction, first note by line (2.5) and the basic properties of join that f(x)∨g(x) ≤
	Df(x)∨	Dg(x), so by line (2.4) we have 	D(f(x)∨g(x)) ≤ 	D(	Df(x)∨	Dg(x)), which
is just to say that µ(f ∨ g) ≤ µ(f)∨pi µ(g). For the other direction, begin by observing that
f, g ≤ f ∨ g implies that µ(f), µ(g) ≤ µ(f ∨ g) by (4.5), so that since ∨pi denotes the join in
B(X ) we have that µ(f) ∨pi µ(g) ≤ µ(f ∨ g).
For top and bottom, simply note that µ(>)(x,D) = 	D> ≡ > uniformly in D by (2.13),
and µ(⊥)(x,D) = 	D⊥ = (⊥pi)(x,D), since ⊥pi = 	pi⊥.
For the definition of the  operator, we need only one further preliminary definition,
namely the inf map. This map is designated as jX ∗ in the proof of Theorem 10.1 on Flagg
[1985, p. 139].
Definition 4.5. Let f ∈ B(X ) and let x ∈ X . Define the map inf : B(X ) → F(X ) by
(inf(f))(x) =
⋂
Z∈P (A) f(x, Z).
Finally, we define the  operator as follows (cf. the definition in Theorem 10.2 of Flagg
[1985, p. 140]):
Definition 4.6. Define the mapping  : B(X ) → B(X ) by  = µ ◦ inf, or equivalently
(f)(x,D) = (	piinf f)(x,D) = 	D(
⋂
Z∈P (A) f(x, Z)).
Again, one might consider consulting Figure 1 to aid in keeping track of the relations between
these various maps.
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B(X ) = {f ∈ F(X × P (A)) | 	pi f ≡ f}
inf


&&
F(X )
µ

·
++
B(X ) F(X × P (A))	pi ·oo
The inf function: (inf f)(x) =
⋂
Z∈P (A) f(x, Z)
The overline function f(x,D) = f(x)
The minus-sub-pi function: (	pi(f))(x,D) = 	Df(x,D)
The µ function: µ(f) = 	pif or (µ(f))(x,D) = 	Df(x)
The box operator:  = µ ◦ inf or f = 	piinf f or (f)(x,D) = 	D(
⋂
Z∈P (A) f(x, Z))
Figure 1: The Diagram of Maps Used to Define the Box Operator
The following proposition gives us some formal indication that the  operator acts like
a modal operator. Recall that valid is a synonym for having top value in the relevant preal-
gebra. A schema of propositional modal logic can be represented by a formula ϕ(f1, . . . , fn)
of propositional modal logic wherein f1, . . . , fn are the basic propositional letters. Let’s then
say that a formula ϕ(f1, . . . , fn) is uniformly valid in B(X ) if there is a single element e of
A such that for all f1, . . . , fn from B(X ), one has that e is a witness to ϕ(f1, . . . , fn) having
top value.
Proposition 4.7. All of the axioms and theorems of the propositional modal system S4 are
uniformly valid on B(X ). Further, (i) one has f ≤ g implies f ≤ g uniformly in f, g.
Finally, (ii) one has g ≡ g iff there is h ∈ F(X ) such that g ≡ µ(h).
Proof. First we show that the modal axioms K,T, 4 are uniformly valid, and then we verify
(i)-(ii), and then we finish the proof by showing that all the theorems of the propositional
modal system S4 are uniformly valid on B(X ). For K, it suffices to show that f ∧(f ⇒
g) ≤ g. First note that ⋂Z∈P (A)(f(x, Z) ∧ (f ⇒ g)(x, Z)) ≤ ⋂Z∈P (A) g(x, Z). Thus one
has the following, where the equivalence follows from line (2.8) and the inequality follows
from line (2.4):
(4.10) f ∧(f ⇒ g) ≡ 	pi(inf f ∧ inf(f ⇒ g)) ≤ 	piinf g = g
For the T-axiom, it suffices to show f ≤ f . So suppose f ∈ B(X ) and note that inf f ≤ f
by means of the identity function. Then by lines (2.4) and (4.1) we have f = 	piinf f ≤
	pif ≡ f . Finally, for the 4-axiom, it suffice to show that f ≤ f . By (2.5), choose a
uniform witness e for all I ≤ 	ZI when I, Z ∈ P (A). Then by setting I = (inf f)(x), we
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have that e is also a uniform witness over all Z ∈ P (A) and x ∈ X for inf f(x) ≤ 	Z inf f(x).
Hence we have:
(4.11) (inf f)(x) ≤
⋂
Z∈P (A)
	Z(inf f)(x) =
⋂
Z∈P (A)
(f)(x, Z) = (inf f)(x)
Thus by line (2.4) one has f = 	piinf f ≤ 	piinf f = f .
Turning to (i), suppose first that f ≤ g. Then f(x, Z) ≤ g(x, Z) uniformly in x, Z,
so that inf(f) ≤ inf(g) and hence inf f ≤ inf g. From this it follows by line (2.4) that we
uniformly have 	piinf f ≤ 	piinf g, hence f ≤ g.
For (ii), the first direction is trivial: if g ≡ g, then let h = inf(g). For the converse,
suppose that g ≡ µh for some h ∈ F(X ). Then it suffices to show µh ≡ µh. By the T-
axiom we may focus on showing that µh ≤ µh, which by definition is the claim that 	pih ≤
	piinf µh. For this it suffices by (2.4) to show that h(x) ≤ (inf µh)(x) =
⋂
Z∈P (A)	Zh(x) for
all x ∈ X . But this follows from the fact that (2.5) holds uniformly.
Finally, we show by induction on length of proof that all of the theorems of the propo-
sitional modal system S4 are uniformly valid on B(X ). The base cases correspond to the
K,T, 4 axioms and the classical propositional tautologies; the earlier parts of this proof han-
dle the former and the prealgebra being Boolean takes care of the latter. The induction
steps amount to showing that the inference rules, namely modus ponens and necessitation,
preserve uniform validity. The case of modus ponens follows from the axioms governing the
conditional in a Heyting prealgebra. For the necessitation rule, suppose that ϕ(f1, . . . , fn)
has top value in B(X ) uniformly in f1, . . . , fn. We must then show that ϕ(f1, . . . , fn) has
top value uniformly in f1, . . . , fn. But since ϕ(f1, . . . , fn) has top value, > ≤ ϕ(f1, . . . , fn).
Then by (i), one has > ≤ ϕ(f1, . . . , fn) uniformly in f1, . . . , fn. But by (ii), one has that
> ≡ > since > ≡ µ(>) by (4.8).
Finally, we close this section by noting how the -operator permits us to describe the
behavior of the µ-embedding on conditionals and intersections.
Proposition 4.8. (Proposition on Action of Embedding on Conditionals)
(4.12) µ(f ⇒ g) ≡ (µ(f)⇒ µ(g))
Proof. Since f ∧ (f ⇒ g) ≤ g, we have that f ∧ f ⇒ g ≤ g. By an application of lines (2.4)
and (2.8) we have 	pif ∧ 	pif ⇒ g ≤ 	pig, i.e., µf ∧ µf⇒g ≤ µg, which amounts to µf⇒g ≤
µf ⇒ µg. Then by parts (i)-(ii) of the previous proposition we have µf⇒g ≡ µf⇒g ≤
(µf ⇒ µg). For the converse, note that f(x) ≤ 	g(x)f(x) by line (2.5), and that this holds
uniformly, which implies that (	g(x)f(x) ⇒ g(x)) ≤ (f(x) ⇒ g(x)). Since g(x) ≡ 	g(x)g(x)
uniformly by (2.11), we have by substitution that (	g(x)f(x)⇒ 	g(x)g(x)) ≤ (f(x)⇒ g(x)).
By considering Z = g(x), we thus see that
⋂
Z∈P (A)(	Zf(x) ⇒ 	Zg(x)) ≤ (f(x) ⇒ g(x)),
i.e.,
⋂
Z∈P (A)(	pif(x, Z) ⇒ 	pig(x, Z)) ≤ (f(x) ⇒ g(x)). So inf(	pif(x) ⇒ 	pig(x)) ≤
(f(x) ⇒ g(x)). From this it follows that inf(µf ⇒ µg) ≤ (f ⇒ g) and hence that (µf ⇒
µg) = 	piinf(µf ⇒ µg) ≤ 	pif ⇒ g = µf⇒g.
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Proposition 4.9. (Proposition on Action of Embedding on Intersections). Suppose that
the sequence {fi ∈ F(X ) : i ∈ I} is such that
⋂
i∈I µ(fi) is in B(X ). Then µ(
⋂
i∈I fi) ≡

⋂
i∈I µ(fi).
Proof. First note that by the monotonicity of µ (cf. line (4.5)) and the definition of  =
µ ◦ inf, the desired equivalence follows from the equivalence ⋂i∈I fi ≡ inf(⋂i∈I µ(fi)) in
F(X ). But this equivalence just is ⋂i∈I fi ≡ ⋂D∈P (A)⋂i∈I 	Dfi, which follows directly from
Proposition 3.12.
5 The Status of S5
In Proposition 4.7, we showed that S4 was uniformly valid on the structure B(X ). In this
section, we show that S5 is not uniformly valid on B(X ), but that there is a special case in
which it is valid in a non-uniform sense. Recall in general that in the setting of S4, the S5
schema is equivalent to ϕ ⇒ ♦ϕ. Before beginning, let us define the following element of
P (A):
(5.1) Q =
⋂
Z∈P (A)
[(> ⇒ Z)⇒ (> ⇒ Z)]
Note that Q is nonempty (e.g., it contains at least the identity element skk).
Proposition 5.1. Given a function f ∈ B(X ), let us define Mf : X → P (A) to be inf(f ⇒
⊥pi). Then one has that Mf (x) =
⋂
Z∈P (A)(f(x, Z)⇒ (> ⇒ Z)) and
(5.2) (♦f)(x,D) =
{ 	DQ : Mf (x) = ⊥
	D⊥ : Mf (x) 6= ⊥
Proof. That the two definitions of Mf are equivalent uses the fact that ⊥pi(x,D) = 	D⊥ =
((⊥ ⇒ D) ⇒ D) = (> ⇒ D). We will use this fact again repeatedly in what follows.
Recall that in general the symbol ♦ is short for ¬¬ and that ¬f in the structure B(X ) is
shorthand for f ⇒ ⊥pi. Thus one has ♦f = [(f ⇒ ⊥pi)⇒ ⊥pi] and hence
(5.3) ♦f = 	piinf(	piinf(f ⇒ ⊥pi)⇒ ⊥pi) = 	piinf(	piMf ⇒ ⊥pi)
Now fix x ∈ X . Then ♦f(x,D) = 	D
⋂
Z∈P (A)(	ZMf (x) ⇒ (> ⇒ Z)) for all D. If
Mf (x) = ⊥, then ♦f(x,D) = 	D
⋂
Z∈P (A)((> ⇒ Z)⇒ (> ⇒ Z)) = 	DQ. If Mf (x) 6= ⊥,
then note that when Z = ⊥, we have
(5.4) (	ZMf (x)⇒ (> ⇒ Z)) = ((⊥ ⇒ ⊥)⇒ (> ⇒ ⊥)) = (> ⇒ (> ⇒ ⊥)) = ⊥
Hence, ♦f(x,D) simplifies to 	D⊥.
Then let’s show:
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Proposition 5.2. S5 is not uniformly valid in B(X ).
Proof. We define two distinct elements f0, f1 of B(X ), namely
(5.5) f0(x,D) = >, f1(x,D) = (> ⇒ D)
First note that f0, f1 ∈ B(X ). In the case of f0, any element of A trivially witnesses
	D> ≤ >. For the case of f1, we have that
(5.6) (	pif1)(x,D) = 	D(> ⇒ D) = 	D((⊥ ⇒ D)⇒ D) = 	D 	D ⊥ ≡ 	D⊥ = f1(x,D)
Now, using the notation of Proposition 5.1, we have that
(5.7) Mf0(x) =
⋂
Z∈P (A)
(> ⇒ (> ⇒ Z)) = ⊥
and
(5.8) Mf1(x) =
⋂
Z∈P (A)
((> ⇒ Z)⇒ (> ⇒ Z)) = Q 6= ⊥,
where Q is defined as in line (5.1). Hence by Proposition 5.1, we have ♦f0(x,D) = 	DQ
and ♦f1(x,D) = (> ⇒ D).
Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that S5 were uniformly valid in B(X ). Then
there would be an e from A such that both e : f0  ♦f0 and e : f1  ♦f1. Thus for all
D ∈ P (A) and all x ∈ X , we have both e : f0(x,D)  	DQ and e : f1(x,D)  (> ⇒ D).
The first of these means we have e : >  	DQ for every D ∈ P (A). The second of these
means that we have e : (> ⇒ D) (> ⇒ D) for every D ∈ P (A).
Now let a and b be two distinct members of A. By Proposition 3.2, choose e′ ∈ A
such that e′n = a for all n ∈ A. Then e′ is in (> ⇒ {a}), so by the above we have both
ee′ ∈ (> ⇒ {a}) and ee′ ∈ 	{b}Q = ((Q ⇒ {b}) ⇒ {b}). This is a contradiction, because
for any m ∈ (Q⇒ {b}) we obtain both ee′m = b and ee′m = a.
Now, there’s a natural enough non-uniform version of validity for S5, and it turns out
that it holds when X has exactly one element and fails whenever X has more than one
element:
Proposition 5.3. (I) Suppose that X has more than one element. Then there is f ∈ B(X )
such that there is no e from A such that e : f  ♦f .
(II) Suppose that X has only one element. Then for each f ∈ B(X ) there is e from A
such that e : f  ♦f .
Proof. For (I), let x0, x1 be two distinct elements of X and define a` la equation (5.5) the
following element f :
(5.9) f(x,D) =
{
> if x = x0,
> ⇒ D otherwise.
23
Then the proof proceeds exactly as in the proof of the previous proposition.
For (II), X is a singleton set {x}. Let f ∈ B(X ). Using the notation of Proposition 5.1,
in case f ≡ ⊥pi, we easily have Mf (x) 6= ⊥. So by Proposition 5.1, we then have f(x,D) ≤
(♦f)(x,D). In the alternate case, wherein f 6≡ ⊥pi, there must be some Z ∈ P (A) such
that f(x, Z) 6≤ ⊥pi(Z). But then Mf (x) = ⊥, so Proposition 5.1 gives (♦f)(x,D) = 	DQ.
Let j′ be any uniform witness to line (2.5) and j be any member of Q. By Proposition 3.2,
choose j′′ in A such that j′′n = j′j. Hence j′′ witnesses f ≤ ♦f .
It’s worth emphasizing that case II of the above proposition is exactly the situation of
B from (4.2). As we will find in the next section, the semantics for closed sentences will
produce functions precisely in B. Hence, we will have that S5 is valid for sentences in the
non-uniform sense.
6 The Modal Semantics
In this section, we provide a semantics for modal formulas ϕ(x) by defining for each such
formula a corresponding function ‖ϕ(x)‖µ from one of the Boolean prealgebras B(X ). We
begin with the following definition, which can be found in [Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988,
volume 2 Definition 6.2-3 pp. 709-711], although they work with Heyting algebras rather
than Heyting prealgebras, and they do not include the information about the quantifiers. The
information about the quantifiers only comes into play in the last clauses of Definition 6.3 and
constraints on the quantifiers are only put in place later in the section (cf. Definition 6.11). In
this section, we’ll be working with arbitrary first-order signatures L, which as usual are just
given by a collection of constant, relation, and function symbols along with a specification
of the arities of the relation and function symbols.
Definition 6.1. Let H be a Heyting prealgebra and let L be a signature. Then an H-valued
L-structure N with quantifier Q is given by an underlying set N , a map ‖· = ·‖ : N2 → H,
a map Q : N → H, and a distinguished element of N for each constant symbol, a map
‖R(·, . . . , ·)‖ : Nn → H for each n-ary relation symbol R, and a map f : Nn → N for every
n-ary function symbol f , such that for each n-ary relation symbol R and each n-ary function
symbol f , and all a, b, c, a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn in N one has
‖a = a‖ = >, ‖a = b‖ = ‖b = a‖, ‖a = b‖ ∧ ‖b = c‖ ≤ ‖a = c‖
‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ∧ ‖R(a1, . . . , an)‖ ≤ ‖R(b1, . . . , bn)‖
‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ≤ ‖f(a1, . . . , an) = f(b1, . . . , bn)‖
Let A be a pca. We are interested in the case of H = P (A). In this setting, there
is a natural strengthening of the notion in Definition 6.1 wherein we require that there be
uniform witnesses to the above conditions. So we define:
Definition 6.2. Let L be a signature and let A be a pca. A uniform P (A)-valued L-structure
N with quantifier Q is given by an underlying set N , a map ‖· = ·‖ : N2 → P (A), a map
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Q : N → P (A), and elements eref1, eref2, esym, etran from A, and a distinguished element of
N for each constant symbol, a map ‖R(·, . . . , ·)‖ : Nn → P (A) and an element eR from A
for each n-ary relation symbol R, and a map f : Nn → N and element ef from A for every
n-ary function symbol f , such that for each n-ary relation symbol R and each n-ary function
symbol f , and all a, b, c, a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn in N one has
eref1 : ‖a = a‖ >, eref2 : > ‖a = a‖
esym : ‖a = b‖ ‖b = a‖, etran : ‖a = b‖ ∧ ‖b = c‖ ‖a = c‖
eR : ‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ∧ ‖R(a1, . . . , an)‖ ‖R(b1, . . . , bn)‖
ef : ‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ‖f(a1, . . . , an) = f(b1, . . . , bn)‖
The following definition contains the semantics for uniform P (A)-valued structures. We
follow the usual conventions in assuming that each of our languages has a constant symbol
for each of the elements in the model under consideration. As one can see, the quantifier Q
is providing the semantics for the existential and universal quantifiers.
Definition 6.3. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. For
every L-formula ϕ(x) ≡ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) with all free variables displayed, define the map
‖ϕ(x)‖ : Nn → P (A), a member of F(Nn), inductively as follows, wherein the base cases
for atomics come from Definition 6.2:
‖⊥‖ = ⊥
‖(ϕ ∧ ψ)(a)‖ = ‖ϕ(a)‖ ∧ ‖ψ(a)‖
‖(ϕ ∨ ψ)(a)‖ = ‖ϕ(a)‖ ∨ ‖ψ(a)‖
‖(ϕ⇒ ψ)(a)‖ = ‖ϕ(a)‖ ⇒ ‖ψ(a)‖
‖∃z ϕ(a, z)‖ =
⋃
c∈N
(Q(c) ∧ ‖ϕ(a, c)‖)
‖∀z ϕ(a, z)‖ =
⋂
c∈N
(Q(c)⇒ ‖ϕ(a, z)‖)
Then we argue that there are witnesses from the underlying pca for all the substitutions:
Proposition 6.4. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. For every
formula ϕ(x) ≡ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) there is an element eϕ of A such that for all a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn
from N one has
(6.1) eϕ : ‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ∧ ‖ϕ(a1, . . . , an)‖ ‖ϕ(b1, . . . , bn)‖
Proof. The base step for atomic formulas R(a) follows directly from eR in Definition 6.2.
For ⊥ the assertion is trivial. For atomics t(x) = s(x), first by an induction on complexity
of terms, one shows that for each term t(x) one has a uniform witness
et : ‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ‖t(a1, . . . , an) = t(b1, . . . , bn)‖
For instance, if t(x) = f(g(x)), then one obtains et which witnesses the reduction ‖a = b‖ ≤
‖g(a) = g(b)‖ ≤ ‖f(g(a)) = f(g(b))‖, by composing ef and eg from Definition 6.2 in the
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pca. Second, suppose that t(x), s(x) are terms. Then by using et, es in conjunction with
esym, etrans one obtains a uniform witness to the reduction
‖a = b‖ ∧ ‖t(a) = s(a)‖ ≤ ‖a = b‖ ∧ ‖t(a) = t(b)‖ ∧ ‖t(a) = s(a)‖ ∧ ‖s(a) = s(b)‖
≤ ‖a = b‖ ∧ ‖t(b) = t(a)‖ ∧ ‖t(a) = s(a)‖ ∧ ‖s(a) = s(b)‖ ≤ ‖t(b) = s(b)‖
For the steps corresponding to the propositional connectives, let us first abbreviate Ea,b =
‖a = b‖ and Φa = ‖ϕ(a)‖, Φb = ‖ϕ(b)‖, Ψa = ‖ψ(a)‖, and Ψb = ‖ψ(b)‖. For conjunction,
note that Ea,b∧Φa ≤ Φb and Ea,b∧Ψa ≤ Ψb implies Ea,b∧Φa∧Ψa ≤ Φb∧Ψb. For disjunction,
note that Ea,b ∧ Φa ≤ Φb and Ea,b ∧ Ψa ≤ Ψb implies the following: Ea,b ∧ (Φa ∨ Ψa) ≤
(Ea,b ∧ Φa) ∨ (Ea,b ∧ Φb) ≤ Φb ∨ Ψb. For the conditional, one notes first that the inductive
hypothesis also gives Ea,b ∧ Φb ≤ Φa. Then one has Ea,b ∧ (Φa ⇒ Ψa) ∧ Φb ≤ Ea,b ∧ (Φa ⇒
Ψa) ∧ Φa ≤ Ea,b ∧Ψa ≤ Ψb, which of course implies that Ea,b ∧ (Φa ⇒ Ψa) ≤ (Φb ⇒ Ψb).
For the quantifiers, first consider the existential quantifier, and suppose that the pair
pmn is in ‖a = b‖∧‖∃ x ϕ(a, x)‖. Then for some c ∈ N one has that n is in Q(c)∧‖ϕ(a, c)‖.
Then eϕ(pm(p1n)) is in ‖ϕ(b, c)‖ by induction hypothesis and so p((p0n)(eϕ(pm(p1n)))) is in
‖∃ x ϕ(b, x)‖. For the universal quantifier, suppose that pmn is in ‖a = b‖ ∧ ‖∀ x ϕ(a, x)‖.
Then for all c ∈ N one has that n is in (Q(c) ⇒ ‖ϕ(a, c)‖). Let t(x1, x2, x3, x4) ≡
x1(px2(x3x4)), and by Proposition 3.2 choose f such that fx1x2x3x4 = t(x1, x2, x3, x4).
Then one has feϕmn` = eϕ(pm(n`)), so that by induction hypothesis for all c ∈ N one has
that feϕmn is in (Q(c)⇒ ‖ϕ(b, c)‖).
Now we finally come to the modal semantics:
Definition 6.5. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q and un-
derlying set N . Then we define the modal B-valued L-structure µ[N ] with quantifier Q by
defining a valuation map ‖ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)‖µ : Nn × P (A) → P (A) for each modal L-formula
ϕ(x) ≡ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) as follows, wherein t, s are L-terms and R is an L-relation symbol, and
where we write the action as (a,D) 7→ ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D):
‖t(a) = s(a)‖µ(D) = 	D(‖t(a) = s(a)‖)
‖R(a)‖µ(D) = 	D(‖R(a)‖), ‖⊥‖µ(D) = 	D⊥
‖(ϕ ∧ ψ)(a)‖µ(D) = (‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ∧ ‖ψ(a)‖µ(D))
‖(ϕ ∨ ψ)(a)‖µ(D) = (‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ∨pi ‖ψ(a)‖µ(D))
‖(ϕ⇒ ψ)(a)‖µ(D) = (‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D)⇒ ‖ψ(a)‖µ(D))
‖∃z ϕ(a, z)‖µ(D) = 	D
⋃
c∈N
[Q(c) ∧ ‖ϕ(a, c)‖µ(D)]
‖∀z ϕ(a, z)‖µ(D) =
⋂
c∈N
[Q(c)⇒ ‖ϕ(a, c)‖µ(D)]
‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) = (‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D))
The following proposition says that, as the name suggests, the valuation maps lie in the
Boolean algebras B(X ) and B (defined in (4.1) and (4.2) from §4):
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Proposition 6.6. (I) For each modal L-formula ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) with all free variables dis-
played, the function ‖ϕ(x1, . . . , xn)‖µ : Nn × P (A) → P (A) is uniformly in B(Nn), in that
for each ϕ(x) there is an element iϕ of A such that for all a from N and all D from P (A)
one has that iϕ : 	D‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D).
(II) For each modal L-sentence ϕ, one has that ‖ϕ‖µ is an element of B.
Proof. Let’s begin with (I). This is obvious in the case of the atomics, as well as in the case
of the disjunctions, existentials, and the box since the ‖ · ‖µ-valuations all begin with 	D
in these cases. For the universal quantifier, one simply appeals to the induction hypothesis
and the proposition on B(X ) being closed under uniform intersections (Proposition 4.1) and
the Proposition on Freedom in the Antecedent (Proposition 4.2). The inductive steps for
the conjunctions and conditionals follow easily from lines (2.8) and (2.18) along with the
induction hypothesis. This finishes the argument for (I).
For (II), any L-sentence ϕ can be written as ψ(c) for an L-formula ψ(x) and a constant
symbol c. By (I), ‖ψ(x)‖µ : N × P (A) → P (A) and is an element of B(N), i.e., one has
	D‖ψ(a)‖µ(D) ≤ ‖ψ(a)‖µ(D) uniformly in a from N and D from P (A). Then by evaluating
at constant c, we obtain ‖ϕ‖µ : P (A)→ P (A) with 	D‖ϕ‖µ(D) ≤ ‖ϕ‖µ(D) uniformly in D
from P (A). But this is precisely the condition to be an element of B, as defined in (4.2).
Note that Part (II) of this proposition, in conjunction with Proposition 5.3, implies that
if ϕ is a modal L-sentence, then ‖ϕ⇒ ♦ϕ‖µ has top value in B, so that S5 holds for each
sentence taken one by one.
Further, we can do substitution in the modal structure just as in the original structure:
Proposition 6.7. For every modal L-formula ϕ(x) ≡ ϕ(x1, . . . , xn) there is an element eϕ
of A such that for all a, b from N and all D ∈ P (A), one has:
(6.2) eϕ :
∧
1≤i≤n
‖ai = bi‖µ(D) ∧ ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ‖ϕ(b)‖µ(D)
Proof. For atomic ϕ, the result follows from Proposition 6.4 and lines (2.4) and (2.8), since
for atomic ϕ one has that Definition 6.2 says that ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) = 	D‖ϕ(a)‖. The conjunc-
tion, conditional, and universal quantifier cases follow as in the proof of Proposition 6.4.
Disjunctions and existentials are nearly as straightforward, keeping in mind the monotonic-
ity of 	pi (line (2.4)). Thus we only need to verify the condition on . Without loss of
generality, suppose that ϕ(x) has only one free variable. By the induction hypothesis, there
is an element eϕ of A such that for all a, b in N and D in P (A) one has
(6.3) eϕ : ‖a = b‖µ(D) ∧ ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ‖ϕ(b)‖µ(D)
Since infimums are intersections, we can keep this uniformity in the following:
(6.4) eϕ : ‖a = b‖µ(D) ∧ inf ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) inf ‖ϕ(b)‖µ(D)
Further this uniformity persists while applying the 	D-operator:
(6.5) 	D ‖a = b‖µ(D) ∧ 	Dinf ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ≤ 	Dinf ‖ϕ(b)‖µ(D)
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But then this is also a uniform witness to
(6.6) ‖a = b‖µ(D) ∧ ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ≤ ‖ϕ(b)‖µ(D)
The following proposition is an indicator of the compatibility of the semantics for the
existential and universal quantifiers on the modal structures, given above in Definition 6.5.
For the non-modal structures, see Proposition 6.13 below.
Proposition 6.8. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. Let
ϕ(x, y) be a modal L-formula. Then on the modal B-valued L-structure µ[N ], both (∀ y ϕ(x, y))⇔
(¬∃ y ¬ϕ(x, y)) and (∃ y ϕ(x, y))⇔ (¬∀ y ¬ϕ(x, y)) are valid.
Proof. It suffices to prove the first since the second follows by replacing ϕ with its negation
in the first and by negating both sides of the biconditional. Further, to ease readability, we
consider the special case where the tuple x consists just of a single variable x. By definition,
one has ‖¬∃ y ¬ϕ(x, y))‖µ(D) = [	D
⋃
y∈N(Q(y) ∧ (‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D) ⇒ ⊥pi(D)))] ⇒ ⊥pi(D).
By ⊥pi(D) ≡ D and (2.14), one then has the equivalence, uniform in x and D:
(6.7) ‖¬∃ y ¬ϕ(x, y))‖µ(D) ≡ [
⋃
y∈N
(Q(y) ∧ (‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D)⇒ D))]⇒ D
Since ‖∀ y ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D) is an element of B(N), one has another equivalence uniform in x
and D:
(6.8) ‖∀ y ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D) ≡ [(
⋂
y∈N
(Q(y)⇒ ‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D)))⇒ D]⇒ D
By (2.2), to show ‖∀ y ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D) ≤ ‖¬∃ y ¬ϕ(x, y))‖µ(D), it suffices to show
(6.9) [
⋃
y∈N
(Q(y) ∧ (‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D)⇒ D))] ≤ [
⋂
y∈N
(Q(y)⇒ ‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D))]⇒ D
By Proposition 3.2, choose f such that fen = (p1e)(n(p0e)). Suppose that e is in the
antecedent of (6.9); we must show that fe is in the consequent. So suppose that n is
in [
⋂
y∈N(Q(y) ⇒ ‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D))]; we must show that fen is in D. By hypothesis, p0e
is in Q(y0) and p1e is in (‖ϕ(x, y0)‖µ(D) ⇒ D) for some y0 from N . Then n(p0e) is in
‖ϕ(x, y0)‖µ(D), and so (p1e)(n(p0e)) is in D, which is just to say that fen is in D.
For the converse, since ‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ is a member of B(N×N), one also has the equivalence:
(6.10) ‖∀ y ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D) ≡
⋂
y∈N
(Q(y)⇒ [(‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D)⇒ D)⇒ D])
By Proposition 3.2, choose f such that fenm = epnm. Suppose that e is in the right-hand
side of (6.7); we show that fe is in the right-hand side of (6.10). So suppose that y ∈ N
is fixed and n is in Q(y) and m is in (‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D) ⇒ D); we must show that fenm is in
D. Then pnm is in (Q(y) ∧ (‖ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D)⇒ D)), and so by the hypothesis on e, we have
epnm is in D, which is just to say that fenm is in D. So we have ‖¬∃ y ¬ϕ(x, y))‖µ(D) ≤
‖∀ y ϕ(x, y)‖µ(D).
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The following proposition tells us that validities are equivalent to their necessitations.
Proposition 6.9. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. Suppose
that ϕ(x) be a modal L-formula such that ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ≡ > uniformly in D and a. Then
‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ≡ ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) ≡ > uniformly in D and a. In particular, suppose that ϕ is a
modal L-sentence such that ‖ϕ‖µ(D) ≡ > uniformly in D. Then ‖ϕ‖µ(D) ≡ ‖ϕ‖µ(D) ≡ >
uniformly in D.
Proof. This is an application of Proposition 4.7.ii, by setting g equal to the function ‖ϕ(x)‖µ :
Nn × P (A)→ P (A) and by setting h equal to >.
The next proposition records that the Converse Barcan Formula CBF (1.2) is valid and
that the schema (∃ x  ϕ(x))⇒ ( ∃ x ϕ(x)) is valid. While we use the latter validity less
frequently, we do employ it in the proof of Theorem 9.2 and Proposition 11.4 below. For a
counterexample to the Barcan formula (1.8), see Proposition 8.7 below. It is unknown to us
whether the schema (∀ x ♦ ϕ(x))⇒ (♦ ∀ x ϕ(x)) is valid.
Proposition 6.10. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. Then
Converse Barcan Formula CBF (1.2) and the schema (∃ x  ϕ(x))⇒ ( ∃ x ϕ(x)) are valid
on the modal B-valued L-structure µ[N ].
Proof. Let’s first argue for the Converse Barcan Formula CBF (1.2). Let ϕ(x) be a modal
formula, perhaps with parameters, which we suppress for the sake of readability. So we must
show ‖ ∀ x ϕ(x)‖µ(D) ≤ ‖∀ x ϕ(x)‖µ(D), uniformly in D from P (A). For all c′ in N , by
taking compositions we have the following:
(6.11) [Q(c′) ∧
⋂
E∈P (A)
⋂
c∈N
(Q(c)⇒ ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(E))] ≤
⋂
E∈P (A)
‖ϕ(c′)‖µ(E)
Then by (2.5) this is ≤ [	D
⋂
E∈P (A) ‖ϕ(c′)‖µ(E)]. Then by moving the Q(c′) to the an-
tecedent, and then taking intersections over all c′ from N and then applying the 	D-operator
again, we obtain:
(6.12) 	D [
⋂
E∈P (A)
⋂
c∈N
(Q(c)⇒ ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(E))] ≤ 	D[
⋂
c′∈N
(Q(c′)⇒ 	D
⋂
E∈P (A)
‖ϕ(c′)‖µ(E))]
The antecedent is ‖ ∀ x ϕ(x)‖µ(D) and consequent is 	D‖∀ x ϕ(x)‖µ(D), and the latter
is equivalent to ‖∀ x ϕ(x)‖µ(D) since this is an element of B. (If ϕ(x) had n parameters,
then it would be an element of B(Nn)).
Now let’s argue for the schema (∃ x  ϕ(x))⇒ ( ∃ x ϕ(x)). It suffices to find a witness
to the following reduction, uniformly in D and c:
(6.13) Q(c) ∧ 	D
⋂
E∈P (A)
‖ϕ(c)‖µ(E) ≤ 	D
⋂
E∈P (A)
⋃
x∈N
(Q(x) ∧ ‖ϕ(x)‖µ(E))
But by (2.5) and (2.8), we have Q(c) ∧ 	D
⋂
E ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(E) ≤ 	D(Q(c) ∧
⋂
E ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(E)),
uniformly in D and c. Further, uniformly in c, the identity function is a witness to the reduc-
tions (Q(c) ∧ ⋂E ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(E)) ≤ ⋂E(Q(c) ∧ ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(E)) ≤ ⋂E⋃x∈N(Q(x) ∧ ‖ϕ(x)‖µ(E)),
and hence these reductions persist when prefaced by the 	D-operator by (2.4).
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The following definition describes a series of constraints that one can put on the quan-
tifiers Q, and the idea of the subsequent theorem and proposition is that these constraints
have consequences for what schemas of modal predicate logic are valid on the structure.
There is no analogue of this definition in the original Flagg paper. See immediately after the
proof of Theorem 8.5 for a discussion of how this relates to what is in the original paper.
Definition 6.11. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. If one
has
⋃
c∈N Q(c) 6= ∅, then Q is said to be non-degenerate. If
⋂
c∈N Q(c) 6= ∅, then Q is said
to be uniform. If Q(c) ≡ > uniformly in c ∈ N , then the quantifier Q is said to be classical.
If for all L-terms t(x1, . . . , xn) with all free variables displayed there is et ∈ A such that
et : Q(a1)∧ · · · ∧Q(an) Q(t(a1, . . . , an)) for all a1, . . . an from N , then the quantifier Q is
said to be term-friendly.
Obviously, all classical quantifiers are term-friendly and uniform, and all uniform quan-
tifiers are non-degenerate.
Theorem 6.12. (Soundness Theorem for Q◦eq.S4 and Qeq.S4). Let N be a uniform P (A)-
valued L-structure with non-degenerate quantifier Q. Then all the theorems of Q◦eq.S4+CBF
are valid on the modal B-valued L-structure µ[N ]. Further, if Q is uniform, then all the
theorems of Qeq.S4 are valid on the modal structure.
Proof. The propositional part follows from Proposition 4.7. For the predicate part ofQ◦eq.S4+
CBF, first note that we have CBF by Proposition 6.10. The first axiom for Q◦eq.S4 in Fitting
and Mendelsohn [1998, pp. 133-134] is Vacuous Quantification, namely ∀ x ϕ ≡ ϕ when
ϕ does not contain x free. But since Q is assumed to be non-degenerate, choose n in Q(d)
for some d ∈ N . To define a witness ⋂c∈N(Q(c) ⇒ ‖ϕ‖µ(D)) ≤ ‖ϕ‖µ(D), let t(x, y) ≡ yx
and by Proposition 3.2 choose f such that fne = en. Then fn is a witness. For the converse
direction, k suffices since if a is in ‖ϕ‖µ(D) then ka is in (Q(c) ⇒ ‖ϕ‖µ(D)) for all c ∈ N ,
since if b ∈ Q(c) then kab = a is in ‖ϕ‖µ(D).
The second axiom in Fitting and Mendelsohn [1998, pp. 133-134] is Universal Dis-
tributivity, namely [∀ x (ϕ(x)⇒ ψ(x))]⇒ [(∀ x ϕ(x))⇒ (∀ x ψ(x))]. But the validity of
this follows straightforwardly by taking compositions. The third axiom is Permutation,
which says that ∀ x ∀ y ϕ(x, y) ⇔ ∀ y ∀ x ϕ(x, y). Let t(x, y, z) = yxz, and choose f such
that fenm = t(e, n,m) = emn; then f performs the desired reduction.
The fourth axiom is Universal Instantiation Axiom (1.3) from §1. So one must
show that the following has top value:
(6.14)
⋂
c∈N
[Q(c)⇒ [(
⋂
d∈N
(Q(d)⇒ ‖ϕ(d)‖µ(D)))⇒ (‖ϕ(c)‖µ(D))]]
But given an element n of Q(c) and an element e of (
⋂
d∈N(Q(d) ⇒ ‖ϕ(d)‖µ(D))), it of
course follows that en is an element of ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(D). Let t(x, y) ≡ xy, and choose f from A
such that fen = en by Proposition 3.2. Then kf is an element of A which sends everything
to f in that kfb = f for all b from A. Hence it is a witness to Universal Instantiation
Axiom having top value.
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The final components of the deductive system of Fitting and Mendelsohn [1998, pp. 133-
134] are the rules Modus Ponens and Universal Generalization. The former follows
by the usual considerations related to composition. The latter is the rule to infer from ϕ to
∀ x ϕ(x). Suppose then that ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(D) has top value in P (A) uniformly in c and D via
index e, so that eb is in ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(D) for all b fromA, uniformly in c andD. Then ke is constant
function which sends everything to e. Then this is a witness to
⋂
c∈N(Q(c) ⇒ ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(D))
having top value, in that keb = e is in (Q(c)⇒ ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(D)) for every b from A.
Now we verify (1.5)-(1.6). Obviously (1.5) follows from eref2 in Definition 6.2 and from
(2.4). As for (1.6), this follows directly from Proposition 6.7.
Finally, suppose that Q is uniform. It suffices to show that the free-variable variant
(∀ x ϕ(x))⇒ ϕ(y) of the Universal Instantiation Axiom has top value. We must show
that we have
⋂
c∈N(Q(c) ⇒ ‖ϕ(c)‖µ(D)) ≤ ‖ϕ(d)‖µ(D) uniformly in d,D. So suppose that
e is in the antecedent. Since Q is uniform, choose an element of n of
⋂
c∈N Q(c). Then for
each d and D, one has that en is an element ‖ϕ(d)‖µ(D).
Sometimes in what follows (cf. Proposition 8.2, Proposition 10.1, and the proof Theo-
rem 9.2 in Appendix C), we will need to apply a similar soundness theorem for the uniform
P (A)-valued structures themselves. In the following proposition, the intuitionistic predicate
calculus IQC with equality is given by the intuitionstic propositional calculus IPC formulated
in a natural deduction system, together with the usual natural deduction rules for quantifiers,
as well as the axioms (1.5)-(1.6) for identity (cf. [Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, volume 1
p. 48]).
Proposition 6.13. Suppose that N is a P (A)-valued L-structure with term-friendly non-
degenerate quantifier Q.
(I) Suppose that ϕ1(x), . . . , ϕn(x), ψ(x) are L-formulas, with all free variables amongst
those displayed. Suppose that IQC, ϕ1(x), . . . , ϕn(x) ` ψ(x). Then the L-sentence ∀ x ((
∧n
i=1 ϕi(x))⇒
ψ(x)) is valid on N .
(II) Hence, if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ are L-sentences and IQC, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ψ, and if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn
are valid on N , then so too is ψ.
Proof. The proof of (I) is by induction on the length of the derivation. For the base case, the
identity axiom (1.5) follows from the clause pertaining to eref2 in Definition 6.2, while the
substitution axiom (1.6) follows from Proposition 6.4. The other base case is where ψ(x) is
one of the ϕi(x), and in this case an appropriate projection function will witness the validity.
The projection functions also allow one to expand the antecedent as needed.
For the inductive steps, one considers first the propositional rules and then the quantifier
rules. But the propositional rules follow from the observation made at the outset of §2
that Heyting prealgebras are sound for the intuitionstic propositional calculus IPC. For the
quantifier rules, it will be convenient to abbreviate the antecedent as Φ(x) ≡ ∧ni=1 ϕi(x) and
to drop excess free variables to enhance readability.
For the “for all” elimination rule, we must show that if ∀ y (Φ(y) ⇒ ∀ x ψ(x)) is valid
on N then so is ∀ y ∀ x (Φ(y) ⇒ ψ(t(x))), where t is an L-term. Since Q is term-friendly,
choose et such that et : Q(a) Q(t(a)) for all a from N . By Proposition 3.2, choose f such
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that fenmu = enu(etm). Supposing that e is in Q(y)⇒ (‖Φ(y)‖ ⇒
⋂
x∈N(Q(x)⇒ ‖ψ(x)‖))
for all y from N , we must show that fe is in Q(y)⇒ ⋂x∈N(Q(x)⇒ ‖Φ(y)⇒ ψ(t(x))‖) for
all y from N . So suppose that y from N is fixed and n is in Q(y). Then we must show that
fn is in (Q(x)⇒ ‖Φ(y)⇒ ψ(t(x))‖) for all x in N . So let x in N and suppose that m is in
Q(x) and u is in ‖Φ(y)‖. We must show that fenmu is in ‖ψ(t(x))‖. By choice of f , this
is the same as showing that enu(etm) is in ‖ψ(t(x))‖. But by hypothesis on e, n, u, we have
that enu is in Q(z) ⇒ ‖ψ(z)‖ for all z from N , and by hypothesis on m and et, we have
that etm is in Q(t(x)), so that we are done.
For the “for all” introduction rule, suppose our induction hypothesis gives us that
∀ y ∀ x (Φ(y) ⇒ ψ(x)) is valid on N ; then we must show that ∀ y (Φ(y) ⇒ ∀ x ψ(x))
is valid on N . By Proposition 3.2, choose f such that fenmu = enum. Supposing that
e is in Q(y) ⇒ (⋂x∈N(Q(x) ⇒ (‖Φ(y) ⇒ ψ(x)‖))) for all y in N , we show that fe is in
Q(y)⇒ (‖Φ(y)‖ ⇒ ⋂x∈N(Q(x)⇒ ‖ψ(x)‖)) for all y in N . So fix y in N and suppose that
n is in Q(y). We must show that fen is in (‖Φ(y)‖ ⇒ ⋂x∈N(Q(x)⇒ ‖ψ(x)‖)). So suppose
that m in ‖Φ(y)‖; we must show that fenm is in Q(x) ⇒ ‖ψ(x)‖ for all x in N . So fix x
in N , and suppose that u is in Q(x); then we must show that fenmu is in ‖ψ(x)‖. But by
choice of f , this is the same as showing that enum is in ‖ψ(x)‖. By hypothesis on e and n
and u we have enu is in (‖Φ(y) ⇒ ψ(x)‖), and by hypothesis on m, we have that enum is
in ‖ψ(x)‖, which is what we wanted to show.
For the “there exists” elimination rule, we must show that if both ∀ y (Φ(y)⇒ ∃ x ψ(x))
and ∀ y ∀ z (Φ(y) ∧ ψ(z) ⇒ ξ(y)) are valid in N , then ∀ y (Φ(y) ⇒ ξ(y)) is valid in
N . But supposing that e1 and e2 are witnesses to the former one may check that fe1e2
is a witness to the latter, where one chooses f from Proposition 3.2 such that fe1e2nu =
e2n(p0e1nu)(pu(p1e1nu)). One may do this by beginning with the antecedent of (6.17), then
moving to (6.15) reading left-to-right, and then moving to to (6.16) reading left-to-right, and
then finishing at the consequent of (6.17), where the idea is that the witnesses in the pca
are written out below the parts of the formula which they are realizing.
∀ y
n
(Φ(y)
u
⇒ ∃ x
p0e1nu
ψ(x)
p1e1nu
)(6.15)
∀ y
n
∀ z
p0e1nu
(Φ(y)
u
∧ ψ(z)
p1e1nu
⇒ ξ(y)
fe1e2nu
)(6.16)
∀ y
n
(Φ(y)
u
⇒ ξ(y)
fe1e2nu
)(6.17)
This “diagram chase” method of verification is sometimes a helpful counterpoint to the types
of verification exemplified in the previous two paragraphs.
For the “there exists” introduction rule, we must show that if ∀ y ∀ x (Φ(y)⇒ ψ(t(x))) is
valid in N for some L-term t(x), then so is ∀ y (Φ(y)⇒ ∃ x ψ(x)). Since Q is term-friendly,
choose et such that et : Q(a) Q(t(a)) for all a from N . Since Q is non-degenerate, choose
m0 with m0 in Q(x0) for some x0 from N . By Proposition 3.2, choose f such that fnu =
p(et(m0))(enm0u). Supposing that e is in Q(y) ⇒ (
⋂
x∈N(Q(x) ⇒ (‖Φ(y) ⇒ ψ(t(x))‖)))
for all y from N , we then show that fe is in Q(y) ⇒ (‖Φ(y)‖ ⇒ (⋃x∈N Q(x) ∧ ‖ψ(x)‖))
for all y ∈ N . So suppose that y from N is fixed and n is in Q(y) and u is in ‖Φ(y)‖. It
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suffices to show that fnu is in Q(t(x0))∧‖ψ(t(x0))‖, which by definition of f is to show that
et(m0) is in Q(t(x0)) and enm0u is in ‖ψ(t(x0))‖. But both of these follow directly from our
hypotheses on et,m0, x0, n, u.
This finishes the proof of part (I). For part (II), suppose ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ are L-sentences
and IQC, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ` ψ, and that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn are valid on N . Let x be a variable, which we
may assume does not appear in any of these sentences. Then the L-sentence ∀ x Φ is also
valid on N , which by part (I) implies that ∀ x ψ is valid on N . But then one may argue just
as in the Vacuous Quantification part of the previous proposition that ψ is also valid
on N , since we’re assuming that the quantifier Q is non-degenerate.
Let’s now explicitly record the simplifying effect of the classical quantifiers on the seman-
tics:
Proposition 6.14. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with classical quanti-
fier Q. Then the quantifier clauses in the semantics have the equivalents ‖∃ z ϕ(a, z)‖ ≡⋃
c∈N ‖ϕ(a, c)‖ and ‖∀ z ϕ(a, z)‖ ≡
⋂
c∈N ‖ϕ(a, c)‖. Similarly, the quantifier clauses in the
semantics for the modal B-valued L-structure µ[N ] have equivalents ‖∃z ϕ(a, z)‖µ(D) ≡
	D
⋃
c∈N ‖ϕ(a, c)‖µ(D) and ‖∀z ϕ(a, z)‖µ(D) ≡
⋂
c∈N ‖ϕ(a, c)‖µ(D).
Proof. A classical quantifier gives Q(c) top value uniformly, so these simplifications follow
from the behavior of top in Heyting and Boolean prealgebras.
We close this section by noting the stability of atomic formulas under the semantics,
together with some helpful characterizations pertaining to the case of negated atomics, which
we will use in Proposition 9.6 to produce some counterexamples to the stability of negated
atomics.
Proposition 6.15. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. Let
R(x) be an atomic formula. Then
(i) Atomic Formulas are Stable: ‖R(x)‖µ ≡ ‖R(x)‖µ.
(ii) Formula for Negated Atomics: One has ‖¬R(a)‖µ(D) ≡ ‖R(a)‖ ⇒ D uniformly for all
a in N and D in P (A).
(iii) Formula for Necessitations of Negated Atomics: Suppose that N0 is a subclass of N ,
and for all a in N0 one has that ‖R(a)‖ 6= ⊥. Then uniformly for all a in N0 and D in
P (A) one has ‖¬R(a)‖µ(D) ≡ D.
Proof. For (i) this follows from Proposition 4.7.ii and the fact that for atomic ϕ(x), we have
that ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(D) = µ(‖ϕ(a)‖) (cf. Definition 6.5). For (ii), we simply chase out definitions
and appeal to (2.14) to obtain ‖¬R(a)‖µ(D) = [	D‖R(a)‖ ⇒ 	D⊥] ≡ [	D‖R(a)‖ ⇒ D] ≡
[‖R(a)‖ ⇒ D]. For the (iii), suppose that ‖R(a)‖ 6= ⊥ for all a from N0. For E = ⊥, we
then have that 	E‖R(a)‖ = > and so ‖¬R(a)‖µ(E) ≡ [	E‖R(a)‖ ⇒ 	E⊥] ≡ > ⇒ ⊥ ≡ ⊥.
Hence one then has that ‖¬R(a)‖µ(D) ≡ 	D
⋂
E ‖¬R(a)‖µ(E) = 	D⊥ ≡ D.
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7 The Go¨del Translation and Flagg’s Change of Basis
Theorem
The aim of this section is to show that an important theorem from Flagg’s original paper,
namely [Flagg, 1985, Theorem 5.4 p. 168], generalizes to semantics from the previous section.
In our view, it’s expedient to separate this theorem into two parts, the first of which pertains
to the Go¨del translation (cf. Troelstra and Schwichtenberg [2000, p. 288], Flagg [1985, p.
147]):
Definition 7.1. (Go¨del Translation) For every non-modal L-formula ϕ, we define its Go¨del
translation ϕ to be the following modal L-formula in the same free variables:
ϕ = ϕ if ϕ atomic
(ϕ ∧ ψ) = ϕ ∧ ψ
(ϕ ∨ ψ) = ϕ ∨ ψ
(ϕ⇒ ψ) = (ϕ ⇒ ψ)
(∃x ϕ) = ∃x ϕ
(∀x ϕ) = (∀x ϕ)
Note that if R(x, y) is a binary atomic, then by definition we will have (∃ x (R(x, y) ∧
ϕ(x))) = ∃ x (R(x, y) ∧ ϕ(x)), and by appealing to the equivalence  ∀ x  ϕ ≡  ∀x ϕ
in Q◦eq.S4 + CBF or Qeq.S4, we may obtain
(7.1) (∀ x (R(x, y)⇒ ϕ(x))) = (∀ x (R(x, y)⇒ ϕ(x))) ≡  ∀ x (R(x, y)⇒ ϕ(x))
In the setting of set theory in §9, the traditional application will be to the case in which
the binary relation R is just membership ∈. Using the standard shorthand ∃ x ∈ y ϕ(x)
for ∃ x (x ∈ y ∧ ϕ(x)) and ∀ x ∈ y ϕ(x) for ∀ x (x ∈ y ⇒ ϕ(x)), we see that existential
∆0-formulas are treated compositionally by the Go¨del translation and universal ∆0-formulas
are treated likewise but with an initial box-operator placed in front:
(∃ x ∈ y ϕ(x)) ≡ ∃ x ∈ y ϕ(x)(7.2)
(∀ x ∈ y ϕ(x)) ≡  ∀ x ∈ y ϕ(x)(7.3)
Similar remarks apply to ∆0-formulas in the setting of arithmetic of §8, wherein the binary
relation is just the less-than relation <. A related observation that we shall apply often in
what follows is that blocks of quantifiers are treated compositionally by the Go¨del translation,
modulo one box operator being placed in front of a block of universal quantifiers (again
appealing to  ∀ x  ϕ ≡  ∀x ϕ):
(∃ x ϕ(x)) ≡ ∃ x ϕ(x)(7.4)
(∀ x ϕ(x)) ≡  ∀ x ϕ(x)(7.5)
Flagg’s result on the Go¨del translation was that, in the setting of arithmetic, a validity
on the non-modal structure had a valid Go¨del translation on the modal structure. The below
theorem indicates that the same relationship obtains generally in the semantics described in
the previous section.
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Theorem 7.2. Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure with quantifier Q. Then for
every non-modal L-formula ϕ(x), one has µ(‖ϕ(x)‖) = ‖ϕ(x)‖µ. Hence, for every non-
modal L-sentence ϕ, one has that ϕ is valid in the uniform P (A)-valued structure N iff ϕ
is valid on the modal B-valued L-structure µ[N ].
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of ϕ(x). For base cases t(x) = s(x),
R(x), and ⊥, the result follows immediately from the fact that the Go¨del translation is the
identity in these cases. For ϕ(x) a conjunction, disjunction, or conditional, the result follows
from the definitions in the semantics as well as the results in lines (4.6), (4.7), and (4.12)
about how µ acts on conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals.
For the universal quantifier, for the sake of readability consider the case of ϕ(x) ≡
∀ y ψ(x, y). By the induction hypothesis µ(‖ψ(x, y)‖) ≡ ‖ψ(x, y)‖µ. Then we must show
that
(7.6) 	D (
⋂
b∈N
(Q(b)⇒ ‖ψ(a, b)‖) ≡ 	D
⋂
E∈P (A)
⋂
b∈N
(Q(b)⇒ 	E‖ψ(a, b)‖)
For the left-to-right reduction, note that we have (Q(b)⇒ ‖ψ(a, b)‖) ≤ (Q(b)⇒ 	E‖ψ(a, b)‖)
by line (2.5) uniformly in E and a, b. Then this persists when taking intersections over b ∈ N
and E from P (A) and by adding the 	D operator to both sides by line (2.4). For the con-
verse, first note that by line (2.11) we have that
⋂
E∈P (A)(
⋂
b∈N(Q(b) ⇒ 	E‖ψ(a, b)‖)) ≤⋂
b∈N(Q(b) ⇒ ‖ψ(a, b)‖). Hence by applying 	D to both sides, this becomes the desired
converse.
For the existential quantifier, again consider the case of ϕ(x) ≡ ∃ y ψ(x, y). Then
we evaluate µ(‖∃ y ψ(x, y)‖)(a,D) as follows, applying Proposition 3.11 in conjunction
with the induction hypothesis to obtain that 	D
⋃
b∈N(Q(b)∧ ‖ψ(a, b)‖) ≡ 	D
⋃
b∈N(Q(b)∧
	D‖ψ(a, b)‖) ≡ 	D
⋃
b∈N(Q(b) ∧ ‖ψ(a, b)‖µ(D)), which is just ‖∃ y ψ(a, y)‖µ(D).
The following theorem provides a way of expanding a structure N by adding a new
predicate symbol to represent the necessitation of any given formula. This will be useful for
many of the proofs in the subsequent sections, since it implies that if any expansion of N
validates a schema J(ϕ), then the modal structure µ[N ] validates the schema J(ϕ).
Theorem 7.3. (Change of Basis Theorem). Let N be a uniform P (A)-valued L-structure
with quantifier Q. Let ϕ(x) be an n-ary modal L-formula with all free variables displayed
and let G(x) be a new n-ary predicate. Further, define G : Nn → P (A) by G(a) =⋂
E∈P (A) ‖ϕ(a)‖µ(E) and let N (G) be the expansion of N to an L ∪ {G}-structure by inter-
preting G by G. Then (i) N (G) is a uniform P (A)-valued L∪{G}-structure with quantifier
Q, and (ii) the valuation of the atomic formula G(x) on the modal B-valued L∪{G}-structure
µ[N(G)] is the same as the valuation of the modal formula ϕ(x) on the modal B-valued
L-structure µ[N ].
Proof. For (i), we need to ensure that there is an element e ofA such that for all a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn
from N , the element e is a witness to the following reduction: ‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an =
bn‖ ∧ ‖G(a1, . . . , an)‖ ≤ ‖G(b1, . . . , bn)‖. Let e be an element of A which is a witness
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to the following, uniformly in D from Proposition 6.7: ‖a1 = b1‖µ(D) ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an =
bn‖µ(D) ∧ ‖ϕ(a1, . . . , an)‖µ(D) ≤ ‖ϕ(b1, . . . , bn)‖µ(D). Then we have the following:
‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ∧ ‖G(a1, . . . , an)‖(7.7)
≤‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖ ∧
⋂
E∈P (A)
‖ϕ(a1, . . . , an)‖µ(E)(7.8)
≤	D ‖a1 = b1‖ ∧ · · · ∧ 	D‖an = bn‖ ∧ ‖ϕ(a1, . . . , an)‖µ(D)(7.9)
≤‖a1 = b1‖µ(D) ∧ · · · ∧ ‖an = bn‖µ(D) ∧ ‖ϕ(a1, . . . , an)‖µ(D)(7.10)
≤‖ϕ(b1, . . . , bn)‖µ(D)(7.11)
In this, line (7.8) follows from interpreting G by G. Further, line (7.9) follows on its first
n-components from line (2.5) and on the last component by the identity function (since we’re
dealing with an intersection). Finally, line (7.10) follows from the semantics for identity in
the modal structure, while line (7.11) follows from the property of element e. The reduction
from (7.7) to (7.11) then suffices by taking intersections over all D from P (A) (since G
is defined as an intersection). So this completes the verification that N (G) is a uniform
P (A)-valued L ∪ {G}-structure.
For part (ii) of the proposition, simply note the following, where for the sake of disam-
biguation we superscript all the valuations with names for their structures:
(7.12) ‖G(a)‖µ[N (G)]µ (D) = 	D‖G(a)‖N (G) = 	D
⋂
E∈P (A)
‖ϕ(a)‖µ[N ]µ (E) = ‖ϕ(a)‖µ[N ]µ
In this equation, the first equality follows from the interpretation of atomics in the modal
structures, the second follows from the definition of G which serves as the interpretation of
G, and the last comes from the definition of the box (cf. Definition 4.5).
8 Epistemic Arithmetic and Epistemic Church’s The-
sis
Let f1, f2, . . . be a standard enumeration of the primitive recursive functions, and let L0 be
the signature {0, S, f1, f2, . . .}. This is the signature of Heyting arithmetic HA (cf. Troelstra
and van Dalen [1988, volume 1 p. 126]). In this section we’ll work exclusively with Kleene’s
first model K1 (cf. §3), and the following structure shall be the focus of our study:
Definition 8.1. Let N0 be the uniform P (K1)-valued L0-structure with domain N = ω and
quantifier Q(n) = {n}, wherein 0 and the primitive recursive functions are interpreted as
themselves, S is interpreted as successor, and equality is interpreted disjunctively:
(8.1) ‖n = m‖ =
{
> if n = m,
⊥ if n 6= m.
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To see that this is indeed a uniform P (K1)-valued structure, note that eref1, esym, etran can
simply be taken to be indexes for the identity function, while eref2 can be taken to be an
index for the function which sends everything to zero. Note that in the terminology of
Definition 6.11, the quantifier Q(n) = {n} is non-degenerate, non-uniform, non-classical,
and term-friendly. It’s non-degenerate because the union of the Q(n) is non-empty, and by
the same token it’s non-uniform because the intersection of the Q(n) is empty. To see that
it is non-classical, suppose there were an index e witnessing e : ω  {n} for each n. Then,
e.g., e0 would be an element of both {0} and {1}. Finally, this quantifier is term-friendly
because all the terms n 7→ t(n) in the language determine a recursive function with index
et, which witnesses et : {n} {t(n)}.
Let L be an expansion of L0 by any number of new relation or function symbols. Then an
expansion N of N0 is given by specifying maps G : ωn → P (K1) to provide the interpretation
of G = ‖G(x)‖ for each new relation symbol, along with interpretations of the new function
symbols. It’s easy to see that any such choice will produce a uniform P (K1)-valued L-
structure. For ease of readability, suppose that a new predicate G(x) is unary. We must
show that there is a uniform witness to the reduction ‖m = n‖ ∧ ‖G(m)‖ ≤ ‖G(n)‖ for
all n,m ≥ 0. If ‖m = n‖ is empty, then any index will be a witness to the reduction.
However, if it’s not empty, then m = n and the sets ‖G(m)‖ and ‖G(n)‖ are equal, so
the second projection function is a witness to the reduction. A similar argument works for
the new atomics produced by new function symbols. However, note that if one expands
the structure by symbols for non-recursive functions, then one will no longer have witnesses
for the quantifiers being term-friendly. Hence, in this section, we work with expansions of
the signature L0 to signatures L by new constant, relation, and function symbols, and we
restrict attention to L-structures N which are expansions of the L0-structure N0 where the
new functions are interpreted by recursive functions.
The first result is that theorems of Heyting arithmetic have top value on these structures.
If L is an expansion of L0, then of course HA in that signature simply contains, in addition,
the instances of the induction schema in that signature.
Proposition 8.2. If ϕ is an L-sentence such that HA ` ϕ, then ϕ is valid on N .
Proof. By Proposition 6.13, it suffices to ensure that the axioms of HA in the expanded
signature are valid on the structure. For the axiom S0 6= 0, note that ‖S0 = 0‖ is empty and
so any index is a witness to ‖S0=0⇒ ⊥‖. The identity function can again be used to verify
the universal closures of any of the defining equations for the primitive recursive functions.
Further, for induction, it suffices to find a witness to the following:
(8.2) ‖ϕ(0)‖ ∧
⋂
n≥0
(Q(n)⇒ (‖ϕ(n)‖ ⇒ ‖ϕ(Sn)‖)) ≤
⋂
n≥0
(Q(n)⇒ ‖ϕ(n)‖)
So let pe0e1 be in the antecedent. Simply choose a recursive function j such that j(e0, e1)0 =
e0 and j(e0, e1)(n+ 1) = (e1n)(j(e0, e1)(n)). Then one can verify by induction on n ≥ 0 that
j(e0, e1) is in Q(n) ⇒ ‖ϕ(n)‖. Since Q(n) = {n}, this is just to verify that for all n ≥ 0,
one has j(e0, e1)(n) ∈ ‖ϕ(n)‖. For n = 0, one has that j(e0, e1)0 = e0 which is an element
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of ‖ϕ(0)‖ by hypothesis. Suppose the result holds for n, so that j(e0, e1)n ∈ ‖ϕ(n)‖. Let
` = j(e0, e1)n. Since n ∈ Q(n) and ` ∈ ‖ϕ(n)‖, it follows by the hypothesis on e1 that
e1n` ∈ ‖ϕ(n + 1)‖. But by definition of j and `, this is just to say that j(e0, e1)(n + 1) ∈
‖ϕ(n+ 1)‖.
In these next results, we appeal often to the Go¨del translation (cf. Definition 7.1) and
to its simple consequences that we noted circa (7.1).
Theorem 8.3. All the theorems of EA◦ are valid on the modal structure µ[N ]. Further,
each instance of the following modal analogue of the induction axiom is valid on the modal
structure µ[N ], where θ(x) can be any modal formula:
(8.3) [ θ(0) ∧ ∀ x ( θ(x)⇒  θ(Sx))]⇒ [ ∀ x θ(x)]
Finally, on the modal structure µ[N ], the following is not valid (cf. (1.4)), in that it does
not have top value uniformly in y:
(8.4) (∀ x E(x))⇒ E(y)
where recall E(x) denotes the existence predicate, which was defined immediately follow-
ing (1.6).
Proof. As consequences of Heyting arithmetic, the axioms of Robinson’s Q are valid in the
P (K1)-valued structure N . Then they are valid on the modal structure µ[N ] since they are
obviously implied by their Go¨del translation. For instance, the Go¨del translation of Q2 is
equivalent to  ∀ x, y (Sx = Sy ⇒ x = y), which implies Q2 by an application of the
T-axiom. For the induction axiom, we must show that for all modal formulas ϕ(x) we have
a uniform witness to the following reduction, uniform in D:
(8.5)
‖ϕ(0)‖µ(D) ∧
⋂
n≥0
(Q(n)⇒ (‖ϕ(n)‖µ(D)⇒ ‖ϕ(Sn)‖µ(D))) ≤
⋂
n≥0
(Q(n)⇒ ‖ϕ(n)‖µ(D))
But the same index used to verify (8.2) also works in this case. As for (8.3), this follows
from the Go¨del translation of the induction axiom in conjunction with the Change of Basis
Theorem 7.3.
As for (8.4), suppose not. Then there would be index which witnesses the following
reduction, uniformly in n ≥ 0 and D from P (K1):
(8.6)
⋂
m≥0
(Q(m)⇒ 	D
⋃
`≥0
(Q(`) ∧ 	D‖m = `‖)) ≤ 	D
⋃
`≥0
(Q(n) ∧ 	D‖n = `‖)
By appealing to Proposition 3.11, this is equivalent to:
(8.7)
⋂
m≥0
(Q(m)⇒ 	D
⋃
`≥0
(Q(`) ∧ ‖m = `‖)) ≤ 	D
⋃
`≥0
(Q(n) ∧ ‖n = `‖)
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Then by the semantics for identity, there would then be an e witnessing the reduction⋂
m≥0(Q(m)⇒ 	DQ(m)) ≤ 	DQ(n), uniformly in n ≥ 0 and D from P (K1). But by (2.5),
choose e′ such that e′ is in (Q(m)⇒ 	DQ(m)) for all m ≥ 0 and all D in P (K1). But then
ee′ is an element of 	DQ(n) for all n ≥ 0 and D in P (K1). Letting i be an index for the
identity map, by choosing D = Q(n), one has ee′i is an element of Q(n) = {n} for all n ≥ 0,
a contradiction.
Let us now record some further notation. In the arithmetical setting, the ∆0-formulas
are the smallest class containing the atomics, closed under the propositional connectives and
closed under bounded quantifiers—i.e., if ϕ(x) is ∆0, then so are ∃ x < y ϕ(x) and ∀ x <
y ϕ(x), which are respectively abbreviations for ∃ x (x < y ∧ ϕ(x)) and ∀ x (x < y ⇒ ϕ(x)).
Of course, in the setting of Heyting arithmetic, we take < to be defined as a certain atomic,
but it provably has all of the usual features, e.g., is a linear ordering etc. (cf. Troelstra
and van Dalen [1988, volume 1 pp. 124 ff]). Just as one can show, in Heyting arithmetic,
that the law of the excluded middle holds for quantifier-free formulas (cf. Troelstra and van
Dalen [1988, volume 1 pp. 128]), so can one show the same of the ∆0-formulas.
Similarly, in the arithmetical setting, the Σ1-formulas are formulas of the form ∃ x ϕ(x)
where ϕ(x) is ∆0, and the Π1-formulas are formulas of the form ∀ x ϕ(x), where ϕ(x)
is ∆0. If N is the standard model of arithmetic, then the usual argument from Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorems implies that if R ⊆ Nn is definable by both a Σ1-formula ϕ(x)
and a Π1-formula ψ(x), then for all n from Nn one has that R(n) implies HA ` ϕ(n), while
¬R(n) implies HA ` ¬ψ(n). This circumstance is sometimes expressed by saying that the
number-theoretic relation R is strongly representable in the theory HA. By Proposition 8.2,
it then follows further that R(n) implies ϕ(n) is valid in N , while ¬R(n) implies ¬ψ(n)
is valid N . Hence, we may take any ∆1-definable predicate over the natural numbers to
be definable in the structure N , and we will express this as the strong representability of
∆1-definable predicates in the structure N .
The usual argument (cf. Troelstra and van Dalen [1988, volume 1 p. 199, volume 2 pp.
725-726]) then shows:
Proposition 8.4. Church’s thesis is valid on the structure N :
(8.8) [∀ n ∃ m ϕ(n,m)] ⇒ [∃ e ∀ n ∃ m ∃ p (T (e, n, p) ∧ U(p,m) ∧ ϕ(n,m))]
Proof. Suppose that e is a member of the antecedent. This is an abbreviation for the set⋂
n≥0[Q(n) ⇒
⋃
m≥0(Q(m) ∧ ‖ϕ(n,m)‖)]. Then index e on input n returns an element of
Q(m) ∧ ‖ϕ(n,m)‖ for some m ∈ ω. Hence, the computable function n 7→ p1(en) returns an
element of ‖ϕ(n,m)‖ for the value m = p0(en). In conjunction with strong representability,
we can use this to uniformly obtain a member of the consequent.
Theorem 8.5. ECT (1.1) is valid on the modal structure µ[N ].
Proof. One proceeds by computing the Go¨del translation of (8.8) in the particular case where
ϕ(n,m) is an atomic G(n,m), which perhaps contains parameters which are suppressed for
the sake of readability. This is a conditional of the form Φ⇒ Ψ, and so its Go¨del translation
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will be of the form (Φ ⇒ Ψ). So let’s proceed by computing Φ and Ψ separately. Since
atomics are not changed by the Go¨del translation, we have that Φ is [∀ n ∃ m G(n,m))].
Now let’s turn to Ψ, which has the form ∃ e  ∀ n ∃ m ∃ p (T (e, n, p)∧U(p,m)∧G(n,m))).
Since T (e, n, p) and U(p,m) are primitive recursive, we can drop the Go¨del translation on
these, and similarly for the atomic G. Hence, in sum, on the modal structure µ[N ], we have
(8.9) [(∀ n ∃ m G(n,m))]⇒ [∃ e  ∀ n ∃ m ∃ p (T (e, n, p) ∧ U(p,m) ∧G(n,m))]
Then we obtain ECT (1.1) from this by the Change of Basis Theorem 7.3.
As mentioned in the introductory section, Flagg [1985] rather suggested that his result
established the consistency of EA+ECT. See, in particular, the first rule governing “for all”
on [Flagg, 1985, p. 146]. Given that Theorem 8.3 displays an explicit counterexample to
the free-variable variant (1.4) of the Universal Instantiation Axiom (1.3), there must
obviously be some place where our treatment differs. In short, Flagg identifies two concepts
which we have distinguished, namely the semantics for identity and the quantifier, and in
particular, Flagg assumes that the semantics for identity are rather defined by ‖n = n‖ = {n}
(cf. the semantics for identity on Flagg [1985, p. 150]).
Now, as mentioned previously, the Heyting prealgebra P (K1) is only two valued up to
equivalence, and so for each particular n ≥ 0, we have that {n} ≡ >. But this equivalence
is not uniform, as one can readily see by the discussion of the first paragraph of this section
showing that the quantifierQ(n) = {n} is non-classical. But in the uniform P (K1)-semantics,
one needs to have that ‖n = n‖ ≡ > uniformly, since this is just the condition pertaining to
eref1, eref2 in Definition 6.2. The reason for our insistence on this condition is that we want
x = x to be valid on our modal structures, since this is an instance of (1.5), an axiom of
both Q◦eq.S4 and Qeq.S4.
On the modal structures, the semantics for x = x is given by ‖x = x‖µ(D) which by
definition is 	D‖x = x‖. This is valid because eref1 from Definition 6.2 is a witness to the first
reduction in > ≤ ‖x = x‖ ≤ 	D‖x = x‖, where the last reduction follows uniformly in D by
(2.5). By contrast, 	D{x} is not uniformly equivalent to >, since if it were then we would
have a uniform witness e to the reduction ({n} ⇒ {n}) ≤ {n}, and by taking j to be an index
for the identity function we would have ej = n for any n, a contradiction. Thus if one follows
Flagg in defining ‖x = x‖ = {x} and one further defines ‖x = x‖µ(D) ≡ 	D(‖x = x‖), then
x = x would not be valid, and thus the semantics would not be sound for Q◦eq.S4. However,
from Flagg’s definition of his deductive system, it seems that x = x is a consequence of this
deductive system (cf. first rule for identity on Flagg [1985, p. 145]).
Another subtlety is that Flagg seems to suggest that one should define identity in the
modal structure by ‖x = x‖µ(D) = {x} (cf. clause (I) of identity in Flagg [1985, Definition
4.2 p. 162]). However, this is not an element of the Boolean algebra B(N). For, suppose
that one has uniformly in x from N and D from P (A) that ({x} ⇒ D)⇒ D ≤ {x}. But by
choosing D = ⊥, one has that this reduction can be rewritten as (⊥ ⇒ ⊥) ≤ {x} and since
(⊥ ⇒ ⊥) = >, this implies that the sets {x} are not disjoint as x varies, which is patently
false.
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For these reasons, we have deviated from Flagg’s own treatment by distinguishing between
the role of the quantifier and the role of the semantics for the identity relation, and we insist
that there always be uniform witnesses for the identity relation.
To close off this section, let’s now note a result about the stability of Σ1-formulas, and its
consequences for the Barcan Formula. It’s also helpful to note this because it shows us that
in the proof of Proposition 8.5, it wasn’t important that we took the Kleene T-predicate to
be represented as a primitive recursive term, but rather we could have used any Σ1-formula
witnessing the strong representability of the Kleene T -predicate. This proposition is stated
in Flagg [1985, p. 149]:
Proposition 8.6. The Σ1-formulas are stable in the modal structure µ[N ] and are moreover
equivalent to their Go¨del translations. That is, for every Σ1-formula ϕ(x), we have that
∀ x [ϕ(x)⇔ (ϕ(x))⇔ ϕ(x)] is valid in the modal structure µ[N ].
Proof. For this proof, let’s work axiomatically in the expansion EA+ of EA◦ by the Go¨del
translations of all theorems of HA. By the earlier results in this section, all the theorems of
EA+ are valid on the modal structure.
First we show that the results hold for all ∆0-formulas by induction on complexity of
formulas. For atomics this follows from the stability of atomics and fact that the Go¨del
translation doesn’t change atomics. The inductive steps for conjunction and disjunction
follow trivially from the inductive hypotheses and Q◦eq.S4.
For conditionals, suppose that the result holds for ϕ(x) and ψ(x). It then suffices
to show (ϕ(x) ⇒ ψ(x)) ⇒ (ϕ(x) ⇒ ψ(x)). Since, as mentioned above, HA proves
∀ x (ϕ(x) ∨ ¬ϕ(x)), we have that the Go¨del translation of this sentence holds in EA+, and
this is equivalent to  ∀ x (ϕ(x)∨¬ϕ(x)) since ϕ(x) is by induction hypothesis equivalent
to its own Go¨del translation and stable. In the case where ϕ(x) holds we can then infer from
ϕ(x)⇒ ψ(x) to ψ(x) and hence to ψ(x) by induction hypothesis, then to (ϕ(x)⇒ ψ(x)).
In the case where ¬ϕ(x) holds, we may directly infer that (ϕ(x)⇒ ψ(x)).
For the case of the bounded quantifiers, suppose that the result holds for ϕ(y) and consider
the case of the universal quantifier. Define the formula θ(x) ≡ [∀ y < x ϕ(y)] ⇒ (∀ y <
x ϕ(y)). It suffices to show that θ(0) and ∀ x (θ(x)⇒ θ(Sx)). Since EA+ proves ∀ y (¬y < 0),
it also proves (∀ y < 0 ϕ(y)). Now suppose that θ(x); we must show that θ(Sx). But since
EA+ proves y < Sx ⇔ (y < x ∨ y = x), it also proves the necessitation of this. Hence in
EA+, the formula θ(Sx) is equivalent to [(∀ y < x ϕ(y))∧ϕ(x)]⇒ (∀ y < x ϕ(y))∧ϕ(x),
which follows from induction hypothesis. The case of the bounded existential quantifier, and
the case for the Σ1-formulas is exactly similar.
The following proposition complements Proposition 6.10. One of Kleene’s original exam-
ples of a sentence of arithmetic which was true but not realizable pertained to the halting
set (cf. Kleene [1945, §9 pp. 115-116], Kleene [1943, p. 71]). The idea of the below proof is
to use Kleene’s halting set example to show the invalidity of the Barcan Formula.
Proposition 8.7. It is not the case that the Barcan Formula BF (1.8) is valid on the modal
B-valued L0-structure µ[N0].
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Proof. So suppose that this was valid. This reductio hypothesis in conjunction with Propo-
sition 6.10 implies that [∀ x  ϕ(x)]⇔ [ ∀ x ϕ(x)] is also valid.
Consider the halting set ∅′, which for the sake of definiteness we take to have membership
conditions y ∈ ∅′ iff ∃ s T (y, y, s), where T is again Kleene’s T -predicate. But then we can
argue that “every number is either in or not in the halting set” is equivalent to its own Go¨del
translation:
‖(∀ y y ∈ ∅′ ∨ y /∈ ∅′)‖µ ≡‖ ∀ y (∃ s T (y, y, s) ∨((∃ t T (y, y, t))⇒ ⊥)‖µ(8.10)
≤‖∀ y (∃ s T (y, y, s)) ∨ ((∃ t T (y, y, t))⇒ ⊥)‖µ(8.11)
≤‖∀ y ∀ t ∃ s (T (y, y, s) ∨ ¬T (y, y, t))‖µ(8.12)
≤‖∀ y ∀ t  ∃ s (T (y, y, s) ∨ ¬T (y, y, t))‖µ(8.13)
≤‖ ∀ y ∀ t ∃ s (T (y, y, s) ∨ ¬T (y, y, t))‖µ(8.14)
≤‖ ∀ y (∃ s (T (y, y, s)) ∨ (∀ t  ¬T (y, y, t))‖µ(8.15)
≤‖ ∀ y (∃ s (T (y, y, s)) ∨ ( ∀ t ¬T (y, y, t))‖µ(8.16)
≤‖ ∀ y (∃ s (T (y, y, s)) ∨ ((∃ t T (y, y, t))⇒ ⊥)‖µ(8.17)
In this, the inference from (8.10) to (8.11) follows from dropping the boxes via the T-axiom,
and the next step is just by manipulating the quantifiers in the usual way that is permitted
in classical logic. The inference from (8.12) to (8.13) follows from Proposition 8.6, and the
inference from (8.13) to (8.14) follows from the reductio hypothesis. The inference from (8.14)
to (8.15) follows from Proposition 8.6 again, and the inference from (8.15) to (8.16) follows
again from the reductio hypothesis, and the final step is again by usual equivalences in
classical logic.
Since PA proves that “every number is either in or not in the halting set,” it is valid on
the modal B-valued L0-structure µ[N0]. Since it is equivalent on this structure to its Go¨del
translation, by Theorem 7.2 this sentence is valid on the P (A)-valued L0-structure N0.
Let e be a witness to this validity, and note that ‖y ∈ ∅′‖ ≡ > iff y ∈ ∅′, and ‖y /∈ ∅′‖ ≡ >
iff y /∈ ∅′. By Proposition 3.2, choose e′ such that e′y = p0(ey). Then for all y ≥ 0, one has
that e′y = k iff y ∈ ∅′, while e′y = k˘ iff y /∈ ∅′, contradicting the non-computability of the
halting set.
As mentioned in the introductory section, Theorem 1.2 is then a direct consequence of
this proposition in conjunction with Theorem 8.5 and Theorem 8.3.
9 Epistemic Set Theory and Epistemic Church’s The-
sis
Letting A be an arbitrary pca, in this section we look at the modalization of a uniform
P (A)-valued set-theoretic structure, with the goal being to establish Theorem 1.5. So let A
be a pca and let κ > |A| be strongly inaccessible. Then we define the following sequence of
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sets:
(9.1) V A0 = ∅, V Aα+1 = P (A× V Aα ), V Aλ =
⋃
β<λ
V Aβ if λ limit
This definition is due to McCarty [1984, p. 87], McCarty [1986, p. 157] in the case ofA = K1.
The observation that McCarty’s construction essentially works without modification for an
arbitrary pca A is indicated in Rathjen [2006, §5 p. 293]. Obviously the definition in (9.1)
mirrors that of the Boolean-valued models of set theory, e.g., Bell [1985, p. 21].
As usual, we define the rank of an element of
⋃
β<κ V
A
β to be the least β such that V
A
β
contains it. By an easy induction on rank, one sees that all elements of
⋃
β<κ V
A
β are subsets
of A × V Aβ for some β < κ. We use the notation 〈·, ·〉 for the set-theoretic ordered pair, so
that x ∈ A×V Aβ iff x = 〈e, y〉 for some e ∈ A and y ∈ V Aβ . This shouldn’t be conflated with
the pairing element p in the pca A itself.
In this section, we always work with the classical quantifier Q(x) = >. Hence as men-
tioned in Proposition 6.14, this has the effect of removing the expression Q(x) from the
clauses for ∃ and ∀. Further, the natural signature for the structure V Aκ is the signature L0
consisting just of the binary membership relation. Hence, to put a uniform P (A)-valued
structure on V Aκ , it suffices to specify the interpretation of the identity function and the
binary membership relation. One does this by defining the maps ‖· = ·‖ : V Aκ ×V Aκ → P (A)
and ‖· ∈ ·‖ : V Aκ × V Aκ → P (A) recursively by the following, which again may with profit be
compared to the case of the Boolean valued models of set theory in Bell [1985, p. 23]:
‖a ∈ b‖ = {pe0e1 : ∃c 〈e0, c〉 ∈ b ∧ e1 ∈ ‖a = c‖)}(9.2)
‖a = b‖ = {e0 : ∀ 〈n, c〉 ∈ a e0n ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖} ∧ {e1 : ∀ 〈n, c〉 ∈ b e1n ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖}
Further, for a set Z ⊆ A, we let p0Z be the set of x ∈ A such that pxy ∈ Z for some y ∈ A,
and similarly, we let p1Z be the set of y ∈ A such that pxy ∈ Z for some x ∈ A. Hence,
one has that p0‖a = b‖ = {e0 : ∀ 〈n, c〉 ∈ a e0n ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖} and p1‖a = b‖ = {e1 : ∀ 〈n, c〉 ∈
b e1n ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖}.
Now we can verify that this generates a uniform P (A)-valued structure. While the
statement of this proposition uses notions specific to this paper (such as uniform P (A)-
valued structures), in the case of A = K1, its proof is that of McCarty [1984, 92-95], and
resembles the usual proof of substitution in Boolean-valued models, as in Bell [1985, Theorem
1.17 p. 24]. We include the proof in Appendix C, since much of the modal semantics rides
on uniformity considerations and since these uniformity considerations aren’t explicit in the
statement of the results in the unpublished McCarty [1984, 92-95], and while they are explicit
in the statement of the results in Rathjen [2006, Lemma 4.2 p. 291] a complete proof is not
given there.
Proposition 9.1. V Aκ is a uniform P (A)-valued L0-structure.
Proof. See Appendix C.
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The following theorem is due to McCarty in the case of A = K1. In this case, the
result is stated without proof in McCarty [1986, Proposition 3.1 p. 158], while the proof
is given in McCarty [1984, pp. 96-97], which remains unpublished. Hence, for the sake of
completeness, we give the proof in Appendix C. In the statement of McCarty’s theorem, the
theory IZF has as axioms the usual ZF axioms, but with collection in lieu of replacement,
and with the induction scheme instead of the foundation axiom (cf. McCarty [1984, p. 58],
McCarty [1986, p. 158]). The reader should be warned that in other sources, such as Beeson
[1985, Chapter VIII], the name “IZF” is rather used for a two-sorted theory, with one sort
for numbers and another for sets. It’s also worth mentioning that the only place where we
employ the hypothesis that κ > |A| is in the verification of collection.
Theorem 9.2. All the theorems of IZF are valid on the uniform P (A)-valued L0-structure
V Aκ , and indeed on any expansion of this structure.
Proof. Again, see Appendix C.
Since we’re always working with classical quantifiers in this section, by Theorem 6.12 the
modal structures will be sound for Qeq.S4. Thus in the modal theories considered in this
section, the background modal predicate logic will be Qeq.S4 (as opposed to Q
◦
eq.S4+ CBF).
Now we show that this structure models the epistemic set theory eZF (cf. Definition 1.4),
which forms part of Theorem 1.5:
Proposition 9.3. All the axioms of eZF are valid on the modal B-valued L0-structure µ[V Aκ ].
Proof. For Axiom I (Modal Extensionality), this is implied by the Go¨del translation of the
usual axiom of extensionality, since we can write its antecedent in a ∆0-fashion, namely as
(∀ z ∈ x z ∈ y) ∧ (∀ z ∈ y z ∈ x), keeping in mind the observations on Go¨del translations of
∆0-formulas from (7.1).
As for Axiom IV (Pairing) and Axiom V (Union) of eZF, note first that the usual non-
modal versions of pairing and union assert the that for any set x there is a set y = f(x),
wherein the graph of the function f may be written in a ∆0-fashion. Then Axioms IV
and V will follow directly from Go¨del translations of the usual non-modal versions of pair-
ing and union. The arguments for Axiom VII (The Modal Power Set Axiom) and Axiom
VIII (Infinity) are exactly parallel, where for the latter we make use of the second part of
Proposition 6.10 to get the second existential quantifier behind the initial box operator.
The final axioms of eZF are Comprehension, Collection, and Scedrov’s Modal Foun-
dation (Axiom III). We give the argument for Comprehension, since the arguments for the
other two are similar. For Comprehension, first consider the following instance of ordinary
non-modal comprehension, wherein we assume that the formula G is atomic, perhaps in a
signature extending that of set theory, and where for the sake of simplicity we assume that
there is only one parameter variable:
(9.3) ∀ p ∀ x ∃ y ∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔ (z ∈ x ∧ G(z, p)))
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The Go¨del translation of this implies the following, which is thus valid on the modal structure
augmented with an interpretation for the atomic:
(9.4) ∀ p ∀ x ∃ y  ∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔ (z ∈ x ∧ G(z, p)))
Now suppose that ϕ(z, p) is an arbitrary modal formula. By Flagg’s Change of Basis Theo-
rem 7.3, we have the following is valid on the structure:
(9.5) ∀ p ∀ x ∃ y  (∀ z (z ∈ y ⇔ (z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z, p)))
In the remainder of the section, we build towards the proof of the other parts of Theo-
rem 1.5. Given the previous proposition, it suffices then to establish a failure of the stability
of negated atomics and the validity of ECT (1.1) in the case A = K1, and we do this in
Proposition 9.6 and Proposition 9.8. In doing this, we work with the ersatzes of the individ-
ual natural numbers and the set of natural numbers within V Aκ . We first recall the definition
of the so-called Curry numerals in a pca A [van Oosten, 2008, Definition 1.3.2 p. 12], which
can easily be shown to be distinct in any pca:
(9.6) 0˜ = skk, n˜+ 1 = pk˘n˜
Like in McCarty [1984, Definition 3.6 pp. 105-106], one then defines corresponding elements
of V Aκ as follows:
(9.7) n = {〈m˜,m〉 : m < n}, ω = {〈m˜,m〉 : m < ω}
As one can see by inspection of the proof of Theorem 9.2 presented in Appendix C, these
are the witnesses to the axiom of infinity in V Aκ .
First let’s note the elementary proposition:
Proposition 9.4. For all m,n ≥ 0, one has (i) n < m iff ‖n ∈ m‖ 6= ∅, and (ii) n = m iff
‖n = m‖ 6= ∅.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction of (i), suppose that n < m. Then 〈n˜, n〉 ∈ m and so
pn˜i0 ∈ ‖n ∈ m‖, where i0 is an element of A such that i0 ∈ ‖a = a‖ for any a ∈ V Aκ . For the
left-to-right direction of (ii), we have that i0 ∈ ‖a = a‖ for any element a of the structure.
For the right-to-left direction, first consider a third condition: (iii) m < n iff ‖m ∈ n‖ 6= ∅.
Then we argue by simultaneous induction on m, that the right-to-left directions of (i)-(iii)
hold. For the base case, consider m = 0. For (i), since 0 = ∅, we have that ‖n ∈ m‖ = ∅.
For (ii), if n 6= 0 then n 6= ∅ which implies that ‖n = m‖ = ∅. For (iii), suppose that
‖m ∈ n‖ 6= ∅ but not 0 < n. Then n = 0 and so n = ∅ and then ‖m ∈ n‖ = ∅.
Now suppose that the result holds for m; we show it holds for m + 1. For (i), suppose
that ‖n ∈ m+ 1‖ 6= ∅. Choose pe0e1 in ‖n ∈ m+ 1‖. Then there is c with 〈e0, c〉 ∈ m+ 1
with e1 ∈ ‖c = n‖. Then there is ` < m + 1 with e0 = ˜` and c = `. Then ‖` = n‖ 6= ∅
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implies ` = n by the induction hypothesis for part (ii). Then n < m + 1, which is what we
wanted to show.
For (ii), suppose that ‖n = m+ 1‖ 6= ∅. Choose e ∈ p1(‖n = m+ 1‖). Since 〈m˜,m〉 ∈
m+ 1, we have that em˜ ∈ ‖m ∈ n‖, so that m < n by the induction hypothesis for (iii).
Choose i ∈ p0(‖n = m+ 1‖). Then for all ` < n, one has that i˜`∈ ‖` ∈ (m+ 1)‖ and so
by the previous paragraph (i.e. the m + 1 case for (i)), we have that ` < m + 1. Thus in
particular n− 1 < m+ 1, so that n < m+ 2. Hence collecting all this together, we have that
m < n < m+ 2, so that n = m+ 1.
For (iii), suppose that ‖m+ 1 ∈ n‖ 6= ∅. Choose pe0e1 in ‖m+ 1 ∈ n‖. Then there is c
with 〈e0, c〉 ∈ n with e1 ∈ ‖c = m+ 1‖. Then there is ` < n with e0 = ˜` and c = `. Then
‖` = m+ 1‖ 6= ∅ and so by the previous paragraph (i.e. the m + 1 case for (ii)), we have
that ` = m+ 1. Then m+ 1 < n, which is what we wanted to show.
To develop our counterexample to the stability of negated atomics (cf. Proposition 9.6),
we need to work not only with the ersatzes of the natural numbers, but also with ersatzes of
subsets of natural numbers. Hence, for any X ⊆ ω, let χX : ω → {k, k˘} be the characteristic
function of X, defined by χX(n) = k if n ∈ X and χX(n) = k˘ if n /∈ X.
Proposition 9.5. For any X ⊆ ω, define X̂ = {〈pn˜χX(n), n〉 : n ≥ 0}, which is an element
of V Aω+1. Then ‖n ∈ X̂‖ = {p(pn˜χX(n))e : e ∈ ‖n = n‖} for all n ≥ 0.
Proof. First suppose that pe0e1 ∈ ‖n ∈ X̂‖. Then there is d with 〈e0, d〉 ∈ X̂ and e1 ∈ ‖n =
d‖. Then 〈e0, d〉 = 〈pm˜χX(m),m〉 for some m ≥ 0. But since e1 ∈ ‖n = m‖ we have n = m
by the previous proposition, so that 〈e0, d〉 = 〈pn˜χX(n), n〉, so that pe0e1 = p(pn˜χX(n))e1
with e1 ∈ ‖n = n‖, which is what we wanted to show. For the converse containment, simply
note that if e ∈ ‖n = n‖ then d = n is a witness to 〈pn˜χX(n), d〉 ∈ X̂ ∧ e ∈ ‖d = n‖, so
that p(pn˜χX(n))e ∈ ‖n ∈ X̂‖.
Finally, we have the counterexample to the stability of negated atomics, which is part of
Theorem 1.5:
Proposition 9.6. In the modal B-valued L0-structure µ[V Aκ ], it is not the case that for
every negated atomic formula ¬Rx, we have that ‖¬R(x)‖µ ≡ ‖(¬R(x))‖µ. In particular,
a counterexample is the negated atomic formula “y /∈ x.”
Proof. Suppose not. Then there would be an index e ≥ 0 such that for all a, b in V Aκ and all
D from P (A), one has that there is a uniform witness to ‖b /∈ a‖µ(D) ≤ ‖(b /∈ a)‖µ(D). For
any n ≥ 0 and any X ⊆ ω one has that ‖n ∈ X̂‖ is non-empty by the previous proposition.
Then by Proposition 6.15 (ii)-(iii), for all n ≥ 0, X ⊆ ω and D from P (A), one has that there
is a uniform witness to (‖n ∈ X̂‖ ⇒ D) ≤ D. But taking D = ‖n ∈ X̂‖, one has that for all
all n ≥ 0, X ⊆ ω, there is a uniform witness e to (‖n ∈ X̂‖ ⇒ ‖n ∈ X̂‖) ≤ ‖n ∈ X̂‖. Let e′
be an index for the identity function, so that e′ is in (‖n ∈ X̂‖ ⇒ ‖n ∈ X̂‖) for all n ≥ 0 and
X ⊆ ω. Then by choosing a pair of distinct numbers n,m, the previous proposition implies
that p0p0(ee
′) is equal to both n˜ and m˜, a contradiction.
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In these last two propositions of this section, we work over Kleene’s first model K1. We
begin with the following proposition from McCarty [1984, p. 158], whose proof we include
for the sake of completeness:
Proposition 9.7. On any expansion of the uniform P (K1)-valued structure V K1κ , the fol-
lowing is valid:
(9.8) [∀ n ∈ ω ∃ m ∈ ω ϕ(n,m)]⇒
[∃ e ∈ ω ∀ n ∈ ω ∃ m ∈ ω ∃ p ∈ ω (T (e, n, p) ∧ U(p,m) ∧ ϕ(n,m))]
Proof. Suppose that i ∈ ‖∀ n ∈ ω ∃ m ∈ ω ϕ(n,m)‖. Then for all b ∈ V K1κ , one has that i is
in ‖b ∈ ω ⇒ ∃ m ∈ ω ϕ(b,m)‖. Then by definition of ω one has that for all n ≥ 0 that
(9.9) i(pn˜i0) ∈ ‖∃ m ∈ ω ϕ(n,m)‖ =
⋃
m∈V K1κ
‖m ∈ ω‖ ∧ ‖ϕ(n,m)‖
where i0 is the program such that i0 ∈ ‖a = a‖ for all a ∈ V K1κ . Then let e0, e1 be
the indexes for the program such that for all n ≥ 0 one has e0n = p0i(pn˜i0) and e1n =
p1i(pn˜i0). Then e0, e1 are total. Hence, for each n ≥ 0 one may compute m, p ≥ 0 such that
T (e0, n, p) ∧ U(p,m). Since these are recursive, one may effectively find from e0, n, p,m a
proof of T (e0, n, p) ∧ U(p,m) from IZF, and then e1n returns an element of ‖ϕ(n,m)‖.
Proposition 9.8. On the modal structure µ[V K1κ ], the following is valid:
(9.10) [ ∀ n ∈ ω ∃ m ∈ ω ϕ(n,m)]⇒
[∃ e ∈ ω  ∀ n ∈ ω ∃ m ∈ ω ∃ p ∈ ω (T (e, n, p) ∧ U(p,m) ∧ϕ(n,m))]
Proof. By invoking the previous proposition, the proof is exactly the same as in the arith-
metic case in §8, using the Change of Basis Theorem 7.3 and the stability of formulas which
are Σ1-definable in the signature of arithmetic in exactly the same way.
As mentioned in the introduction, Theorem 1.5 follows from this proposition and the
earlier Proposition 9.3 and Proposition 9.6.
10 Troelstra’s Elementary Analysis and Kleene’s Sec-
ond Model
Now we focus on building models of fragments of second-order arithmetic with very limited
amounts of comprehension. This will be relative to the pca K2, namely Kleene’s second
model (cf. §3), and we shall concentrate our efforts on the theory of elementary analysis EL
studied by Troelstra (cf. Troelstra [1977, §§3.3, 3.4 pp. 982-983], Troelstra and van Dalen
[1988, volume 1 §3.6 pp. 144 ff], Troelstra [1998, §2.5 pp. 425-426]).
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Let us extend the single-sorted signature of Heyting arithmetic HA by second sort reserved
for functions from natural numbers to natural numbers. The modal semantics developed in §6
carries over straightforwardly to the many-sorted setting. Since there are only two sorts, we’ll
simply reserve the lower-case Roman letters `,m, n, x, y, z for numbers and we’ll reserve the
lower-case case Greek letters α, β, γ, δ for functions from natural numbers to natural numbers.
The only primitive that we add to the signature is the application function (α, n) 7→ α(n),
which takes a number-theoretic function α and a number n and evaluates α at n.
We work with the standard model of second-order arithmetic, which we call N 20 . In this,
the number sort is interpreted as ω = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .} and the function sort is interpreted
as Baire space ωω. The elements of the signature of Heyting arithmetic are interpreted
exactly the same as in §8, except that they are taken to be P (K2)-valued instead of P (K1)-
valued. In many treatments of second-order arithmetic, equality for second-order objects
would be defined in terms of coextensionality. However, since the modal semantics of §6
always has identity built-in, we go ahead and assume that identity terms between functions
are well-formed and interpreted disjunctively just as in (8.1).
The application function (α, n) 7→ α(n) is interpreted by the usual application function
given by the metatheory. The same argument as deployed vis-a`-vis first-order arithmetic in
§8 shows that N 20 is a uniform P (K2)-valued structure, and that any expansion N 2 of N 20
by new function or relation symbols is similarly a uniform P (K2)-valued structure. As for
the quantifiers, here we must proceed a little differently from §8, since the quantifiers must
map each element of the domain to a subset of K2 instead of K1. Recall from §3 that [σ] is
the clopen through the finite string σ in Baire space, so that [(n)] = {α ∈ ωω : α(0) = n}.
We then define the quantifiers in N 2 as Q(n) = [(n)] and Q(α) = {α}, so that ωω =⊔
n≥0Q(n) and ωω =
⊔
α∈ωω Q(α) provide us with two distinct partitions of Baire space.
Using the terminology from Definition 6.11, it’s easy to see that these quantifiers are non-
degenerate, non-uniform, and non-classical (where these notions are relativized to sorts in
the obvious way). They are also term-friendly, providing that we only introduce new recur-
sive number-theoretic functions, like in §8, and providing that we don’t introduce any new
functions defined on second-order objects outside of the application function. For, assuming
this, it then suffices to show that there is γ in K2 such that γ : Q(n) ∧ Q(α)  Q(α(n))
for all n ≥ 0 and α. Since the function F : ωω × ωω → ωω given by F (β, α) = α(β(0))_0
is a continuous function, by Proposition 3.3.I choose δ such that δαβ = F (β, α). Then by
Proposition 3.2 choose γ such that γγ′ = δ(p0γ′)(p1γ′). This is why the quantifiers on this
structure are term-friendly.
Proposition 10.1. All of the axioms of HA are valid on the structure N 2, as well as the
following recursion axiom and choice schema and law of the excluded middle for the new
atomics:
∀ n0 ∀ α ∃ γ γ(0) = n0 ∧ ∀ n γ(S(n)) = α(γ(n))(10.1)
[∀ n ∃ m ϕ(n,m)]⇒ ∃ γ [∀ n ϕ(n, γ(n))](10.2)
∀ α ∀ n ∀ m (α(n) = m ∨ α(n) 6= m)(10.3)
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Proof. Again, by Proposition 6.13, it suffices to verify the validity of the axioms. For HA,
the proof proceeds much as in the proof of Proposition 8.2, modulo needing to work with K2
instead of K1. In parallel to equation (8.2), for induction it suffices to find a witness to the
following:
(10.4) ‖ϕ(0)‖ ∧
⋂
n≥0
([(n)]⇒ (‖ϕ(n)‖ ⇒ ‖ϕ(Sn)‖) ≤
⋂
n≥0
([(n)]⇒ ‖ϕ(n)‖)
For each n ≥ 0, by Proposition 3.2 choose γn such that γnαβ = (α((n)_0))(β). Then
by Proposition 3.3.II, the map Gn(α, β) = γnαβ has Gδ domain En and is continuous on
this domain. Define a partial function of three variables F : ωω × ωω × ωω 99K ωω by
F (α0, α1, (0)
_β) = α0 and F (α0, α1, (n + 1)
_β) = γnα1F (α0, α1, (n)
_β). We claim that F
has Gδ domain and is continuous on this domain. Since the domains Dn of F  (ωω × ωω ×
[(n)]) are disjoint and separated by opens, it suffices to show by induction on n ≥ 0 that
F  (ωω × ωω × [(n)]) is partial continuous and that its domain Dn is Gδ. For n = 0, this is
trivially the case. Suppose it holds for n. To show it holds for n+1, define F̂ (α0, α1, (n)
_β) =
(α1, F (α0, α1, (n)
_β)) which is continuous on Dn by induction hypothesis. Then (α0, α1, (n+
1)_β) ∈ Dn+1 iff both (α0, α1, (n)_β) ∈ Dn and (α0, α1, (n)_β) ∈ F̂−1(En), which is Gδ
by induction hypothesis. Further F is continuous on Dn+1 since it is the composition of
two continuous functions. So indeed F has Gδ domain and is continuous on this domain.
Then by Proposition 3.3.I there is a γ such that γα0α1β = F (α0, α1, β). By Proposition 3.2,
choose γ′ such that γ′α = γ(p0α)(p1α). Now, to verify (10.4), suppose that α = pα0α1 is in
the antecedent of this reduction, so that p0α = α0 and p1α = α1. Then an easy induction
on n ≥ 0 shows that γ′α = γα0α1 is in the consequent of this reduction.
For the recursion axiom (10.1), for ease of readability, consider the specific case where n0
has been fixed ahead of time, and let’s find a witness to the following reduction, uniformly
in α:
(10.5) {α} ≤
⋃
γ
({γ} ∧ [
⋂
n≥0
([(n)]⇒ (‖γ(0) = n0‖ ∧ ‖γ(S(n)) = α(γ(n))‖))])
Define a function F : ωω → ωω by F (α)(0) = n0 and F (α)(n + 1) = α(F (α)(n)). Then
F : ωω → ω is continuous iff pin◦F : ωω → ω is continuous, wherein pin denotes the projection
onto the n-th component, so that pin(β) = β(n), and wherein ω is given the discrete topology.
Clearly pi0◦F is continuous since it is a constant function. Suppose that pin◦F is continuous.
Then (pin+1 ◦ F )−1({k}) =
⋃
`≥0{α : α(`) = k ∧ α ∈ (pin ◦ F )−1({`})} is open since it’s
a union of sets which are an intersection of a clopen and an open. Hence F : ωω → ωω
is indeed continuous. By Proposition 3.3.I there is a γ such that F (α) = γα. Choose β∧
such that β∧ is a uniform witness to > ≤ > ∧ >. By Proposition 3.2 choose δ such that
δα = p((γα)(β∧)). Let’s verify that δ is a witness to (10.5). So suppose that α is given.
Then by construction (γα)(0) = F (α)(0) = n0 and so ‖(γα)(0) = n0‖ = > and (γα)(Sn) =
F (α)(n + 1) = α(F (α)(n)) = α((γα)(n)), so that ‖(γα)(Sn) = α((γα)(n))‖ = >. Then by
construction, β∧ is an element of [(n)]⇒ (‖γ(0) = n0‖∧‖γ(S(n)) = α(γ(n))‖)] for all n ≥ 0,
which finishes the argument for the recursion axiom (10.1).
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For the choice schema (10.2), we must find a witness to the following reduction:
(10.6)
⋂
n≥0
[(n)]⇒
⋃
m≥0
([(m)] ∧ ‖ϕ(n,m)‖) ≤
⋃
γ
({γ} ∧ (
⋂
n≥0
([(n)]⇒ ‖ϕ(n, γ(n))‖)))
Define a partial map F : ωω 99K ωω by (F (α))(n) = (p0(α((n)_0)))(0). For each n ≥ 0, by
Proposition 3.2, there is δn such that δnα = p0(α((n)
_0)). By Proposition 3.3.II, this map
is continuous on its Gδ domain Dn, and hence its projection α 7→ (p0(α((n)_0)))(0) onto its
zero-th component is also continuous with Gδ domain Dn, where we view ω as having the
discrete topology. Then F has Gδ domain D =
⋂
nDn and F : D → ωω is continuous. By
Proposition 3.3.II, there is γ such that F (α) = γα. Similarly, there is γ′ such that for all α
and n ≥ 0 and β one has (γ′α)((n)_β) = p1(α((n)_0)). By Proposition 3.2 choose δ such
that δα = p((γα)(γ′α)). Suppose that α is in the antecedent of (10.6). Then we show that
δα is in the consequent of (10.6). For each n ≥ 0, there is m ≥ 0 such that α((n)_0) is in
[(m)] ∧ ‖ϕ(n,m)‖, so that p0(α((n)_0)) is in [(m)] and p1(α((n)_0)) is in ‖ϕ(n,m)‖. Then
by the definition of F and γ, γ′, we have (γα)(n) = (F (α))(n) = (p0(α((n)_0)))(0) = m, and
for all β we have (γ′α)((n)_β) = p1(α(n_0)) ∈ ‖ϕ(n,m)‖ = ‖ϕ(n, (γα)(n))‖. Hence indeed
δα is in the consequent of (10.6), which finishes the verification of the choice schema (10.2).
For the law of the excluded middle for the new atomics (10.3), first define F : ωω ×ωω ×
ωω → ωω by F (α, β, γ) = pkk if α(β(0)) = γ(0), while F (α, β, γ) = pk˘k˘ otherwise. Then
clearly F is continuous and so by Proposition 3.3.I, choose δ such that δαβγ = F (α, β, γ).
It suffices to show that δα is in [(n)] ⇒ ([(m)] ⇒ (‖α(n) = m‖ ∨ ‖α(n) 6= m)‖) for
all α and n,m ≥ 0. Fix α and n,m ≥ 0 and β ∈ [(n)]; we must show that δαβ is in
[(m)] ⇒ (‖α(n) = m‖ ∨ ‖α(n) 6= m)‖). So suppose that γ ∈ [(m)]; we must show that
δαβγ = F (α, β, γ) is in ‖α(n) = m‖ ∨ ‖α(n) 6= m)‖. If α(β(0)) = γ(0) then α(n) = m
and so ‖α(n) = m‖ = > and hence F (α, β, γ) = pkk is in ‖α(n) = m‖ ∨ ‖α(n) 6= m‖. If
α(β(0)) 6= γ(0) then α(n) 6= m and so ‖α(n) = m‖ = ⊥ and ‖α(n) 6= m‖ = > and hence
F (α, β, γ) = pk˘k˘ is in ‖α(n) = m‖ ∨ ‖α(n) 6= m)‖.
Now, if t(x) is term, then ∀ x ∃ y t(x) = y is valid in the structure N 2, since the
quantifiers in this structure are term-friendly. Hence by the axiom of choice (10.2), one has
that there is γ such that γ(x) = t(x). Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume
that we have λ-terms in the language, and write λx.t in lieu of γ. These satisfy λ-conversion
(λx.t)(n) = t(x/n) since γ(n) = t(n). Similarly, we may assume that we have a term rn0,α
which provides a witness to the recursion axiom (10.1). Further, by a conceptually-slight but
notationally-heavy modification of the proof of the recursion axiom (10.1), one may replace
the base case n0 by a term t(x1, . . . , x`) with `-parameter places and obtain a modified
version of the recursion axiom which reads as follows:
(10.7) ∀ α ∃ γ ∀ x [γ(0) = t(x) ∧ ∀ n γ(S(n), x) = α(γ(n), x)]
In this, one thinks of the elements α, γ of Baire space as taking `+ 1-many inputs by using a
primitive recursive pairing function on natural numbers, which is available in the structure
due to it validating Heyting arithmetic HA. Proceeding in this fashion, one then introduces
the term rt,α for the γ from (10.7).
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Troelstra’s development of the theory EL of elementary analysis proceeded deductively
rather than semantically, and so it was natural for him to work in a logic enriched by λ-
terms and the recursion terms rt,α. Since we can introduce these terms as abbreviations,
it’s then a consequence of the above proposition that all the theorems of EL are valid on
the definitional expansion of N 2 induced by these abbreviations. See the citations in the
beginning paragraph of this section for references to Troelstra’s explicit description of the
syntax and axioms of EL.
Troelstra further developed the basics of oracle computability in EL, and showed for in-
stance that if we define (αβ)(n) = m in the natural Σ01-way in arithmetic as ∃ ` (α(((n)_β) 
`) = m + 1 ∧ ∀ `0 < ` α(((n)_β)  `0) = 0), then one can show in EL that {e0}α⊕β = α(β),
where the left-hand side is written out in terms of oracle computations and where e0 can
be taken to be the same index as in (3.1) [Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, volume 1 §§3.7.9-
3.7.10 p. 157]. Another consequence which it is useful to take note of is that the usual
Normal Form Theorem for oracle computation is provable in EL [Troelstra and van Dalen,
1988, volume 1 §§3.7.6 p. 155].
These observations allow us to establish the following helpful proposition, where in
part (I), the expression “{e}γ = β” in the context ‖{e}γ = β‖ is an abbreviation for
“∀ n ∃ q (T (e, n, γ, q)∧U(q, β(n))),” where T is the oracle-computability version of Kleene’s
T -predicate given by the Normal Form Theorem, and where both T and U may be repre-
sented by a term in the signature of N 20 (using the λ-terms and rt,α-terms introduced above).
Further, in part (II) of this proposition, the expression “γα = β” in the context ‖γα = β‖
is an abbreviation for ‖{e0}γ⊕α = β‖.
Proposition 10.2. (I) For every index e ≥ 0 there is δe such that for all γ, β one has
{e}γ = β implies δeγ ∈ ‖{e}γ = β‖. (II) Hence, there is δ such that for all α, β, γ one has
that γα = β implies δγα ∈ ‖γα = β‖.
Proof. First let’s note why (II) follows from (I). By (I), one has that {e0}γ⊕α = β implies
δe0(γ⊕α) ∈ ‖{e0}γ⊕α = β‖. Since (γ, α) 7→ γ⊕α is continuous, by Proposition 3.3.I, choose
p′ such that p′γα = γ ⊕ α. Then by Proposition 3.2, let δ be such that δγα = δe0(p′γα).
Then γα = β implies δγα = δe0(p
′γα) = δe0(γ ⊕ α) ∈ ‖{e0}γ⊕α = β‖. By the remark in the
previous paragraph, we have that ‖{e0}γ⊕α = β‖ is identical to ‖γα = β‖.
Now we prove (I). Choose index e′ so that e′ on input n with oracle γ searches for a
halting computation of e on input n with oracle γ. By Proposition 3.3.I, choose δ such
that δγ = {e′}γ. The function H which on input α returns H(α) = ((δ(p0α))(n))_0 for
n = (p1α)(0) is a partial continuous function with Gδ domain, and so by Proposition 3.3.I,
choose η with ηα = H(α). Then η(pγ((n)_β)) = ((δγ)(n))_0, so that
(10.8) β ∈ [(n)] implies η(pγβ) ∈ [(q)] for q = (δγ)(n)
Let δ∧ be any witness for > ≤ > ∧ >. By Proposition 3.2, choose δ′e such that δ′eβ =
p(η(pγβ))(δ∧β). Suppose that {e}γ = β. It suffices to show that δ′e is a witness to [(n)] ≤⋃
q≥0[(q)] ∧ (‖T (e, n, γ, q)‖ ∧ ‖U(q, β(n)‖) for all n ≥ 0. Suppose that β ∈ [(n)]. Then
by (10.8) we have η(pγβ) ∈ [(q)] for q = (δγ)(n). By definition of δ, it follows that q is
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a halting computation of e on input n with oracle γ, so that T (e, n, γ, q) and since {e}γ =
β by hypothesis, also U(q, β(n)). Then by the semantics for the atomics, it follows that
(‖T (e, n, γ, q)‖ ∧ ‖U(q, β(n)‖) = > ∧>, so that δ∧β is in this set.
In Troelstra [1998, p. 427], it is noted that in discussions of Kleene’s second model K2,
the role of Church’s Thesis is taken over by the following schema, which is called generalized
continuity :
Proposition 10.3. In N 2, the following Generalized Continuity schema is valid:
(10.9) [∀ α ∃ β ϕ(α, β)]⇒ [∃ γ ∀ α ∃ β (γα = β ∧ ϕ(α, β))]
Proof. It suffices to show that there is witness such that when given an element γ of
(10.10)
⋂
α
({α} ⇒
⋃
β
({β} ∧ ‖ϕ(α, β)‖))
returns an element of the set
(10.11)
⋃
γ′
({γ′} ∧ [
⋂
α
({α} ⇒
⋃
β
({β} ∧ (‖γ′α = β‖ ∧ ‖ϕ(α, β)‖)))])
By Proposition 3.2 choose δi so that δiγα = pi(γα), so that if γ is an element of (10.10) then
δ1γα ∈ ‖ϕ(α, δ0γα)‖ and both δiγ↓ and δiγα↓ for all α. By Proposition 3.2, choose δ′ such
that δ′γα = p(δ0γα)(p(δ(δ0γ)α)(δ1γα)), where δ is from part II of the previous proposition.
Then similarly, let δ′′ such that δ′′γ = p(δ0γ)(δ′γ). Then we claim that δ′′ is the desired
witness. So let γ be from (10.10); we must show that δ′′γ is in (10.11). For this it suffices to
show that δ′γα is an element of:
(10.12)
⋃
β
({β} ∧ (‖δ0γα = β‖ ∧ ‖ϕ(α, β)‖))
Let β = δ0γα. Then since (δ0γ)α = β, by the previous proposition, we have that δ((δ0γ)α) is
in ‖δ0γα = β‖, where we keep in mind from the discussion prior to the previous proposition
that the syntax of “δ0γα = β” in the context ‖δ0γα = β‖ is not an atomic. Finally, as
remarked above, we also have that δ1γα ∈ ‖ϕ(α, β)‖, and so we are done.
Using the apparatus constructed thus far, we can then deduce the consistency of HA and
an epistemic version of generalized continuity:
Theorem 10.4. In µ[N 2], all the theorems of EA◦ are valid, as is
(10.13) [ ∀ α ∃ β ϕ(α, β)]⇒ [∃ γ  ∀ α ∃ β (γα = β ∧ ϕ(α, β))]
Proof. As for the theorems of EA◦, the argument proceeds just as in the proof of Theorem 8.3,
using Proposition 10.1 in lieu of Proposition 8.2. As for (10.13) this follows directly from
taking the Go¨del translation of (10.9) in the case of an atomic and applying the Change of
Basis Theorem 7.3. In particular, Proposition 8.6 holds on this structure as well, so that
since γα = β in (10.13) is a Π02-formula, it’s implied by its own Go¨del translation. The
reason that Proposition 8.6 holds on this structure is that the law the excluded middle holds
for the new atomics by (10.3).
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11 Scott’s Graph Model of the Untyped Lambda Cal-
culus
To illustrate the generality of our construction, let’s consider now Scott’s graph model S de-
scribed in §3. Since in this pca the application operation (3.2) is total, there is a natural way
of viewing S as a uniform P (S)-valued structure in the sparse functional pca signature L (cf.
immediately after Proposition 3.2 for a definition of this signature). On the uniform P (S)-
valued L-structure, we interpret identity disjunctively as in (8.1), and we use the quantifier
Q(x) = {x} which is non-degenerate, non-uniform, and non-classical (cf. Definition 6.11).
Further, it is term-friendly by Proposition 3.2.
Then in parallel to Proposition 3.7, we can show that
Proposition 11.1. On the uniform P (S)-valued L-structure S, all of the following axioms
are valid: ∀ x, y kxy = x and ∀ x, y, z sxyz = (xz)(yz) and 12k = k and 13s = s and the
Meyer-Scott axiom ∀ a, b ((∀ x ax = bx)⇒ 1a = 1b).
Proof. For ∀ x ∀ y kxy = x, it suffices to find an element of ⋂x({x} ⇒ ⋂y({y} ⇒ ‖kxy =
x‖)). But in fact any element of c is an element of this set. For, suppose that x is given;
we must show that cx ∈ ⋂y({y} ⇒ ‖kxy = x‖). So suppose that y is given; we must
show that cxy ∈ ‖kxy = x‖. But since kxy = x is true, we have ‖kxy = x‖ = >,
and so trivially cxy ∈ ‖kxy = x‖. A similar argument works in the case of s; and the
validity of the identities 12k = k and 13s = s follows trivially since they are true in the
classical model. For the Meyer-Scott Axiom, it suffices to find a witness to the reduction⋂
x({x} ⇒ ‖ax = bx‖) ≤ ‖1a = 1b‖, uniformly in a, b. But again, any element c will do.
For, suppose that y is an element of
⋂
x({x} ⇒ ‖ax = bx‖); we must show that cy is in
‖1a = 1b‖. But for all x, we have that yx is in ‖ax = bx‖, so that it is true, and hence since
the Meyer-Scott axiom holds classically, we have that 1a = 1b is true, and so ‖1a = 1b‖ = >,
and so cy ∈ ‖1a = 1b‖.
Similar to the previous sections, it’s convenient to consider expansions S∗ of S by new
relation or function symbols, which are for the same reasons still uniform P (S)-valued struc-
tures; and for the same reasons as in the previous sections, here too we refrain from introduc-
ing function symbols which violate term-friendliness. Then we have that the following choice
principle holds on these expansions. However, note that in this choice principle, “cx = y”
is literally the atomic formula, and so the proof of this choice principle is less involved than
the proof of Proposition 10.3.
Proposition 11.2. On the uniform P (S)-valued L-structure S∗, the following choice prin-
ciple holds for any formula in the signature:
(11.1) (∀ x ∃ y ϕ(x, y))⇒ (∃ c ∀ x ∃ y (cx = y ∧ ϕ(x, y)))
Proof. By Proposition 3.2, choose b0, b1, b2 from S such that b0ax = p0(ax) and b1ax =
p((p0(ax))(p(k)(p1(ax)))) and b2a = p(b0a)(b1a). Then b2 is a witness to the reduction.
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For, suppose that a is a member of the antecedent. Then for all x one has that p1(ax) ∈
‖ϕ(x, p0(ax))‖. Define c = b0a, and let x be arbitrary. Then by construction cx = b0ax =
p0(ax). Further, if we define y = p0(ax), we have that p(k)(p1(ax)) ∈ ‖cx = y‖ ∧ ‖ϕ(x, y)‖
and hence b1ax ∈ {y} ∧ (‖cx = y‖ ∧ ‖ϕ(x, y)‖). Hence, since x was arbitrary we have
that b1a ∈ ‖∀ x ∃ y (cx = y ∧ ϕ(x, y))‖. Since c = b0a, we then have that b2a ∈
‖∃ c ∀ x ∃ y (cx = y ∧ ϕ(x, y))‖.
Proposition 11.3. On the modal B-valued L-structure µ[S], all of the following axioms are
valid: ∀ x, y kxy = x and ∀ x, y, z sxyz = (xz)(yz) and 12k = k and 13s = s and the modal
version of the Meyer-Scott axiom ∀ a, b (((∀ x ax = bx))⇒ 1a = 1b). In addition, one has
the following choice principle, for any modal formula in the signature:
(11.2)  (∀ x ∃ y  ϕ(x, y))⇒ (∃ c  ∀ x ∃ y (cx = y ∧  ϕ(x, y)))
However, Meyer-Scott axiom itself ∀ a, b ((∀ x ax = bx)⇒ 1a = 1b) is not valid on µ[S].
Proof. The positive parts of the proposition follow from the Go¨del translation and Flagg’s
Change of Basis Theorem, by considerations which are by now routine. For the negative
part, suppose for the sake of contradiction that the Meyer-Scott axiom itself ∀ a, b ((∀ x ax =
bx) ⇒ 1a = 1b) was valid on µ[S]. By Proposition 3.8, fix a, b ∈ S such that 1a 6= 1b and
for all x ∈ S one has ax 6= bx. Since 	D⊥ ≡ D uniformly, for each x ∈ S we would have
‖ax = bx‖µ(D) ≡ D uniformly, and similarly ‖1a = 1b‖µ(D) ≡ D uniformly. Then our
reductio hypothesis yields a witness c to the reduction {x} ⇒ D ≤ D uniformly in D and x.
But since skk is the identity function in pcas, one has that skk is a member of {x} ⇒ {x} for
all x. But then taking D = {x}, we have that c(skk) = x for all x ∈ S, a contradiction.
Proposition 11.4. On the modal B-valued L-structure µ[S], the negated atomics are not
stable, and in particular the negated atomic x 6= y is not stable.
Proof. Scott [1975] p. 174 showed that the “paradoxical combinator” y used by Curry in
his eponymous paradox (cf. Barendregt [1981, Appendix B pp. 573 ff]) is such that for all
continuous f : S → S one has f(yg) = yg, where g = graph(f) (cf. Proposition 3.6.I). By
Proposition 3.6.I & IV, choose g in S such that gc = graph(fun(c)) for all c from S. Putting
these two things together, one has that c(y(gc)) = y(gc) for all c from S. By Proposition 3.2,
choose δ in S such that δc = p(y(gc))k for all c in S. Then δ is a witness to the validity of
∀ c ∃ x cx = x on the uniform P (S)-valued L-structure S.
The Go¨del translation of this is  (∀ c ∃ x cx = x) which is thus valid on the modal B-
valued L-structure µ[S]. In conjunction with the stability of identity and (11.2), this implies
that the following is valid on the modal B-valued L-structure µ[S]:
(11.3)  (∀ x ∃ y  ϕ(x, y))⇒ ∃ x  ϕ(x, x)
If one applies this to ϕ(x, y) ≡ x 6= y, then because ∀ x ♦ ¬ϕ(x, x) is valid on the modal
B-valued L-structure µ[S], so too is
(11.4) ♦ ∃ x ∀ y ♦ x = y
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Suppose now for the sake of contradiction that the negated atomic x 6= y was stable. This
implies that  ∀ x, y (♦(x = y) ⇒ x = y) is valid on the modal B-valued L-structure µ[S].
In conjunction with the previous equation, we then obtain the validity of ♦ ∃ x ∀ y x = y,
which implies
(11.5) ♦ ∀ x, y x = y
But by choosing distinct x 6= y in S, our reductio hypothesis gives that  x 6= y, which
implies ∃ x, y  x 6= y, which by Proposition 6.10 implies  ∃ x, y x 6= y, which contradicts
the previous equation.
12 Conclusions and Further Questions
Drawing the comparison to modal logic prior to Kripke semantics, Horsten once reported the
concern about ECT (1.1) and related systems that “in the absence of a clear and unifying
semantic framework there is the suspicion [. . . ] that we don’t know what we are talking
about” [Horsten, 1998, p. 24]. While one can always adopt an instrumentalist attitude
towards semantics, it’s hard not to have some sympathy for Horsten’s remark, and it’s our
hope that the realizability semantics developed here, which we take to generalize Flagg’s
1985 construction, can add to our understanding of ECT (1.1). On the one hand, we’ve
tried to do so by making transparent how, e.g., these semantics don’t validate the Barcan
Formula BF (1.8) or the stability of non-identity (cf. Proposition 8.7 and Proposition 11.4),
but they do validate the Converse Barcan Formula CBF (1.2) and the stability of identity
and other atomics (cf. Proposition 6.10 and Proposition 6.15). On the other hand, we’ve
sought to specify the senses in which the Flagg construction does not depend crucially on
the ordinary model of computation over the natural numbers. One degree of freedom is that
we can vary the partial combinatory algebra over which we are working, and we can rather
work over Kleene’s second model or Scott’s graph model of the untyped lambda-calculus (cf.
§§10-11). But we can also vary the base theory from Flagg’s original setting of arithmetic
to the setting of set theory using McCarty’s construction (cf. §9).
But there is obviously much that is left unresolved by this paper. Four issues in particular
seem especially noteworthy. First, one would like some understanding of how complex the
consequence relation is for the modal semantics developed here. Given that the semantics for
the box operator is defined in terms of intersections over arbitrary subsets of the underlying
pca (cf. Definitions 4.5 and 4.6), one suspects that the induced consequence relation might
be rather complex, and showing that it was not computably enumerable would be good
evidence that there is no natural completeness theorem for these semantics.
Second, given the centrality of the stability of atomics to the Flagg construction, the
considerations of this paper tell us nothing about the consistency of ECT (1.1) plus the
failure of the stability of atomics against the background of an epistemic set theory. (See
Flagg [1985, p. 149] for a discussion of the stability of atomics against the background of an
epistemic arithmetic.)
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Third, the main open technical question about ECT (1.1) is whether it plus epistemic
arithmetic is a conservative extension of Peano arithmetic PA (cf. Horsten [1997, p. 649],
Horsten [1998, p. 20], Horsten [2006, p. 260], Halbach and Horsten [2000, Question 1 p.
462]). But the conservation of a given system over a subsystem can often be established by
showing that any model of the subsystem can be expanded into a model of the given system.
Because of this, as well as due to its intrinsic interest, one would want to know whether
the model of EA◦ + ECT constructed in §8 validates all the same arithmetical truths as the
standard model of arithmetic.
Fourth and finally, we indicated in §1 how the stability of atomics motivated the modifi-
cation eZF of Goodman and Scedrov’s theory EZF, and in §9 we showed that modal versions
of McCarty’s model, which is closely related to the Boolean-valued models of set theory,
validated this theory eZF. However, Martin once suggested that “[. . . ] a Boolean-valued
model would hardly seem to be a contender for the universe of sets” [Martin, 2001, p. 15].
While the philosophical interpretation of Boolean-valued models is currently being debated,
one might reasonably want some further assurance that eZF had the right to the name of
a set theory at all, and for this it would be natural to show that it actually interpreted
ordinary set theory ZF, or at least some fragment of this.
A Appendix: Proposition on Kleene’s Second Model
Here is the proof of Proposition 3.3, which we stated in §3 in the context of describing
Kleene’s second model K2 but only used in §10:
Proof. For (I) in the case of n = 1, let D =
⋂
n Un, where Un is open. Let pin : ω
ω → ω be the
n-th projection pin(α) = α(n), so that (pin ◦ G) : D → ω is continuous where ω is given the
discrete topology. For each n,m ≥ 0, choose open Vn,m ⊆ Un such that (pin ◦ G)−1({m}) =
Vn,m ∩D. Define γ by γ((n)_σ) = m+ 1 if [σ] ⊆ Vn,m and [τ ] * Vn,m for all τ ≺ σ and m is
the least with this property, and γ((n)_σ) = 0 if there is no such m. Suppose that α ∈ D
and n ≥ 0 and m = G(α)(n), so that α ∈ (pin ◦G)−1({m}) = Vn,m ∩D. Choose least ` such
that [σ] ⊆ Vn,m where σ = α  `, and note that there is no m′ < m with this property since
it would then imply that G(α)(n) was equal to both m′,m. Then γ((n)_σ) = m + 1 and
γ((n)_τ) = 0 for all τ ≺ σ. Hence (γα)(n) = m. Finally, note that if α /∈ D, then γα is
undefined. For, if α /∈ D, then choose Un with α /∈ Un. Then γ((n)_σ) = 0 for all initial
segments σ of α, and so (γα)(n) is undefined.
For (I) in the case of n = 2 and D = ωω × ωω, see van Oosten [2008, Lemma 1.4.1 p.
16]. Then by applying this to the homeomorphism Γ2 : ω
ω×ωω → ωω given by Γ2(α1, α2) =
α1 ⊕ α2, one obtains γ2 such that γ2α1α2 = α1 ⊕ α2.
Now let’s show (I) in the case of n = 2 and D ⊆ ωω×ωω being Gδ. Its image D′ under Γ2
is also Gδ, and F
′ : D′ → ωω defined by F ′(α1⊕α2) = F (α1, α2) is also continuous. Then by
(I) in the case of n = 1, one has that there is γ such that γβ = F ′(β) for all β in D′. Then
γ(γ2α1α2) = γ(α1⊕α2) = F ′(α1⊕α2) = F (α1, α2) for all (α1, α2) in D. By Proposition 3.2,
choose γ′ such that γ′α1α2 = γ(γ2α1α2). Then γ′ is the desired witness, and so we are done
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with the case n = 2.
To finish the proof of (I), suppose that the result holds for n ≥ 2. To show it holds
for n + 1, suppose that D ⊆ (ωω)n+1 is Gδ. Then its image D′ under the homeomorphism
Γn+1 : (ω
ω)n+1 → (ωω)n given by Γn+1(α1, . . . , αn−1, αn, αn+1) = (α1, . . . , αn−1, αn ⊕ αn+1)
is also Gδ. Further the function F
′ : D′ → ωω defined by F ′(α1, . . . , αn−1, αn ⊕ αn+1) =
F (α1, . . . , αn−1, αn, αn+1) is continuous. Then by induction hypothesis, choose γ such that
γβ1 · · · βn = F ′(β1, . . . , βn) for all (β1, . . . , βn) in D′. Then one has γα1 · · ·αn−1(γ2αnαn+1) =
F ′(α1, . . . , αn⊕αn+1) = F (α1, . . . , αn, αn+1). Then by Proposition 3.2, choose an element γ′
such that γ′α1 · · ·αn+1 = γα1 · · ·αn−1(γ2αnαn+1). Then γ′ is the desired witness.
For (II), for the case n = 1, it follows from (3.1). For the case of n = 2, (α1, α2) is
in the domain the map iff (i) α1 is in the domain of the map α 7→ γα and (ii) for all
n ≥ 0 there is σ1 ⊕ σ2 such that the following three Σ01-conditions in oracle γ ⊕ α1 ⊕ α2
occur: (ii.1) for all i < |σ1| there is τi  γ ⊕ α1 such that σ1(i) = {e0}τi(i), and (ii.2)
σ2  α2 and (ii.3) {e0}σ1⊕σ2(n)↓. Note that condition (ii.1) is Σ01 in the oracle since the Σ01-
formulas are closed under bounded quantifiers. Since conditions (i)-(ii) are Π02 in the oracle,
it follows that the domain in the case n = 2 is Π02 and thus Gδ. For continuity, suppose that
αi,k → αi where (α1,k, α2,k) is in the domain of the function. Then by case n = 1, we have
γα1,k → γα1. Suppose that we are trying to secure agreement with γα1α2 up to length `.
Choose σ  γα1 ⊕ α2 such that {e0}σ(i)↓ for all i < `. Then choose K ≥ 0 large enough
so that if k ≥ K, then γα1,k agrees with γα1 up to length |σ| and αi,k agrees with α2 up to
length |σ|.
B Appendix: Heyting Prealgebras and Uniformity
In this section, we briefly set up a logic in which to state and prove quantifier-free facts
about Heyting prealgebras, and in this logic we prove (2.4)-(2.14), and we connect this to
the discussion of uniform witnesses in Heyting prealgebras from §3. The well-formed formulas
of this logic are simply the quantifier-free formulas in the language of Heyting prealgebras
without equality, and the deduction rules are the simply the usual natural deduction rules
for the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC together with the substitution rule “from
ϕ(x) infer ϕ(t).” The axioms of Heyting prealgebras are naturally quantifier-free, and so for
instance the axiom governing the conditional may be written
(B.1) x ∧ y ≤ z iff y ≤ x⇒ z
Let us call the system formed by this logic and the quantifier-free versions of the axioms of
Heyting prealgebras the system elementary Heyting prealgebras or EHP. It’s obviously just
a Heyting-prealgebra analogue of primitive recursive arithmetic PRA (cf. Troelstra and van
Dalen [1988, volume 1 §3.2 120 ff]).
First let’s begin by noting some more elementary consequences of EHP:
Proposition B.1. EHP proves (2.1)-(2.3) and hence each are true on any Heyting prealge-
bra.
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Proof. For, equation (2.1) follows from (B.1) by setting y equal to x⇒ z. For equation (2.2),
suppose x ≤ y; we want to show y ⇒ z ≤ x ⇒ z. By equation (B.1) this is equivalent to
x∧ (y ⇒ z) ≤ z. But since x ≤ y, we have x∧ (y ⇒ z) ≤ y ∧ (y ⇒ z) ≤ z, where the second
reduction comes from equation (2.1). Finally, equation (2.3) follows from two applications
of equation (2.1).
Using this more elementary proposition, we may then establish:
Proposition B.2. EHP proves (2.4)-(2.14), so that these are true on all Heyting prealgebras.
Proof. For equation (2.4), suppose that x ≤ y. Then by equation (2.2), we have y ⇒ d ≤
x ⇒ d. Then by equation (2.2) again, we have (x ⇒ d) ⇒ d ≤ (y ⇒ d) ⇒ d. Then
	dx ≤ 	dy.
For equation (2.5), note that by equation (B.1), it is equivalent to (x⇒ d)∧x ≤ d, which
follows immediately from equation (2.1).
For equation (2.6), let z be (x ⇒ d). Then by equation (2.1), we have (z ⇒ d) ∧ z ≤ d.
Since z is (x ⇒ d) we have (z ⇒ d) ≡ 	dx. We thus have that 	dx ∧ z ≤ d. By
equation (B.1), it follows that z ≤ 	dx ⇒ d or (x ⇒ d) ≤ 	dx ⇒ d. From this we argue
that (x⇒ d)∧	d	dx ≤ (	dx⇒ d)∧((	dx⇒ d)⇒ d) ≤ d, where the last reduction comes
from equation (2.1). By equation (B.1), this thus yields that 	d	dx ≤ (x⇒ d)⇒ d = 	dx.
For equation (2.7), we want to show that 	d	d x ≡ 	dx. But we already have 	d	d x ≤
	dx from equation (2.6). To see 	dx ≤ 	d 	d x, we note that we have x ≤ 	d(x) from
equation (2.5), and applying equation (2.4) with y equal to	d(x), we obtain	dx ≤ 	d	d(x).
For equation (2.8), let us first show that 	d(x ∧ y) ≤ 	dx ∧ 	dy. Since ∧ is defined
in Heyting prealgebras as the infimum, it suffices to show that 	d(x ∧ y) ≤ 	d(x) and
	d(x ∧ y) ≤ 	d(y). But these both follow directly from equation (2.4), since x ∧ y ≤ x and
x ∧ y ≤ y. Now we show the converse, namely 	dx ∧ 	dy ≤ 	d(x ∧ y). By equation (B.1),
this is equivalent to
(B.2) ((x ∧ y)⇒ d) ∧ 	dx ∧ 	dy ≤ d
which by expanding is equivalent to
(B.3) [((x ∧ y)⇒ d) ∧ ((x⇒ d)⇒ d)] ∧ 	d(y) ≤ d
By two applications of equation (B.1) we can get ((x ∧ y) ⇒ d) ≤ (y ⇒ (x ⇒ d)). Hence
we may argue from this and equation (2.3) to equation (B.3) by noting that [((x ∧ y) ⇒
d) ∧ ((x⇒ d)⇒ d)] ∧ 	d(y) ≤ (y ⇒ d) ∧ 	dy ≤ d.
For equation (2.9), note that we have by equation (2.1) that x ∧ (x ⇒ y) ≤ y. By
equation (2.4), we have 	d(x∧(x⇒ y)) ≤ 	d(y). By equation (2.8) we obtain 	dx∧	d(x⇒
y) ≤ 	d(y). Then by equation (B.1), we have 	d(x⇒ y) ≤ 	dx⇒ 	dy.
For equation (2.10), since ∨ is defined in Heyting prealgebras as the supremum, it suffices
to show that 	d(x ∨ y) ≥ 	d(x) and 	d(x ∨ y) ≥ 	d(y). But these both follow from
equation (2.4), since x ∨ y ≥ x and x ∨ y ≥ y.
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For (2.11), note that d ≤ d implies that > ≤ (d ⇒ d). Hence one has that 	dd ≤
(	dd) ∧ (d⇒ d) ≤ d.
For equation (2.12), note that it is equivalent to d ≤ (x⇒ d)⇒ d. But by equation (B.1)
this is equivalent to d ∧ (x ⇒ d) ≤ d, which follows directly from ∧ being a lower bound.
Note that equation (2.13) follows directly from equation (2.5) since this implies > ≤ 	d(>)
and we always have the converse.
For equation (2.14), first note that (	d(x)⇒ d) ≤ (x⇒ d) is equivalent to [x∧(	d(x)⇒
d)] ≤ d by (B.1). But this follows from x∧ (	d(x)⇒ d) ≤ 	d(x)∧ (	d(x)⇒ d) ≤ d by (2.5)
and (2.1). Second note that (x⇒ d) ≤ (	d(x)⇒ d) is equivalent to [	d(x) ∧ (x⇒ d)] ≤ d
by (B.1). But since 	dx = (x⇒ d)⇒ d, this follows from (2.1).
Now we formally justify the claim, made initially in §3 but used throughout the paper,
that there are uniform witnesses to the reductions in (2.4)-(2.14). In the statement of this
proposition, recall that the ample relational signature for pcas was introduced immediately
after Proposition 3.2.
Proposition B.3. Suppose that t(x), s(x) are two terms in the signature of Heyting preal-
gebras. Suppose that EHP proves t(x) ≤ s(x). Then there is a closed term τ in the ample
relational signature of pcas such that for all pcas A and all non-empty sets X and all f in
F(X ), one has τ : t(f) s(f).
Proof. In the context of this proof, for a ∈ A let’s write a : t(f)  s(f) as a : t(f) ≤ s(f).
Let’s further inductively define a : ϕ(f) for all a from A and all formulas ϕ(x) of EHP as
follows:
a : ϕ(f) ∧ ψ(f) iff a = p0a0a1 ∧ a0 : ϕ(f) and a1 : ψ(f)(B.4)
a : ϕ(f) ∨ ψ(f) iff (a = pkb ∧ b : ϕ(f)) or (a = pk˘b ∧ b : ψ(f))(B.5)
a : ϕ(f)⇒ ψ(f) iff ∀ b ∈ A, if b : ϕ(f) then ab : ψ(f).(B.6)
and where we say that that no b from A is such that b : ⊥. It then suffices to show by
induction on length of proofs that if EHP, ϕ0(x), . . . , ϕn(x) ` ψ(x), then there is closed
term τ such that for all pcas A and all non-empty sets X and all f in F(X ), one has
τ : (ϕ0(f)∧· · ·∧ϕn(f))⇒ ψ(f). To aid in readability, we’ll write Φ(x) for ϕ0(x)∧· · ·∧ϕn(x),
and we’ll drop the free variables from Φ, ϕ, ψ when not needed.
One base case is where ψ is one of the axioms of Heyting prealgebras, which are taken
care of by the closed terms e1, . . . , e12 mentioned immediately after Definition 3.9. Another
base case is where ψ is one of the ϕk, in which case we may take τ to be an appropriate
projection function.
The induction steps correspond to the introduction and elimination rules of the intu-
itionistic propositional calculus IPC and the substitution rule. For the “and” introduction
rule, by Proposition 3.2, choose τ such that ττ0τ1x = p(τ0x)(τ1x). Then τi : Φ⇒ ψi implies
ττ0τ1 : Φ ⇒ (ψ0 ∧ ψ1). Similarly, for the “and” elimination rule, by Proposition 3.2 choose
τi such that τiτx = pi(τx). Then τ : Φ⇒ (ψ0 ∧ ψ1) implies τiτ : Φ⇒ ψi.
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For the “or” introduction rule, by Proposition 3.2 choose τ, τ ′ such that ττ0x = pk(τ0x)
and τ ′τ1x = pk˘(τ1x). Then τ0 : Φ⇒ ψ0 implies ττ0 : Φ⇒ (ψ0∨ψ1), while τ1 : Φ⇒ ψ1 implies
τ ′τ1 : Φ ⇒ (ψ0 ∨ ψ1). For the “or” elimination rule, by Proposition 3.2 choose ι such that
ιxyz = xyz, so that ιkab = kab = a and ιk˘ab = k˘ab = b, so that ι serves to distinguish cases.
By Proposition 3.2, choose τ ′ such that τ ′στ0τ1x = (ι(p0(σx))τ0τ1)(px(p1(σx))). Suppose
that σ : Φ⇒ (ψ0∨ψ1) and τi : (Φ∧ψi)⇒ ξ. Suppose that x : Φ. Then σx : (ψ0∨ψ1). Then
σx = pky for y : ψ0 or σx = pk˘y for y : ψ1. In the former case ι(p0(σx))τ0τ1 = ιkτ0τ1 = τ0 and
px(p1(σx)) = px(p1(pky)) = pxy, so that in sum τ
′στ0τ1x = τ0(pxy) and clearly τ0(pxy) : ξ.
The argument in the latter case is analogous.
For the “arrow” introduction rule, by Proposition 3.2 choose τ ′ such that τ ′τxy = τ(pxy).
Then τ : (Φ ∧ ϕ)⇒ ψ implies τ ′τ : Φ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ). For the elimination rule, τ : Φ⇒ ϕ and
σ : Φ⇒ (ϕ⇒ ψ) together imply sστ : Φ⇒ ψ.
For the ex falso rule, suppose that σ : Φ ⇒ ⊥. Since no b from A is such that b : ⊥, it
follows from (B.6) that there is no a such that a : Φ, since otherwise b = σa would be such
that b : ⊥. Hence, it follows that σ : Φ⇒ ψ for any ψ, again by (B.6).
For the substitution rule, suppose that EHP+ Φ(x) ` ψ(x) with σ being a witness to the
inductive hypothesis, so that for all pcas A and all non-empty sets X and all f in F(X ) one
has σ : Φ(f) ⇒ ψ(f). Let t(y) be a term in the signature of Heyting prealgebras. Then by
taking f = t(g), one has σ : Φ(t(g))⇒ ψ(t(g)) for all pcas A and all non-empty sets X and
all g in F(X ).
C Appendix: McCarty’s Theorem
The purpose of this brief appendix is to present a self-contained proof of Proposition 9.1
and Theorem 9.2. For references to McCarty’s original work, see the discussion prior to the
statements of these results in §9. We begin with the proof of Proposition 9.1:
Proof. So it suffices to find ρ, σ, τ, ι (for “reflexivity”, “symmetry,” “transitivity”, and “in-
discernability”) such that for all a, b, c, a′, b′ from V Aκ we have ρ : >  ‖a = a‖, σ : ‖a =
b‖ ‖b = a‖, τ : ‖a = b‖∧‖b = c‖ ‖a = c‖, ι : ‖a = a′‖∧‖b = b′‖∧‖a ∈ b‖ ‖a′ ∈ b′‖.
For ρ, by the recursion theorem [van Oosten, 2008, Proposition 1.3.4 p. 12], choose an
index j such that jn = pn(pjj). We show that pjj ∈ ‖a = a‖ for all a ∈ V Aκ by induction
on rank, so that we can set ρn = pjj. Suppose it holds for all sets in V Aκ of lower rank than
a. Suppose that 〈n, c〉 ∈ a. Then c has lower rank than a, so pjj ∈ ‖c = c‖. Then we have
pn(pjj) ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖, and so jn = pn(pjj) ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖. Since 〈n, c〉 ∈ a was arbitrary, we thus
have j ∈ p0‖a = a‖. A similar argument shows j ∈ p1‖a = a‖ and so pjj ∈ ‖a = a‖.
Symmetry is trivial since it is witnessed by σ(pe0e1) = pe1e0, which exists by Proposi-
tion 3.2.
For transitivity, by Proposition 3.2, choose ℘ from A such that ℘uvwxy = u(v(w(xy))).
By the recursion theorem [van Oosten, 2008, Proposition 1.3.4 p. 12], choose τ such that
(p0τ)(p(pe0e1)(pe
∗
0e
∗
1))n = p(℘p0e
∗
0p0e0n)(τ(p(p1(e0n))(℘p1e
∗
0p0e0n)))
(p1τ)(p(pe0e1)(pe
∗
0e
∗
1))n = p(℘p0e1p0e
∗
1n)(τ(p(p1(e
∗
1n))(℘p1e1p0e
∗
1n)))
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We argue by induction on rank. So suppose that pe0e1 ∈ ‖a = b‖ and pe∗0e∗1 ∈ ‖b = c‖. We
must show that (p0τ)(p(e0e1)p(e
∗
0e
∗
1)) ∈ p0‖a = c‖ and (p1τ)p((e0e1)p(e∗0e∗1)) ∈ p1‖a = c‖.
We focus on the first since the other is similar. For this we must show that if 〈n, d〉 ∈ a then
(p0τ)(p(e0e1)p(e
∗
0e
∗
1))n ∈ ‖d ∈ c‖. So suppose that 〈n, d〉 ∈ a. Since e0 ∈ p0‖a = b‖, we have
that e0n ∈ ‖d ∈ b‖. Let e0n = pn0n1. Since pn0n1 ∈ ‖d ∈ b‖ there is d′ with 〈n0, d′〉 ∈ b
and n1 ∈ ‖d = d′‖. Since 〈n0, d′〉 ∈ b and e∗0 ∈ p0‖b = c‖, we have e∗0n0 ∈ ‖d′ ∈ c‖.
Then e∗0n0 = pm0m1 and there is d
′′ with 〈m0, d′′〉 ∈ c and m1 ∈ ‖d′ = d′′‖. By induction
hypothesis τ(pn1m1) ∈ ‖d = d′′‖. Then ∃ d′′ (〈m0, d′′〉 ∈ c ∧ τ(pn1m1) ∈ ‖d = d′′‖). Hence
pm0τ(pn1m1) ∈ ‖d ∈ c‖. Now, note that m0 = p0(e∗0n0) = p0(e∗0(p0(e0n))) = ℘p0e∗0p0e0n, and
n1 = p1(e0n) and m1 = p1(e
∗
0n0) = p1(e
∗
0(p0(e0n))) = ℘p1e
∗
0p0e0n. From this and what was
said earlier in the paragraph, we are then done with the verification that τ is the witnesses
to transitivity.
Now it remains to define ι. So apply Proposition 3.2 to obtain ι0 and ι such that ι0e0e1e
′
1 =
τ(p(σ(pe0e1)e
′
1)), ιe0e1e
∗
0e
∗
1e
′
0e
′
1 = p(p0(e
∗
0e
′
0))(τ(p(ι0e0e1e
′
1)((p1(e
∗
0e
′
0))))). So suppose that
pe0e1 ∈ ‖a = a′‖ and pe∗0e∗1 ∈ ‖b = b′‖ and pe′0e′1 ∈ ‖a ∈ b‖. It suffices to show that
ιe0e1e
∗
0e
∗
1e
′
0e
′
1 ∈ ‖a′ ∈ b′‖. Since pe′0e′1 ∈ ‖a ∈ b‖, there is c such that 〈e′0, c〉 ∈ b and e′1 ∈
‖a = c‖. Since pe0e1 ∈ ‖a = a′‖ we have τ(p(σ(pe0e1))e′1) ∈ ‖a′ = c‖, or what is the same
ι0e0e1e
′
1 ∈ ‖a′ = c‖. Now, since e∗0 ∈ p0‖b = b′‖ and 〈e′0, c〉 ∈ b, it follows that e∗0e′0 ∈ ‖c ∈ b′‖.
If we write e∗0e
′
0 = p`0`1 then it follows that there is c
′ with 〈`0, c′〉 ∈ b′ and `1 ∈ ‖c = c′‖.
Since ι0e0e1e
′
1 ∈ ‖a′ = c‖ and `1 ∈ ‖c = c′‖ we have that τ(p(ι0e0e1e′1)(`1)) ∈ ‖a′ = c′‖. Since
`i = pi(e
∗
0e
′
0), we thus have ∃ c′ 〈(p0(e∗0e′0), c′〉 ∈ b′ ∧ τ(p(ι0e0e1e′1)(p1(e∗0e′0))) ∈ ‖a′ = c′‖,
which is to say that ιe0e1e
∗
0e
∗
1e
′
0e
′
1 ∈ ‖a′ ∈ b′‖.
Before going onto the proof of Theorem 9.2, we need only one small preliminary propo-
sition, which is from McCarty [1984] Lemma 6.2 p. 92.
Proposition C.1.
(i) For all b ∈ V Aα and all c ∈ V Aκ , if ‖c ∈ b‖ ≡ > then c ∈ V Aβ for some β < α.
(ii) If a ∈ V Aα and ‖a = b‖ ≡ >, then b ∈ V Aα .
(iii) If β < α then V Aβ ⊆ V Aα .
Proof. The proof of (i)-(iii) is by simultaneous induction on α. The zero and limit steps are
trivial. So suppose the result holds for α; we show that it holds for α + 1.
For (i), suppose that b ∈ V Aα+1. Then b ⊆ ω × V Aα . Suppose that ‖c ∈ b‖ ≡ >. Choose
pe0e1 ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖, so that there is d with 〈e0, d〉 ∈ b and e1 ∈ ‖c = d‖. Then d ∈ V Aα and so
by the induction hypothesis for (ii) we have that c ∈ V Aα .
For (ii), suppose that a ∈ V Aα+1 and that ‖a = b‖ ≡ > with witness j ∈ ‖a = b‖. Suppose
that 〈e, d〉 ∈ b. It suffices to show that d ∈ V Aα since then we would have b ∈ V Aα+1. Recall that
in the proof of Proposition 9.1, we showed that there is an index i0 such that i0 ∈ ‖d = d‖
for all a ∈ V Aκ . Then 〈e, d〉 ∈ b implies pei0 ∈ ‖d ∈ b‖. Then by appeal to V Aκ being a
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uniform P (A)-valued structure and substitution therein (Proposition 6.4 in conjunction with
Proposition 9.1), choose k0 such that for all u, v, w one has k0 ∈ ‖(u ∈ v ∧ w = v)⇒ u ∈ w‖.
Then k0p(pei0)j ∈ ‖d ∈ a‖. Then by the induction hypothesis for (i) and (iii), we have that
d ∈ V Aα .
For (iii), it suffices by induction hypothesis to show that V Aα ⊆ V Aα+1. So suppose that
b ∈ V Aα , and suppose that 〈e, c〉 ∈ b. Then pei0 ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖ and so by (i) there is β < α such
that c ∈ V Aβ and so by induction hypothesis we have c ∈ V Aα . Hence b ⊆ A × V Aα which is
just to say that b is an element of V Aα+1.
Here, finally, is the proof of Theorem 9.2, which of course resembles the proof that the
axioms of set theory are valid on Boolean-valued models from e.g. [Bell, 1985, pp. 37 ff]:
Proof. By Proposition 6.13, it suffices to show that the axioms of IZF are valid. Recall that
in the proof of Proposition 9.1, we showed that there is an index i0 such that i0 ∈ ‖a = a‖
for all a ∈ V Aκ . This index i0 is fixed throughout this proof.
To verify extensionality, by Proposition 3.2 choose f, h such that fen = epni0 and
hpe0e1 = p(fe0)(fe1). Suppose pe0e1 ∈
⋂
c∈V Aκ (‖c ∈ a⇒ c ∈ b‖∧‖c ∈ b⇒ c ∈ a‖). We must
show that hpe0e1 ∈ ‖a = b‖, or what is the same that fe0 ∈ p0‖a = b‖ and fe1 ∈ p1‖a = b‖.
This is equivalent to showing that 〈n, c〉 ∈ a implies fe0n = e0pni0 ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖ and
〈n, c〉 ∈ b implies fe1n = e1pni0 ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖. We verify the first since the proof of
the other is identical. So suppose that 〈n, c〉 ∈ a. Then taking d = c we trivially have
∃ d (〈n, d〉 ∈ a ∧ i0 ∈ ‖c = d‖). Then pni0 ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖. Since e0 ∈ p0‖c ∈ a ⇒ c ∈ b‖ we
have that e0pni0 ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖, so that we are now done verifying extensionality.
For pairing, suppose that a, b are members of V Aα . Fix an element e0 of A. Then
c = {〈e0, a〉 ∪ 〈e0, b〉} is a member of V Aα+1. By Proposition 3.2, consider h such that hn =
p(pe0i0)(pe0i0). Then we may verify that h : >  ‖a ∈ c‖ ∧ ‖b ∈ c‖. For, by setting d = a
and d′ = b we have ∃ d (〈e0, d〉 ∈ c ∧ i0 ∈ ‖d = a‖) and ∃ d′ (〈e0, d′〉 ∈ c ∧ i0 ∈ ‖d = b‖).
This finishes the verification of pairing.
For the union axiom, let a in V Aκ be given and then set u = {〈n, c〉 : n ∈ ‖∃ x (c ∈ x ∧ x ∈
a)‖}. Then u is in V Aκ by Proposition C.1. By Proposition 3.2, choose f such that fn = pni0.
Then we show that f is the witness to the reduction ‖∃ x (c ∈ x ∧ x ∈ a)‖ ≤ ‖c ∈ u‖.
So suppose that n is in ‖∃ x (c ∈ x ∧ x ∈ a)‖. Then by taking d = c we have that
∃ d (〈n, d〉 ∈ u ∧ i0 ∈ ‖c = d‖). Then fn = pni0 ∈ ‖c ∈ u‖.
For power set, let a in V Aκ be given and set P
A(a) = {〈n, c〉 : n ∈ ‖c ⊆ a‖}. By
Proposition C.1, choose β < κ such that b ∈ V Aκ and ‖b ∈ a‖ ≡ > implies b ∈ V Aβ . Supposing
that 〈n, c〉 ∈ PA(a), we first show that c ∈ V Aβ+1. So suppose that 〈e, b〉 ∈ c. Then taking
d = b we have ∃ d 〈e, d〉 ∈ c ∧ i0 ∈ ‖b = d‖, so that pei0 ∈ ‖b ∈ c‖. Then by hypothesis on
n, we have that npei0 ∈ ‖b ∈ a‖. Hence ‖b ∈ a‖ ≡ > and thus b ∈ V Aβ . Thus indeed c ∈ V Aβ+1
for all 〈n, c〉 ∈ PA(a). Hence PA(a) ∈ V Aβ+2. Now consider, just as in the verification of the
union axiom, the element f such that fn = pni0. Then we show that f is the witness to the
reduction ‖c ⊆ a‖ ≤ ‖c ∈ PA(a)‖. So suppose that n ∈ ‖c ⊆ a‖. Then taking d = c we have
that ∃ d (〈n, d〉 ∈ PA(a) ∧ i0 ∈ ‖c = d‖). Hence fn = pni0 ∈ ‖c ⊆ PA(a)‖.
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For separation, let a in V Aκ and a formula ϕ(x) in the signature be given, which perhaps
has parameters from V Aκ . Define b = {〈e0, d〉 : e0 ∈ ‖d ∈ a ∧ ϕ(d)‖}. Again by
similar appeal to Proposition C.1, b is an element of V Aκ . Then by appeal to V
A
κ being a
uniform P (A)-valued structure and substitution therein (Proposition 6.4 in conjunction with
Proposition 9.1), let g be an element witnessing the substitution ‖d ∈ a ∧ ϕ(d) ∧ c = d‖ ≤
‖c ∈ a ∧ ϕ(c)‖. Suppose that pe0e1 ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖. Then ∃ d (〈e0, d〉 ∈ b ∧ e1 ∈ ‖c = d‖). Then
by definition of b, we have e0 ∈ ‖d ∈ a ∧ ϕ(d)‖. Then g(pe0e1) ∈ ‖c ∈ a ∧ ϕ(c)‖. Hence
g is also a witness to the reduction ‖c ∈ b‖ ≤ ‖c ∈ a ∧ ϕ(c)‖. Conversely, suppose that
e0 ∈ ‖c ∈ a ∧ ϕ(c)‖. Then by taking d = c, we have that ∃ d (〈e0, d〉 ∈ b ∧ i0 ∈ ‖c = d‖).
Then pe0i0 ∈ ‖c ∈ b‖. Hence the element fe0 = pe0i0 is the witness to the reduction
‖c ∈ a ∧ ϕ(c)‖ ≤ ‖c ∈ b‖.
For collection, suppose that a from V Aκ is given and that ϕ(x, y) is a formula in the
signature, perhaps with parameters from V Aκ . Choose α such that ‖c ∈ a‖ ≡ > implies
c ∈ V Aα , and set Z = {c ∈ V Aα : ‖c ∈ a‖ ≡ >}. For each triple (c, e, k) such that c ∈ Z,
e ∈ ‖∀x ∈ a ∃ y ϕ(x, y)‖, k ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖, define γ(c, e, k) to be the least ordinal γ < κ such
that there is d ∈ V Aγ with ek ∈ ‖ϕ(c, d)‖. Then since κ is strongly inaccessible and satisfies
κ > |A|, choose β < κ such that β is strictly greater than all such γ(c, e, k). Let b = A×V Aβ
which is trivially an element of V Aκ . Fix an element e0 of A. Our desired e′ is given by
e′ek = p(pe0i0)(ek), which exists by Proposition 3.2. For suppose e ∈ ‖∀x ∈ a ∃ y ϕ(x, y)‖.
We must establish that e′e ∈ ‖∀ x ∈ a ∃ y ∈ b ϕ(x, y)‖. So suppose c is fixed and k ∈ ‖c ∈ a‖.
By construction of β, choose d ∈ V Aβ with ek ∈ ‖ϕ(c, d)‖. Then pe0i0 ∈ ‖d ∈ b‖ and so
p(pe0i0)(ek) ∈ ‖∃ y ∈ b ϕ(c, y)‖.
For the axiom of infinity, recall the elements n˜ from A from (9.6) and the elements n and
ω from V Aκ from (9.7). It suffices to show that there are e
′, e ∈ A such that e′ ∈ ‖0 ∈ ω‖ and
e ∈ ‖c ∈ ω ⇒ ∃ y (c ∈ y ∧ y ∈ ω)‖. For e′, simply take e′ = p0˜i0. Then we have 〈0˜, 0〉 ∈ ω
and i0 ∈ ‖0 = 0‖ and hence e′ ∈ ‖0 ∈ ω‖. Now we work on e. By appeal to V Aκ being a
uniform P (A)-valued structure and substitution therein (Proposition 6.4 in conjunction with
Proposition 9.1), choose k0 such that for all u, v, w one has k0 ∈ ‖(u ∈ v ∧ u = w)⇒ w ∈ v‖.
Using primitive recursion on Curry numerals [van Oosten, 2008, Proposition 1.3.5 p. 12], we
choose e such that epn˜e1 = p(k0p(pn˜i0)e1)(p(n˜+ 1)i0). Suppose that pe0e1 ∈ ‖c ∈ ω‖. Then
there is d such that 〈e0, d〉 ∈ ω and e1 ∈ ‖d = c‖. Then 〈e0, d〉 = 〈n˜, n〉 for some n < ω and
hence e1 ∈ ‖n = c‖. Since pn˜i0 ∈ ‖n ∈ n+ 1‖, we have k0(p(p(n˜i0))e1) ∈ ‖c ∈ n+ 1‖. Since
p(n˜+ 1)i0 ∈ ‖n+ 1 ∈ ω‖, we thus have that epn˜e1 = epe0e1 ∈ ‖∃ y (c ∈ y ∧ y ∈ ω)‖.
For the the induction schema, we need to show that there is e such that e ∈ ‖[∀ x (∀ y ∈
x ϕ(y)) ⇒ ϕ(x)] ⇒ (∀ x ϕ(x))‖. Let k0 such that for all a, b in V Aκ we have k0 ∈ ‖ϕ(b) ⇒
(b ∈ a⇒ ϕ(b))‖. By Proposition 3.2, choose f such that fem = mk0(em). By the recursion
theorem [van Oosten, 2008, Proposition 1.3.4 p. 12], choose an e such that em = fem =
mk0(em). Suppose that
(C.1) m ∈ ‖∀ x (∀ y ∈ x ϕ(y))⇒ ϕ(x)‖
We show by induction on α that a ∈ V Aα implies em ∈ ‖ϕ(a)‖. Suppose it holds for all
β < α. Suppose that a ∈ V Aα . Then we claim k0(em) ∈ ‖∀ y ∈ a ϕ(y)‖. For this claim,
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it suffices to show that for all b ∈ V Aκ we have k0em ∈ ‖b ∈ a ⇒ ϕ(b)‖. So suppose that
n ∈ ‖b ∈ a‖. Then by the second part of Proposition C.1, we have that b ∈ V Aβ for some
β < α. Then by induction hypothesis we have em ∈ ‖ϕ(b)‖. Then by definition of k0 we
have that k0(em) ∈ ‖b ∈ a⇒ ϕ(b)‖, which is what we wanted to show. So we’ve succeeded
in showing the claim. Then by the hypothesis on m recorded in equation (C.1), we have
mk0(em) ∈ ‖ϕ(a)‖, which by the choice of e implies that em ∈ ‖ϕ(a)‖, which is what we
wanted to show.
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